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Résumé de synthèse 
 
Les études présentées dans ce thèse, The Violence of Bearing Witness in Flannery O’Connor and 
Cormac McCarthy, portent sur les représentations narratives de l’acte de témoigner dans les 
textes des écrivains américains Flannery O'Connor et Cormac McCarthy. Plus précisement, 
j'identifie l'acte de témoigner comme étant une fonction essentielle du prophète et situe ensuite la 
représentation narrative de cet acte dans la tradition de la jérémiade américaine. Je débute alors 
mon étude de O’Connor en examinant son interprétation du rôle du prophète aussi bien dans ses 
textes que dans la société en générale et sa culture en particulier. Je place ensuite son corpus dans 
le contexte du mouvement des droits civiques des 1950s-60s et retrace l’évolution de ses 
personnages noirs à travers la progression d’un groupe de récits que je term « The Geranium 
Variations ». Mon analyse herméneutique de Blood Meridian emploie la typologie de la violence 
de Slavoj Žižek pour affirmer que, bien que le roman soit rempli de représentations vives de la 
violence, McCarthy démontre que la violence structurelle est à l’origine des flambées 
individuelles – c’est-à-dire de guerre, d’expansion territoriale agressive et de génocide 
sanctionné par l’État. De plus, mes études démontre que les descriptions excessives de violence 
du roman sont juxtaposées à une pénurie de description narrative dans la mesure où les 
représentations incessantes de violence tout au long du roman aboutissent à la mort non décrite 
du protagoniste, the kid. Enfin, je conclus que les allusions aux Écritures au tout début du roman 
prédit que the kid aura un rôle liminal dans le texte en tant que prophèt maudit qui a pour 
fonction de témoigner les horreurs indescriptibles de la nuit des temps. 
 
Mots-clés: Flannery O’Connor, Cormac McCarthy, littérature américaine, grâce, maledictions, 





This dissertation, The Violence of Bearing Witness in Flannery O’Connor and Cormac 
McCarthy, investigates the narrative expressions of bearing witness in the fiction of two writers 
of the American South: Flannery O’Connor and Cormac McCarthy. I identify the act of bearing 
witness as an essential function of the prophet and locate the narrative representation of this act 
within the tradition of the American jeremiad. I begin my study of O’Connor’s works by 
investigating her understanding of the significance of the role of the prophet in her writing as 
well as in modern society. I then situate O’Connor’s literary art within the context of the civil 
rights movement and trace the evolution of her treatment of Black characters through the 
progress of a group of stories I have termed the “Geranium Variations.” My hermeneutic 
analysis of Blood Meridian employs Slavoj Žižek’s typology of violence to argue that though the 
novel is replete with vivid portrayals of violence, the true horror with which McCarthy reckons is 
the structural violence that fosters the individual outbreaks of brutality, i.e. warfare, aggressive 
territorial expansion, and state-sanctioned genocide. I demonstrate that the novel’s excessive 
descriptions of violence are juxtaposed with an absence of description insofar as the relentless 
representations of gratuitous violence throughout the novel culminate in the unnarrated death of 
the protagonist, the kid. I conclude that the allusions to scripture in the opening sentences of the 
novel foretells the kid’s liminal role in the text as a cursed prophet whose function is to witness 
the unspeakable horrors of history.   
 
Keywords: Flannery O’Connor, Cormac McCarthy, American literature, prophets, curses, grace, 
epiphanies, violence, psychoanalysis, Old Testament. 
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In his book entitled The American Jeremiad, Sacvan Bercovitch identifies the New England 
jeremiad as "America's first distinctive literary genre" (6) and notes the persistent presence of the 
jeremiad's rhetorical style "throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in all forms of 
[literature]" (10-11). Indeed, from Henry David Thoreau and Walt Whitman, to Martin Luther 
King and James Baldwin, the prophetic character of the jeremiad has subsumed not only 
American letters, but the American ethos altogether. Yet, these American prophets are 
preoccupied not with answering questions of national identity, but rather, as Bercovitch notes, 
"almost in deliberate evasion of that question, the old prophetic refrain: 'When is our errand to be 
fulfilled? How long, O Lord, how long?'" (11).  
The "errand" here referenced is defined by Bercovitch, through Perry Miller, as "either a 
venture on another's behalf or a venture of one's own" (4). In the case of the Puritans, their errand 
began as a missionary venture on behalf of the Reformation, and then shifted, after the ousting of 
Cromwell's Protectorate and the social corruption that followed from their isolation, to the 
introspective venture of revealing a "meaning by themselves and out of themselves" (5). Thus, as 
the Puritans turned their focus inward, their errand became increasingly charged with self-
condemnation.  
As Bercovitch notes, however, despite the denunciations expressed in these jeremiads, 
the purpose of these sermons was not wholly one of reprimand. Bercovitch remarks that though 
the American jeremiad is rooted in the traditional European mode of lamentation whereby the 
depravity of man and the inevitable punishment to ensue was proclaimed from the pulpit, the 
sermon form practiced by the Puritans and beyond sounds "a different note" (7) insofar as the 
prophetic voices of the New World "joined lament and celebration in reaffirming America's 
mission" (11). The American jeremiad thus combines both threat and hope, both condemnation 
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and a prophetic vision of the good that is to come. As such, the rhetoric of the American 
jeremiad, continues Bercovitch, "posits a movement from promise to experience — from the 
ideal of community to the shortcomings of community life – and thence forward, with prophetic 
assurance, toward resolution that incorporates (as it transforms) both the promise and the 
condemnation" (16) with the goal of improving public life.  
The present dissertation seeks to explore the ambiguity that proceeds from the double 
valence of the prophetic errand of revealing both promise and condemnation. To this end, my 
research will examine the works of Flannery O’Connor and Cormac McCarthy, writers who, 
despite both raised Catholic and thus denominationally segregated from the Christianity of the 
New England Puritans, emerge from the distinctive literary genre of the American jeremiad 
insofar as their works engage with the prophetic task of bearing witness. Let it here be noted that 
to bear witness is not simply the passive act of observation, but, more properly, the dispensation 
of testimony and repudiation. I am therefore interested in investigating not only the portrayal of 
prophetic characters in the texts of O’Connor and McCarthy, but also in how each writer 
performs the part of prophet his or herself as they bear witness through their works to their 
communities, to their culture, and to history. While their writing does not take the form of the 
jeremiad in the way that, say, some of James Baldwin’s best writing does, both writers, I argue, 
nonetheless employ a prophetic vision that, like the American Puritan jeremiad, makes “anxiety 
its end as well as its means” (23). As Bercovitch writes,  
Crisis was the social norm [the American Puritan jeremiad] sought to inculcate. The very 
concept of errand, after all, implied a state of unfulfillment. The future, though divinely 
assured, was never quite there, and New England’s Jeremiahs set out to provide a sense 
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of insecurity that would ensure the outcome. Denouncing or affirming, their vision fed on 
the distance between promise and fact. (23) 
I thus intend to show that the anxiety, or crisis, that the American jeremiad seeks to inculcate 
manifests itself in O’Connor and McCarthy’s texts in the form of violence, which for the former 
is a violence that is steeped in mystery, while for the latter, violence is at once promise and fact. 
 
O’Connor’s Prophetic Vision 
Given that O’Connor was much more forthcoming than McCarthy in her role as a public 
intellectual, my understanding of the prophetic function of both writers is largely contingent 
upon the former’s work on the subject, and so I have laminated my study of the prophetic in 
O’Connor upon my reading of McCarthy. O’Connor’s fascination with the role of the prophet is 
well documented in much of her writing, from her fiction to her personal correspondence, as she 
returned to the topic repeatedly over the course of her career as a writer and, to a certain extent, a 
public intellectual. Indeed, though she has only two novels to her name, The Violent Bear It 
Away and Wise Blood, both portray the lives of backwoods prophets, from Francis Marion 
Tarwater who is raised by his great uncle to inherit the role backwoods prophet, to Hazel Motes 
and his evangelising for the “Church without Christ.” The character-type features prominently in 
her short fiction as well, particularly the late stories collected in her posthumous Everything That 
Rises Must Converge, suggesting that her interest in prophets amplified as she matured both 
creatively and intellectually. But the prophetic is not simply thematic fodder for her texts; 
O’Connor not only wrote about prophets, but wrote as a prophet, for she believed that writers, 
insofar as their “business is to contemplate experience” (MM 84), are characterized “not by 
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[their] function but by [their] vision” (47), which, as she notes in “Catholic Novelists and Their 
Reader”, is a prophetic vision. 
Karl Martin’s “Flannery O’Connor’s Prophetic Imagination” provides a thorough 
investigation of the development of the significance of the prophetic figure to O’Connor’s 
philosophy and literary aesthetic, indicating that her understanding of the role of the prophet was 
cultivated through years of close study: 
O'Connor's fiction is closely related to, and informed by, her systematic study of the role 
of the prophet in culture, and her fiction exhibits prophetic tendencies in accordance with 
the writings of not only the significant theologians of prophecy whose works she read and 
often reviewed but also the writings of later theologians. (34) 
Martin supports his analysis of O’Connor’s prophetic imagination with the work of theologian 
Walter Brueggemann whose own study of the role of the prophet focuses on how prophetic texts 
from the Old Testament speak to modern problems, “a position,” as Martin notes, “latent in the 
works of the scholars O’Connor reviewed and latent as well in O’Connor’s own fiction” (35). 
Brueggemann further argues that there is a critical link between the Old Testament narratives of 
the prophets and social change insofar as “The task of prophetic ministry is to nurture, nourish, 
and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness and perception of the 
dominant culture around us” (qtd. in Martin 35). The prophet’s responsibility is thus to articulate 
the suffering of the marginalized — or, viewed from O’Connor’s perspective, of the grotesque 
freaks and the misfits. Martin goes on to summarize three tasks that follow this responsibility, as 
conceptualized by Brueggemann: to present symbols that adequately reflect the suffering that has 
been ignored and denied, to bear witness to said suffering, and to “speak metaphorically but 
concretely about the real deathliness that hovers over us and gnaws within us…” (qtd. in Martin 
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38). Yet, the prophet is not simply a political spokesperson or a star witness for the oppressed. 
Rather, as Martin notes, and as both O’Connor and McCarthy portray in and/or through their 
fiction, the prophet can more accurately be understood as a poet whose office is that of 
revelation. The prophet’s message must therefore use language that simultaneously invigorates 
and amazes, which is to say language that incites affect. Or, as O’Connor famously puts it in 
“The Fiction Writer and His Country,” “to the hard of hearing you shout, and for the almost-blind 
you draw large and startling figures” (MM 34). Only then can the writer of fiction attempt to 
portray “mystery as it is incarnated in human life” (176).  
Consequently, the predisposition of modern man to worship reason, and thus to separate 
mystery from nature, is one of O’Connor’s great grievances with the Age of Enlightenment. “Our 
age not only does not have a very sharp eye for the almost imperceptible intrusions of grace,” she 
writes in “On Her Own Work,” “it no longer has much feeling for the nature of the violences 
which precede and follow them” (MM 112). The writer of fiction who produces successful 
stories, insofar as success relates to producing affect through artistic mimesis, therefore must 
complete the three prophetic tasks outlined by Brueggemann: to symbolize, to bear witness, and 
to “speak metaphorically but concretely.” In this sense, O’Connor’s prophetic responsibility as a 
writer mirrors that of her prophetic characters — that is, the function of offering a gesture that 
transcends “any neat allegory that might have been intended […]. It would be a gesture which 
somehow [makes] contact with mystery” (111). The contact with mystery that O’Connor here 
describes is a contact with the Divine life, a revelation of the presence of grace which, if 
recognized and if accepted, can only be earned “at a considerable cost” (112). In her fiction, this 
considerable cost is typically levied in some form of brutal violence, often leading to death. 
From the murders in “A Good Man is Hard to Find” to Tanner’s defilement in “Judgment Day,” 
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violence erupts mysteriously, emerges from an unknowable evil, and is frequently “an action in 
which the devil has been the unwilling instrument of grace” (118). As she goes on to explain, 
“violence is strangely capable of returning [her] characters to reality and preparing them to 
accept their moment of grace. Their heads are so hard that almost nothing else will do the work” 
(112). Thus, due to the obduracy of her characters, and, by extension, of the masses made numb 
to mystery by modern life, the prophetic act of revelation is not to enlighten, but to provoke.  
In a contemporary review of Blood Meridian for the Sewanee Review, Walter Sullivan 
notes that McCarthy shares O’Connor’s understanding of the proper application of violence in 
literary art. “For O’Connor,” he writes, “[violence] is engendered by a sense of good and evil 
[and the] same is true [for] McCarthy” (653). Like O’Connor, he adds, McCarthy understands 
“evil in all its dimensions, and this makes him a prophet” (653). Thus, the terra damnata that he 
portrays, and the fiends with which he populates it, coalesce to reveal to readers “the world in 
which we live” (653). As George Shulman observes in “Thinking Authority Democratically: 
Prophetic Practices, White Supremacy, and Democratic Politics,” prophets are “firmly persuaded 
about the conditions they state, [and] in their frustrated rage at us, [are] punitive in their 
insistence that we will suffer because we refuse to face (the true meaning of) our situation” 
(726). Considered through the prism of the Southern Gothic, the artistic mode to which both 
O’Connor’s McCarthy’s work is often attributed, the true meaning of the situation entails the 
deeply troubling and haunting history of the South and South-West, from the generational trauma 
of chattel slavery and systematic genocide of Aboriginal peoples, to the long-lasting damage 
caused by the Mexican and Civil Wars. While O’Connor, for her part, refuses to classify her 
writing as being strictly Southern, she acknowledges that the South’s social context “cannot be 
left out by the Southern writer” as he is “forced on all sides to make his gaze extend beyond the 
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surface, beyond mere problems, until it touches that realm which is the concern of prophets and 
poets” (MM 198, 45). The writer, as prophet, must wrestle with the force of the South’s social 
context, the prophetic gesture thus serving a dual function: first, to make contact with mystery, 
and second, to voice the unspeakable—that which cannot be said, only represented. This dual 
function recalls Brueggeman’s second prophetic task of bearing witness, a task that entails not 
only the act of testifying, but of repudiating that which is witnessed. As Shulman writes,  
[Prophets] testify not to an absolute truth but to what we forget, both a god of justice and 
those Toni Morrison calls "the disremembered and unaccounted for." Making present 
those we make absent and naming conduct whose meaning we deny, witnesses perform 
acknowledgments through testimony that can reconstitute a political body haunted by 
what and who it forgets. (720) 
As witness, the prophet’s position in society is simultaneously marginal and integral as he 
necessarily exists outside of the status quo, yet pronounces revelations that are meant for the 
masses. The prophet thus occupies a liminal space insofar as he bears witness to what has 
happened and announces what will (or can) happen if his testimony is not taken seriously. 
Further to this point, Shulman observes that in the Greek, Hebrew, and Islamic traditions, the 
prophet has a social role of mediating “between human beings and powerful realities they neither 
understand nor control to address the vicissitudes and fateful choices of a community” (712). In 
the works of O’Connor and McCarthy, the fateful choices of the community are both historical 
and spiritual, temporal and eternal, requiring of prophets, and, as O’Connor notes, novelists, to 
see “near things with their extensions of meaning and thus [to see] far things close up” (MM 44). 
Wendy Piper notes in Misfits and Marble Fauns that O’Connor’s writing, emerging as it 
does from the American romance tradition, strives to represent a “balance of inner and outer 
	 9	
worlds” (74). Piper elucidates that “the mimetic aim of the romancer [is] not to faithfully 
describe external reality, but rather to reveal mystery, conflict or contradiction, within the 
individual” (75). Like Hawthorne before her, and McCarthy after her, O’Connor’s narrative art is 
thus concerned less with realism than it is with revealing hidden, or disavowed, truths. Indeed, 
according to O’Connor, a dogmatic demand for realism in fiction has the obverse effect of 
limiting “rather than [broadening] the novel’s scope” (MM 39), and so “a literature which mirrors 
society would be not fit guide for it” (46). This predilection for producing narratives of 
revelation rather than of verisimilitude indicates that the aims of the romancer are therefore 
congruent with those of the writer with prophetic vision. O’Connor best describes the writer’s 
prophetic role in her lecture “Catholic Novelists and Their Readers” when she discusses the 
prophetic vision necessary for writing about human nature:  
[The fiction writer’s] kind of vision is a prophetic vision. Prophecy, which is dependent 
on the imaginative and not the moral faculty, need not be a matter of predicting the 
future. The prophet is a realist of distances, and it is this kind of realism that goes into 
great novels. It is the realism which does not hesitate to distort appearances in order to 
show a hidden truth. (MM 179) 
The writer with prophetic vision writes not about that which does happen in the world, but about 
that which can happen; must show readers not only what they are, “but what [they] have been 
and what [they] could become” (118). O’Connor notes that this inclination towards portraying 
the possible rather than the probable is what demarks the orthodox Christian writer, insofar as he 
exists in a universe that contains both the natural and the supernatural, from the naturalist. 
Consequently, this means that the orthodox Christian writer’s “obligation to portray the natural,” 
she argues, “is [not] less; it means it is greater” (175). It is thus the orthodox Christian writer’s 
	 10	
ability to discern the supernatural that is enfolded within the natural world that allows him to see 
“near things with their extension of meaning” (44), and, in turn, to reveal hidden truths through 
the distortion of appearances. Accordingly, O’Connor’s narrative art strives for mimesis by 
means of distortions, achieving this ambition through the narrative mode of the grotesque. As she 
notes, however, the ‘grotesque’ is typically a pejorative term born of regional bias: “Of course, I 
have found that anything that comes out of the South is going to be called grotesque by the 
Northern reader, unless it is grotesque, in which case it is going to be called realistic” (40). 
Undeterred by such prejudices, O’Connor nevertheless understands the value of the grotesque to 
her narrative project, particularly with regards to the depiction of her backwoods prophets insofar 
as “her distorted characterizations have an ‘inner coherence’ that fits the frame of romance, if 
they do not cohere to a ‘social framework’ or to social expectations” (Piper 76). Further to this 
point, O’Connor emphasizes that her portrayal of backwoods prophets is in no way meant to be 
ironic or satirical, that their position on the margins of the society she exposes in her fiction does 
not mean that their function in her narrative structure is marginal. “When you write about 
backwoods prophets,” she explains, “it is very difficult to get across to the modern reader that 
you take these people seriously, that you are not making fun of them, but that their concerns are 
your own and, in your judgment, central to human life” (MM 204). Prophets and prophecy are 
therefore not simply one of many narrative techniques that O’Connor employs in her texts, but 
are indeed central to her artistic ambitions, which, as I will show, are echoed in the works of 
McCarthy. 
 
Prophets Failed, False, and Gone Wrong 
Farrell O’Gorman’s essay “Violence, Nature, and Prophecy in Flannery O’Connor and Cormac 
McCarthy” provides important critical support for my own research on the prophetic in 
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O’Connor and McCarthy. As the critic notes, much of the scholarship that engages with both 
writers is chiefly concerned with, on the one hand, their shared Southern provenance (O’Connor 
hailing from Georgia, and McCarthy from Tennessee), and on the second hand, with their 
“penchant for violence,” and are consequently apt to “casually link them as practitioners of a 
“Southern Gothic” mode of fiction” (144). O’Gorman’s work, however, provides a more in depth 
comparison of the two writers and suggests that much of McCarthy’s writing owes as great a 
debt (if not greater) to O’Connor’s work as it does to William Faulkner, Herman Melville, or 
Homer. Indeed, O’Gorman posits that some of McCarthy’s characters, such as Chigurh from No 
Country for Old Men, or the kid from Blood Meridian, are counterparts to (if not rewritings of) 
O’Connor’s Misfit or Hazel Motes. As O’Gorman writes, “understanding McCarthy’s killer 
Chigurh in relation to O’Connor’s Misfit—both insistently self-reliant males who engage in 
extended dialogues with their ultimate female victims—is crucial to understanding the role of the 
failed prophet therein” (145). O’Gorman further argues that McCarthy’s prophets are 
consistently shaped in relation to O’Connor’s, and suggests that The Violent Bear It Away is a 
“crucial intertext (or pre-text) for McCarthy’s work” (144) and that the construction of Blood 
Meridian’s the kid owes much to Francis Marion Tarwater, as well as Hazel Motes of Wise 
Blood:  
At the novel’s beginning the protagonist, the kid, at least superficially resembles Hazel 
Motes as “his eyes lay dark and tunneled in a caved and haunted face” (BM 21); he is also 
like Motes in that he is homeless, a prodigal entering a new and nightmarish landscape 
where he seems hell-bent on doing some things he never has done before (CW 5). But 
McCarthy’s kid is more insistently linked to Francis Marion Tarwater in his identity as a 
fourteen-year-old runaway whose mother has died in childbirth; his rape by a Satanic 
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antagonist, the judge, at the novel’s conclusion; and his persistent role in the failed 
baptism motif that runs throughout Blood Meridian. (147)  
While my own research will not engage in a comparative reading of O’Connor and McCarthy’s 
works, I am interested in exploring how each writer complicates, or disrupts, the prophetic figure 
in their texts. It is important to make the distinction, however, between the failed prophets that 
are the focus of O’Gorman’s essay, and both the false prophets and the prophets gone wrong that 
I shall examine in the pages to come. Moreover, while O’Gorman views the kid as one such 
failed prophet, my work will show that Blood Meridian’s spectral protagonist does not fail to 
become a prophet so much as his prophetic impulses are futile. This is not to say that my reading 
absolves him of his participation in any of the horrific violence portrayed in the novel, but rather, 
that his demise is preordained, that he was never meant to actualize his prophetic purpose. In this 
sense, the kid embodies the state of unfulfillment inherent to the concept of the errand. 
 
Grace Withheld  
D.H. Lawrence posits, in his essay Studies in Classic American Literature, that art has two 
functions: “First, it provides an emotional experience. And then, if we have the courage of our 
own feelings, it becomes a mine of practical truth” (14). Emotional reactions to art, argues 
Lawrence, are commonplace: “we have had them ad nauseam” (14). The more difficult, more 
vital task is to examine these emotional responses and attempt to interpret the truths that they 
might reveal, truths about our societies, about our cultures, and, indeed, about ourselves. But 
audiences are not often receptive to the truth, and will indeed vehemently reject it when that 
which is revealed challenges the status quo. This impulse to disavow is what leads O’Connor to 
draw such large and startling figures in her fiction, and why McCarthy’s prose is so relentlessly 
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poetic in its descriptions of the abhorrent—their narrative art commands strong emotional 
reactions from readers. 
Aristotle writes in Poetics that the purpose of the reader’s emotional reactions to artistic 
mimesis is to stimulate a state of catharsis: that is, the cleansing of excess emotional charges via 
the reaction to, and the interpretation of, narrative poetics. Consequently, artistic forms have the 
potential to be a source of moral and practical instruction whereby the faults and failures of 
characters reveal to the audience the universal truths of the human experience, in turn inspiring a 
redressing of social wrongs. Aristotle primarily treats the forms of epic poetry and tragedy, 
privileging the latter form for being more succinct than the former, which thus allows audiences 
to properly focus their attention on the nuances of the narrative content and thereby experience 
the principal emotions elicited from tragedy, which, he argues, are pity and fear and which are 
necessary for catharsis.  
The Violence of Bearing Witness aims to demonstrate how O’Connor’s short story 
“Judgment Day” and McCarthy’s novel Blood Meridian actively interrupt the reader’s cathartic 
release by omitting the culminating epiphanic moments of grace of their respective narratives. To 
this end, I claim that both the kid and Tanner provoke in readers emotions that overlap with the 
fear and pity that is meant to be elicited by tragedy, even if neither protagonist properly fits 
Aristotle’s character model of the tragic hero—that is, being not only good, but better than the 
man of real life. Thus, while neither character is particularly likeable—the kid maliciously 
violent and Tanner an alcoholic squatter—both are nevertheless pitiful in their desolation. For 
example, both protagonists are wretches who live in varying degrees of squalor, both are 
confronted and defeated by the decline of their respective ways of life, and both die in an 
ignominious fashion. Moreover, Aristotle notes that one of the primary means of eliciting pity is 
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via the typical narrative progression of the tragic hero’s fall from good fortune to bad fortune. 
The kid and Tanner, however, endure circumstances that regress from bad to worse, culminating 
in their deaths, which, significantly, both go unrepresented, or disnarrated, in their respective 
narratives, the reader thus denied access to each character’s dénouement. I suggest that this 
narrative withholding magnifies the misery with which the kid and Tanner have been 
characterized: they are so pitiful that they do not even deserve a proper resolution. Yet, if their 
deaths are deliberately anticlimactic, thereby obstructing emotional reactions to the narratives, 
then how are readers of Blood Meridian and “Judgment Day” meant to achieve catharsis? The 
answer is that they are not, or at least not entirely, for, as I will show, these narrative omissions 
point to the anxiety of unfulfillment that is inherent to the concept of the errand.  
 
Flannery O’Connor’s Black Prophets 
My first chapter is divided into two sections. The first half largely provides critical, theoretical, 
and contextual support for the second half, which is a close reading of a group of texts that I have 
termed the “Geranium Variations.” I begin the chapter with an overview of the critical reception 
of O’Connor’s fictional representations of the racial divide in the United States. My reference to 
said criticism is used to establish trends in O’Connor scholarship that I argue have limited the 
analysis and interpretation of her ultimate text, “Judgement Day.” I put forth the argument that 
though her fiction rarely engages directly with the issue of the subjugation of Black Americans, 
her late texts do deal with the topic in a more nuanced fashion. Moreover, I note that 
representations of Black characters evolve over the course of her career from simple, tertiary 
characters that are little more than spectres of the cultural landscape, to men and women who not 
only have agency, but are often smarter, or at least shrewder, than the white protagonists, 
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culminating with the arrival of the Black prophet in her late works. I identify “Everything That 
Rises Must Converge,” the opening and titular story of the collection, as a twin text to “Judgment 
Day,” the final story of the collection, and analyze the narrative details that establish O’Connor’s 
literary treatment of the tension between whites and blacks. I argue that the protagonist, Julian, is 
an illustration of one of O’Connor’s favourite character types, which is the college-educated 
idealist who believes himself to be smarter and more politically progressive than he in fact is, 
and who, ultimately, is punished in some form for his arrogance.  
My reading of Julian and his antecedents in Asbury and Rayber initiates an examination 
of the critical industry’s imperative to either denounce or defend O’Connor’s perceived racism. 
Consequently, I provide an analysis of the political and cultural posturing typical of the academic 
types that Julian, Asbury, and Rayber represent. I borrow from Michel Foucault’s model of the 
economy of the perverse implantation, which he develops in The History of Sexuality vol. 1, to 
generate what I term the incitement to diagnose racism. My ensuing discussion of the patronizing 
attitude of the well-meaning educated class attempts to outline the superficiality of the moralistic 
condemnations with which the examined O’Connor’s texts reckon, yet which are too often 
reproduced in critical investigations of her work.  
“O’Connor and The Black Prophetic Tradition” examines O’Connor’s collected letters to 
provide a historical context for her interpretation of racial politics and the Civil Rights 
Movement and her subsequent treatment of the topic in her fiction. Though many of her letters 
reveal her to have little time or patience for the most prominent voices of the Black community, 
including James Baldwin and Martin Luther King, I argue that her outlook has much in common 
with not only Baldwin and King, but with some of the more radical voices as well, such as Amiri 
Baraka and Malcolm X. Moreover, I note that her admiration for Muhammad Ali indeed 
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supports my premise insofar as Ali was Malcolm X’s most famous and most vociferous student. 
Thus, while I do not draw direct, irrefutable links between the Black prophets of her time and the 
Black prophets depicted in her late texts, I propose that she was at least indirectly exposed to the 
revelations of Black prophetic fire, and that the fervour of their prophesying is captured in both 
the woman on the bus in “Everything That Rises Must Converge,” and the New York actor in 
“Judgment Day.” 
The chapter’s second section embarks upon a close reading of the evolution of what I 
term O’Connor’s “Geranium Variations,” so called for the original incarnation of “Judgment 
Day,” which was the titular story from her master’s thesis The Geranium. Using Karl-Heinz 
Westarp’s Flannery O’Connor: Growing Craft: A Synoptic Variorum Edition of: The Geranium, 
and Exile in the East, Getting Home, Judgment Day, I trace the transformation of O’Connor’s 
source material as she repeatedly re-writes the same essential story over the course of her career. 
I pay special attention to the growth of her characters, Black and white, and argue that as the 
fundamental story is refined, so too is her representation of the Black characters who shift from 
the happy-go-lucky caricature of the earlier versions to the street-smart hustler and angry black 
man of the later versions. I conclude, however, that her portrayal of Black characters in her late 
texts, rather than simply being stereotypes, are in fact manifestations of prophets gone wrong.  
 
Bearing Witness to Violence in Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian 
My second chapter is also divided into two parts. The first part investigates the role of violence 
in Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian and attempts to argue that the true violence with which 
the novel concerns itself is not the sundry descriptions of bloodshed and destruction, but rather 
the structural violence that enables and normalizes such brutality. To this end, I employ Slavoj 
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Žižek’s typology of violence to parse through the McCarthy’s representations of brutal violence 
to attempt to discern the narrative purpose of said violence. Consequently, I put forth that 
McCarthy’s re-telling of the history of the American frontier has a dual purpose: on the one 
hand, it aims to de-romanticize the tropes of the American Western by revealing the barbarity of 
both the so-called Indians and the frontiersmen, or cowboys, as it were, while on the other, it 
draws a parallel between the cruelty of aggressive territorial expansion and genocide in the 19th 
century, and the horror of the American war in Vietnam roughly 100 years later, which, at the 
time of the novel’s production (late 70s to mid 80s), was also beginning to be simultaneously 
disavowed and romanticized in popular culture. 
 The second part of the chapter explores how the novel’s allusions to the curses of the 
Gibeonites and of Canaan, as described in the Old Testament, provide a backstory for the 
protagonist, the kid, who is otherwise a spectral figure who says very little and who functions 
mostly to shepherd the reader through the graphic and challenging narrative. Though the novel 
begins with his attempt to free himself of his family, and thus of his lineage, he is unable to 
completely divest himself of his inherited cursed and so wanders the terra damnata in search of a 
new identity. Lydia Cooper notes in No More Heroes that the kid “seems to make a journey that 
is a dark antithesis to the traditional pattern of the bildungsroman, which a young man leaves his 
father’s identity and home and ventures into his own future and fortune” (53). Cursed as he is, 
though, the kid’s departure from his father leads instead to an “unenlightening journey” (54). As 
a nameless participant of frontier violence, the story of his life is an allegory directed at all 
Americans who, though they may overtly oppose systemic violence, nevertheless benefit from it 
insofar as the economic and political infrastructures of their day-to-day lives are maintained by 
that very violence. As John Cant writes in Cormac McCarthy and the Myth of American 
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Exceptionalism, “the violence of Blood Meridian expresses an aspect of contemporary American 
life that many would have preferred to have suppressed” (159). The very purpose of Blood 
Meridian, and indeed of the kid, however, is to bear witness to that violence which most would 



















































Investigating the Role of the Prophet in 









“Some people have the notion that you read the story 
and then climb out of it into meaning, but for the fiction writer himself 
the whole story is the meaning, because it is an experience, not an abstraction.” 




















“The Topical is Poison” 
Prophets Failed and False Converge 
 
Precious few of Flannery O’Connor’s texts engage directly with the delicate issue of racial 
politics in American culture and society, which is to say the historical, and continued, systematic 
subjugation of Black individuals and communities in the United States of America. While myriad 
critics, from Ralph C. Wood to Alice Walker to Mark Greif, have explored the topic of race in 
O’Connor’s work and have offered insightful readings, most have engaged with the topic 
primarily as a sociological study, asking if the writer’s depiction of Black characters is racist or if 
her treatment of their plight is sensitive and nuanced enough, or if she herself was a racist, and so 
on. The present study’s critical interest is the evolution of O’Connor’s handling of the topic in 
her fiction throughout her career, and, more specifically, in how her Black characters evolve 
from ciphers to prophets. Given that the role of the prophet in culture is a significant aspect of 
O’Connor’s literary aesthetic, the emergence of Black prophets in her fiction invites close study. 
While O’Connor recognized the plight of Black Americans and understood the 
underlying complexities of any praxis of reparation, she nevertheless thought it an undertaking of 
indulgence to participate in symbolic displays of moral superiority, in art or otherwise, under the 
guise of social activism and liberal idealism. Her treatment of the issue in her fiction is therefore 
typically ambiguous because, as Alice Walker observes in “A South Without Myths,” her writing 
is “not about race at all, which is why it is so refreshing, coming, as it does, out of such 
a racial culture.” “If it can be said to be "about" anything,” Walker’s thought continues, “then it 
is "about" prophets and prophecy, "about" revelation, and "about" the impact of supernatural 
grace on human beings who don't have a chance of spiritual growth without it” (“A South 
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Without Myths”). O’Connor would further argue, however, that her writing is not about this 
racial culture to which Walker alludes either, which is to say that her writing is not about the 
South, even if her texts are largely set in the South, and are peopled by Southerners with the 
distinct voices and habits of their region. “As a fiction writer who is a Southerner,” she notes in 
“The Teaching of Literature,” “I use the idiom and the manners of the country I know, but I don’t 
consider that I write about the South” (MM 133-34). The point O’Connor attempts to make here 
is that writing from the South is not by necessity about the South. She does, however, concede 
elsewhere that the South, and all its cultural and historical baggage, cannot so easily be discarded 
by the Southern writer: “The image of the South, in all its complexity, is so powerful in us that it 
is a force which has to be encountered and engaged. The writer must wrestle with it, like Jacob 
with the Angel, until he has extracted a blessing” (198). Consequently, while her writing is not 
overtly about racial politics, or about the South, or about racial politics in the South, it does 
nevertheless wrestle with these topics, and it is this very wrestling that is the basis of my study of 
O’Connor’s body of work.      
So, if O’Connor’s writing is not about race, and she does not consider it to be, more 
generally, about the South, then what is her writing about? Must it be about anything? The 
abstract answer that O’Connor offers in “The Nature and Aim of Fiction” is that the writer of 
fiction’s goal is to contemplate experience (MM 84). She reiterates this idea, though very plainly, 
in “The Teaching of Literature,” stating that “the fiction writer writes about life” (122). In the 
same essay, a few pages later, she writes: “[good] fiction” deals not with the topical, but “with 
human nature. If it uses material that is topical, it still does not use it for a topical purpose” (126). 
To O’Connor, the production of stories that are preoccupied with the topical rather than with 
people or with the mysteries of life is a juvenile venture: 
	 22	
[Beginning fiction writers] are conscious of problems, not of people, of questions and 
issues, not of the texture of existence, of case histories and of everything that has a 
sociological smack instead of with all those concrete details of life that make actual the 
mystery of our position on earth.  (68) 
If, however, we must hold fast to the notion that O’Connor’s fiction is about any one thing in 
particular, if we must insist upon reducing her textual output to “literary [specimens] to be 
dissected” (108), then I would argue, and I feel fairly confident in saying that she would agree 
with me, that her fiction is about the fallibility of man. Of course, O’Connor would most 
certainly reframe my assertion to place her Catholic faith at the centre of her modus operandi, as 
she does in “The Catholic Novelist in the Protestant South”: “[the Catholic novel] will see [man] 
as incomplete in himself, as prone to evil, but as redeemable when his own efforts are assisted by 
grace” (197). Nevertheless, our determinations are essentially assonant: her writing is 
preoccupied not with exploring topics, but with depicting the perils of the human experience. She 
therefore populates her texts with fallible, incomplete characters who are prone to evil, from the 
bumbling professor Rayber in her budding effort “The Barber,” to the fish out of water that is 
Carver in her final masterpiece, “Judgment Day.” Moreover, when she does make use of topics 
such as the racial divide in her country in texts such as “The Artificial Nigger,” “Everything That 
Rises Must Converge,” “The Enduring Chill,” “Revelation,” and “Judgment Day,” it is because 
art cannot be created in a vacuum—it must take as inspiration that which is available and 
accessible to the artist, such as her faith, her values, her environment, and her culture. “Fiction,” 
elaborates O’Connor in “The Nature and Aim of Fiction,” “is about everything human and we 
are made out of dust, and if you scorn getting yourself dusty, then you shouldn’t try to write 
fiction” (68). The topic of the racial divide, in the South specifically and in the United States 
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more generally, is therefore but part of the human dust with which O’Connor wrestles. Yet, as the 
topic is inarguably a significant feature of American history and culture, so must its treatment be 
significantly considered. O’Connor’s verbiage in the above citation is revealing in this regard: 
she does not say “then you shouldn’t write fiction,” but rather that “you shouldn’t try to write 
fiction.” The lesson to be gleaned from the use of “try” is that one does not simply write—one 
can only ever but try to write, which is to say try to portray the truth of human experience, try to 
produce a story that says “something that can’t be said any other way” (96). Writing, in the sense 
that I am exploring, is not simply the act of putting pen to paper, of finger tips raining upon 
keyboards, but is instead the artistic endeavour of investigating the mysteries of life. The creation 
of a story that wrestles with human dust, that plunges itself in the filth of the racial divide in 
America, thus requires nothing short of a Sisyphean effort.  
The present chapter shall argue that “Judgment Day” is to O’Connor what to Sisyphus 
was his boulder. Completed only days before her death, “Judgment Day,” the concluding story of 
the posthumous collection Everything That Rises Must Converge, is the final of many redrafts of 
the title story from her 1946 master’s thesis The Geranium: A Collection of Short Stories. I 
believe that this collection of drafts—which I have termed the “Geranium Variations”—along 
with the final version’s sister text, “Everything That Rises Must Converge”, reveal a more 
nuanced, more sophisticated engagement with the topic of the racial divide than in any of 
O’Connor’s other texts. As biographer Jean W. Cash observes in Flannery O’Connor: A Life, the 
topic occupies a central position in these two short stories, crafted as they were in the thick of the 
civil rights movement in the United States. “When Black characters inhabit O'Connor's other 
mature stories,” writes Cash, “they appear in somewhat stereotypical roles like that of delivery 
boy in “Revelation,” or farm workers, Astor and Sulk, being “displaced” by Guizac in “The 
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Displaced Person.” Only in “Everything That Rises Must Converge” and “The Geranium” does 
race occupy a central position” (Cash 486). The narratives of the two texts in question are 
suffused by the social tension between Blacks and whites rather than merely decorated with it. 
For instance, the portrayal of the divide between the white and Black characters in “The 
Enduring Chill” is buttressed by their economic divide: the Black farmhands are the employees 
of the white protagonist’s family. So is the case in “Revelation” where the Black characters, save 
for the delivery boy at the doctor’s office, are Ruby Turpin’s employees. With “Everything That 
Rises…” and the Geranium Variations, however, the white protagonists are the economic equals 
of their Black counterparts: Julian Chestny and his mother must take the bus from their haggard 
apartment to the free reduction class at the YMCA because of their limited income; Tanner’s 
living conditions signal desperate economic means as he first squats in a shack with Coleman, 
his former employee turned roommate, and then moves into an integrated apartment building 
with his daughter and her lover in New York City. Thus, since the white characters in these 
stories are on the same economic level as the Black characters, the tension that simmers between 
them, and eventually boils over, is primarily born of the long history of the racial divide rather 
than of any kind of class distinction. Indeed, their shared poverty serves only to provoke the 
innate cultural schism between whites and Blacks in the United States of America.  
This is not to say, however, that the white characters in these texts are malicious bigots 
and that the narrative arcs of each story are predicated upon the consequences of their racist 
behaviour. That these characters are not overtly bigoted is precisely O’Connor’s point as she is 
not interested in following the relativist impulse of her peers to “continually [justify] the actions 
of [her] characters on a sliding scale of values” (MM 168). Rather, she views her fiction as 
concerned with a poverty that is “fundamental to man” insofar as she believes that “the basic 
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experience of everyone is the experience of human limitation” (131). The narrative detail of a 
shared economic hardship between Black and white characters therefore allows O’Connor to 
more acutely explore the experience of human limitation: “Just as in the sight of God we are all 
children, in the sight of the novelist we are all poor, and the actual poor only symbolize for him 
the state of all men” (132). Thus, while their material lack is secondary to a much more profound 
kind of poverty, their economic precarity makes them more susceptible to “the raw forces of life” 
(132).  
Racial tensions between Black and white Americans in the mid 20th century certainly 
qualifies as such a raw force, yet, it is still but a detail of the human limitation explored by 
O’Connor in her texts, and not the impetus of the respective narrative arcs. Nevertheless, given 
the infrequency, over the course of her career, of her artistic engagement with the topic, it is a 
narrative detail well worth investigating. To this end, I shall explore how the “Geranium 
Variations” provide a useful timeline for the growth of these characters and of her struggle to 
find a satisfactory expression of the story’s source material over the course of twenty or so years, 
finally culminating with “Judgment Day.” I ultimately aim to demonstrate how this final 
variation, as well as “Everything That Rises Must Converge,” represent the zenith of both 
O’Connor’s artistic development and of her engagement with the topic of the racial divide in the 
United States of America insofar as these texts announce the arrival of her Black prophets. 
 
 
Critical Interpretations of the Racial Divide in O’Connor’s Fiction 
The O’Connor texts that engage with the topic of the racial divide in the United States unfold the 
way most of her stories do—that is, chickens come home to roost. It is the characters who are the 
most stubborn and presumptuous who suffer the harshest fates in her stories, all those who 
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interfere in the lives of others, however well-intentioned they may believe themselves to be. 
Critic J.S. Kennedy, a contemporary of O’Connor, observed in his review of Everything That 
Rises Must Converge that “the interferers tell themselves that their motive is the very best, and 
they attempt to judge, direct, protect, straighten out, always with disastrous results” (Flannery 
O’Connor The Contemporary Reviews 234). Consider, for example, a bewildered and broken-
hearted Julian cradling his fallen mother in the darkening streets at the end of “Everything That 
Rises Must Converge,” or, Tanner's twist of fate in the stairwell of a New York City apartment 
building in “Judgment Day” when he attempts to finally make his escape back to the South. 
None of O’Connor’s complacent characters escape her wrath, each dole of violence 
commensurate with their obliviousness.  
I believe that Kennedy’s description of these characters as interferers who judge, direct, 
protect, and straighten out can also be applied to many of O’Connor’s critics. Given the writer’s 
status as a white woman of privilege from the South, much of the criticism that explores any of 
the aforementioned stories is typically underscored by one of two sentiments: the texts either 
support the argument that O’Connor harboured some prejudiced points of view, or they contain 
enough nuance and depth to forgive her of any potential and perceived transgressions. Critics 
Ralph C. Wood, Mark Greif, Lorine M. Getz,1 and Alice Walker2 all struggle with this 
																																																						
1 In recounting details of O'Connor's early years at Andalusia, Getz, in Flannery O'Connor Literary 
Theologian (1999), notes that “Blacks, unlettered and seemingly as enduring as the landscape,” were an 
essential feature of daily life at the O'Connor dairy farm, responsible for much of the hard labour and 
living not too far off from the main house in a weathered shack. O'Connor was very familiar with the 
farmhands and developed a sense of empathy for the maltreatment beset upon them by her society, which 
Getz indicates was “somewhat out of character for the times.” Getz goes on to resolve that O'Connor 
never tried to write from their perspective, however, because she was “'never able to understand how they 
think.' Nor did she indicate specific concern for their social, economic or political plight in her works. 
Rather, she seemed to have an almost romantic view of their unfallen nature” (57). 
2 From “A South Without Myths”: “That [O’Connor] retained a certain distance (only, however, in her 
later, mature work) from the inner workings of her Black characters seems to me all to her credit, since, 
by deliberately limiting her treatment of them to cover their observable demeanor and actions, she leaves 
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predicament and express some variation of the opinion that O'Connor was sensitive enough to 
the plight of people of colour to avoid portraying their particular point of view in her fiction or to 
make any kind of assumption about their experience as second – or even third class – citizens. It 
is true that O'Connor does not write from the perspective of Black Southerners insofar as the 
protagonists of her stories are always white and her characters of colour rarely partake in any 
important exchange of dialogue. Black characters keep mostly to themselves and speak only 
when spoken to. In this way, yes, O'Connor has never pretended, through her fiction, to 
understand the condition of Black men and women in America. But I claim that O'Connor does 
in fact attempt to portray the inner lives of her Black characters in both “Everything That Rises 
Must Converge” and “Judgment Day.” The manifestations of anger and violence, first by 
Carver's mother upon Julian's mother, and finally by the actor neighbour upon Tanner, are a 
portrayal of a particular type of resentment, that is, the simmering anger of Blacks felt for whites, 
a kind of idle frustration that lingers beneath the surface of any and all interactions, latent but not 
dormant, awaiting the opportune moment to manifest itself. But does O’Connor’s attempt to 
portray the inner lives of Black characters automatically jeopardize her moral integrity? 
Esteemed O'Connor scholar Ralph C. Wood begins “The Problem of the Color Line” 
with a stern reassurance that O'Connor was definitely not a racist. If anything, he argues, she 
“offered the one lasting antidote to racism” (94), that is, that we are created equal in the eyes of 
God. Wood takes his reasoning a step further and claims that O'Connor's criticism of white self-
righteousness in her later writing required “considerable moral and artistic courage” (95). While 
																																																						
them free, in the reader's imagination, to inhabit another landscape, another life, than the one she creates 
for them. This is a kind of grace many writers do not have when dealing with representatives of an 
oppressed people within a story, and their insistence on knowing everything, on being God, in fact, has 
burdened us with more stereotypes than we can ever hope to shed.” See: 
http://math.buffalo.edu/~sww/walker/south-without-myths.html 
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I agree that O'Connor's criticism of the figure of the white liberal is an essential element of her 
work, I believe that these accolades of moral and artistic courage are overwrought at best and 
that Wood’s excitement over her perceived bravery reveals his own insecurities about the 
portrayal and synthesis of the racial divide in her fiction. I understand that Wood may have 
meant to argue that O’Connor’s criticism exhibits moral and artistic courage within the sphere of 
her literary community, much of which typically operates further left on the socio-political 
spectrum, and that taking something of a contrarian position had the potential of alienating her 
from her peers, editors, publishers and so on. Yet, we know from her letters and essays that she 
had little patience for the self-satisfaction of “stupid Yankee liberals smacking their lips over 
typical life in the dear old dirty Southland” (HB 537), and so would probably not have lost much 
sleep over alienating any such lip-smackers. 
Wood goes on to opine in a footnote that O'Connor's correspondence falls into two 
categories: unguarded confessions to friends and superficial opinions “tossed off in a trice and 
thus never meant for conclusion-drawing scrutiny” (94). Wood here overtly implies that the 
letters most fruitful for research are those from the former category and that we need not bother 
too much with anything that may sound indecent or untoward. The critic’s approach to 
O'Connor's correspondence is therefore far too deferential to her artistic legacy. In “Where is the 
Voice Coming From?: Flannery O'Connor on Race,” he laments that accusations of racism 
jeopardize the legacy of “the most important Southern writer since Faulkner” (The Flannery 
O'Connor Bulletin 90). Wood’s impulse to consolidate O'Connor's literary accomplishments with 
her moral character into a testimony of her importance as a cultural touchstone of the South 
cheapens his advocacy for her status as Faulkner’s heir. This is not to say that O’Connor does not 
deserve to be mentioned in the same breath as her Mississippian peer, but only that the means by 
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which Wood attempts to preserve O’Connor’s legacy is flawed in that he makes of her an idol 
rather than let her work exist as a subjective attestation of a particular place at a particular time. 
Wood is what Timothy P. Caron refers to in his essay “'The Bottom Rail Is on the Top': 
Race and 'Theological Whiteness' in Flannery O'Connor's Short Fiction” as a “True Believer,” an 
O'Connor critic who believes that the Southern region, while shouldering tremendous historical 
guilt, “offers the nation its largest religious hope” (123).  As Caron outlines, these critics view 
the world in much the same way as O’Connor did: “as a fallen world in which evil is a “mystery” 
that must be endured” (139). This premise of the unavoidable mystery of evil that pervades the 
fabric of society is of course an extension of the concept of original sin wherein we are all, as 
descendants of Adam and Eve, fallen creatures. Yet, to reckon the evil of racism in America as a 
mystery that must be endured is at best a reductive practice that perforce obviates any form of 
subjective responsibility. There is, in my view, nothing mysterious about the systemic 
subjugation of Black men and women in the United States of America,3 and the insistence of 
True Believers to orient their readings of O’Connor’s work along a vertical theological axis fails 
to understand, as Caron notes, “the network of horizontal relationships between and among 
Southern Blacks and whites” (160). We are here faced with the outlines of a predicament that in 
																																																						
3 Nothing much has changed in this regard since O’Connor’s time. In Race in the American South, David 
Brown and Clive Webb note that “Southern Blacks still experience numerous forms of institutional 
racism. The criminal justice system, for instance, discriminates against African-Americans in a number of 
ways. Per statistics published by Human Rights Watch in April 2003, African-Americans represent on 
average 21.6 percent of the Southern population, but 55 percent of all prison inmates across the region. It 
is worth noting that the disparity is even worse in the northern states such as Vermont or North Dakota, 
where Blacks are few in number but still form a disproportionate share of the prison population. Racial 
bias is also evident in the administration of the death penalty. Southern states continue to execute more 
prisoners than the rest of the nation put together. Between 1976 and 2006, 832 of the 1019 executions 
carried out in the United States occurred in the South. Southern states administer the death penalty most 
commonly in cases where the criminal is Black and the victim is white. In Georgia, 60% of murder 
victims are African-American. However, since 1973 more than 80% of executions have involved Blacks 
who committed crimes against whites” (325). 
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many ways defines the South: the preservation of ideals is prioritized over the ontic questioning 
of the material conditions of life. The True Believer’s critical reading of O’Connor’s work thus 
operates as a kind of dialectical analysis of history wherein the past is rewritten, or at the very 
least reframed, thereby delegitimizing any previously established accounts.  
Toni Morrison, in Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination, makes a 
very similar argument when she writes about the predilection of literary critics to employ a 
“dehistoricizing allegory” (68) in their reading of American literature, and more specifically in 
their reading of Blackness in that literature. Morrison contends that through this “dehistoricizing 
allegory” the suffering of persons of colour is, in a sense, fetishized into a symbol for the 
suffering of the South in general. The plight of persons of colour is thus recast as a broad 
redemptive suffering that enables readers of O’Connor’s work to, as Caron explains, “displace 
the messy topic of race from our readings and firmly fix our gaze upon heaven, for it is there that 
race will cease to matter” (162). This gaze upon heaven dismisses the material in favour of the 
ideal and reduces the evils of systemic racism to a mystery that must be endured until salvation. 
What is more, this ideal state of equivalence is never realized within O’Connor’s fiction, but 
rather, “in the subsequent readings and interpretations” (163) of her work. Black characters then 
become little more than signposts on the uncertain path to salvation, helping to guide not only 
her white characters towards heaven, as Morrison implies, but, I argue, some of her critics 
towards a contained interpretation of her work, and by extension, of the South and its artists.  
I thus contend that Wood’s reading of O’Connor’s fiction, and by extension the readings 
of all True Believers, is tainted by Morrison’s notion of the “dehistoricizing allegory.” His 
analysis is contingent upon the assumption that the South's dark past is concurrently the means 
through which it will be redeemed—that is, the cumulative weight of the region’s socio-political 
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transgressions ipso facto produces the proportionate capacity for grace, as though grace were a 
reward, thereby delivering the necessary conditions for reparation and thus social, national, and 
even moral progress. The aim of Caron’s essay, however, is to challenge this point of view and to 
unveil what he believes to be an orthodoxy that has shrouded readings of O'Connor's work over 
the course of the last fifty or so years, a shared conviction that only a culturally and socially 
conservative Catholic reading will yield the proper understanding of her texts. “Claiming this 
ground is a masterstroke for the True Believers,” writes Caron, “because any other reading 
subsequently becomes a misreading, any other interpretation a misinterpretation” (147). I think 
this is a valid assessment of much of the critical work on O'Connor’s oeuvre, and while I do 
intend to refute some of these readings in the present analysis, I also suggest pushing Caron’s 
argument a step further and identifying a different, yet related, critical culprit: I suggest that there 
is a specific kind of liberal reading that percolates through much O’Connor criticism, one which 
is quick to offer apologias in order to secure O’Connor’s position not only as a prominent literary 
and cultural figure. My aim is not to altogether dismiss theological readings of O’Connor’s work 
in favour of cultural and political considerations of race and class, but rather to suggest that both 
points of view pose a very similar interpretive problem. I believe that the more meaningful 
question is not why was O’Connor reticent to make common cause, in her fiction or otherwise, 
with disenfranchised Black Americans, but rather, why are so many of her critics hasty to defend 
her moral integrity in the first place?   
Mark Greif ‘s “Flannery O’Connor and Faith” from The Age of The Crisis of Man 
provides an overture for answering this question. Central to his analysis is the argument that 
O’Connor’s writing produces “an interpretive problem, as well as insight into alternative 
possibilities, before the sixties, for the ‘liberal’ faith in a unity of man” (214). He explains that 
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O’Connor’s texts, though principally critical of liberal ideals of progress, would not properly 
function as a critique if they did not to some degree adhere to the very traditional liberal 
structures and expectations that the author aims to refute. Moreover, Greif claims that this is the 
very dilemma that constitutes what he calls the crisis of man in the 20th century, which is, as he 
sees it, the near-impossible task of reconciling one’s faith in the unity of man in the aftermath of 
the atrocities of the 1930s and 40s. For Greif, liberal faith in the “unity of man” is as much a 
secular enterprise as it is religious, and it is precisely for this reason that he believes O’Connor’s 
work creates an interpretive problem for the liberal ideals of the 20th century:    
 [O’Connor] juxtaposes her explanatory insistence on an orthodox religious fiction of 
symbolism and near-allegory, drawn from real theology and dogma, with her fiction's 
practical use of forms of psychological explanation, which are thoroughly liberal—liberal 
in the progressive and post-New Deal sense, defending progress toward the perfection of 
reasoned goals of equality and freedom, feeling compassion for outcasts because of their 
sociological circumstance and demographics and situation; liberal too in the sense of the 
church doctrine, both on the Protestant side (which surrounded her in the South) and on 
the Catholic side (her minority religion by birth and lifelong commitment). (205-06) 
While O’Connor may attempt in her writing to pillory the supreme liberal vanity of rational 
improvement, she nevertheless operates within a political, social, and cultural infrastructure that 
is predominantly, in a Lockean and Kantian sense, liberal. She can thus profess to resist, as she 
does in a letter to Cecil Dawkins,4 the basic tenets of the Enlightenment all she wants, but the 
																																																						
4 From Habit of Being: “[The South] still believes that man has fallen and that he is perfectible by God’s 
grace, not by his own unaided efforts. The Liberal approach is that man has never fallen, never incurred 
guilt, and is ultimately perfectible by his own efforts. Therefore, evil in this light is a problem of better 
housing, sanitation, health, etc. and all the mysteries will eventually be cleared up” (302-03). 
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fact remains that liberalism is the historically dominant orthodoxy of her culture, and thus of the 
world in which her characters come to life.  
Unfortunately, Greif’s analysis of O’Connor’s life and work ultimately succumbs to the 
very same trap as do the True Believers whereby he then levies an appraisal of the writer’s moral 
character. Much like Wood, Greif contends that O’Connor is more admirable than many of her 
white liberal peers because she 
goes out of her way not to suggest that she has any idea what her Black characters' inner 
lives and interior consciousnesses are like. She portrays them entirely from the outside, 
and lets her white characters talk about them without the Black characters assenting, and 
gives her Black characters autonomy, while still letting them seem human, not ciphers or 
symbols. (213-14) 
I disagree with this assessment for I believe that O’Connor does in fact, to some degree, reveal 
the “interior consciousnesses” of her Black characters in both “Everything That Rises Must 
Converge” and “Judgment Day” by means of their violent reactions to her white characters. I 
maintain that the anger expressed by these Black characters through their violence upon their 
white counterparts is clearly motivated by the frustrations that derive from the racial divide and 
is not simply the manifestation of some mysterious evil that must be endured. Moreover, these 
violent outbursts reflect those of characters such as Mary Grace from “Revelation” who throws 
her textbook at Ruby Turpin’s head, or the hitchhiker from “The Life You Save May Be Your 
Own” who lashes out at Mr. Shiftlet, which is to say that they reflect the outbursts of characters 
who fulfill the role of prophet in their respective texts. Thus, not only does O’Connor indeed 
attempt to portray the inner lives of her Black characters in these two late texts, she also elevates 
the import of their narrative function. Greif’s impulse to laud what he perceives to be her 
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sensitive management of the topic of the racial divide therefore results in a stunted interpretation 
of what the writer in fact accomplishes with these two late texts.  
 I consequently return to Caron who gestures towards the most plausible source of the 
critical impulse to preserve O’Connor’s moral integrity: Flannery O’Connor herself. Few writers, 
he argues, have had as much command, whether implicitly or incidentally, in shaping the 
reception and dissemination of their work as O’Connor has had with hers. One would not have to 
venture very far into the breadth of O'Connor criticism, Caron explains, before coming across 
assertions taken directly from her non-fiction and serving as the foundation for the critic's 
approach. Examples include understanding the South as being “Christ-haunted” rather than 
“Christ-centered,” or, by extension, failing to analyze the bursts of violence common in her 
fiction as anything but “the mysterious workings of Christian conversion” (Caron 142). James 
M. Mellard makes a similar claim in his essay “Flannery O'Connor's Others: Freud, Lacan, and 
the Unconscious,” noting that while writers such as Joyce, Woolf, and Faulkner likewise made 
efforts to set the terms of their reception, they were primarily motivated by the difficult nature of 
their work. O'Connor, however, depended “less upon the determinations effected by form than 
upon those achieved by instruction. [She] simply tells her readers—either through narrative 
interventions or by extra-textual exhortations—how they are to interpret her work” (Mellard 
625). According to Mellard, the instructions in O'Connor's non-fiction, whether they be found in 
her essays or in her private letters, therefore become restrictive parameters of interpretation that 
leave little to no room for divergent perspectives, automatically dismissing any critic who strays 
from the well-lit path. The much more difficult and inconvenient interpretations, those that take 
account of the complexities and particularities of the history of the United States and the social 
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climate of American South during the period of O’Connor’s writing career, are thus left largely 
unexplored. 
I do not believe that being mindful of the racial undertones of her work leads to 
oversensitive, uncharitable readings, as George Cheatham reasons in “Jesus, O'Connor's 
Artificial Nigger” (CR 475). I argue that it is possible to examine the dynamics of the racial 
divide in O’Connor’s texts, and more precisely the nuances of her treatment of the related issues, 
without falling into the presentist dialogical trap of retroactively moralizing. That O'Connor may 
have had certain ingrained prejudices should surprise no one: she was a woman of privilege 
whose family benefitted from the exploitation a Black underclass. This does not confirm that she 
was hateful, or felt threatened by the uprising of Black independence, but only that she was a 
product of her environment. It should be expected that great writers were familiar with, and 
possibly even shared, the same prejudices of the dominant culture of their time. Likewise, I am 
suspicious of this impulse to absolve O'Connor, or any writer, of whatever perceived moral 
failings as discovered in her texts.  
Wood’s criticism indulges this very impulse when he writes that charges of racism 
threaten O'Connor's legacy as a cultural figure of importance for the South. What is more, he 
maintains that the writer’s attitude towards the racial divide was guided by the dominical 
directive that each person be treated with charity, and that though she was imperfect, she did her 
best to love her neighbour. To support his vote of confidence, he asserts that there is an important 
distinction between opinions and convictions. “Opinions,” he writes, 
are often quickly formed and just as quickly abandoned, since they do not constitute the 
fundament of our lives. We often keep our opinions to ourselves, lest they give needless 
offense, and lest we be ashamed at their disclosure. Convictions, by contrast, are slowly 
	 36	
acquired and firmly maintained. We do not surrender our convictions readily nor keep them 
private, no matter whom they may offend. They are the public verities upon which we 
stand, the truths by which we live and die. (100-01) 
While I may not agree with Wood’s contrived rationalization, I do believe that  
the tension between O’Connor’s public omissions and private confessions indicates that she 
struggled to reconcile her prejudices with her ideals, or, in Wood’s words, her opinions with her 
convictions, which, obviously, is natural and to be expected of anyone with as critical and 
curious a mind as she. Furthermore, I am far more interested in exploring how these struggles 
reveal themselves in the narrative details of her late texts, rather than what they disclose about 
O’Connor’s moral integrity.  
 
 
The Incitement to Diagnose Racism 
 
“It is neither a politic nor a popular thing to say, but a Black man facing a white man becomes at once 
contemptuous and resentful when he finds himself looked upon as a moral problem for that white man's 
conscience”  
–James Baldwin (The Cross of Redemption: Uncollected Writings). 
 
Like all writers, O’Connor was a product of her place and time and so held the prejudices typical 
of her Southern environment. The critical urge to diagnose and then treat transgressions of 
perceived cultural impropriety, however, raises a much more compelling concern: why must this 
question be asked in the first place? Why is O’Connor’s potential racism, or any other white 
Southern writer, important to the culture of the contemporary academy, and more broadly to the 
liberal class? What drives this impulse to inquisition? The answer, I propose, is found in the 
pursuit of canonical purity by critics and academics who feel a sense of responsibility toward the 
institutions which they serve, since they are expected, by themselves as well as by the 
institutional bodies that control the dispensation of funding, to lead by pedagogical example. As 
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historian and political analyst Thomas Frank writes in Listen Liberal, “educational achievement 
is, after all, the foundation of the professions’ claim to higher status.” We should therefore not be 
surprised, he continues, 
that the liberal class regards the university as the greatest and most necessary social 
institution of all, or that members of this cohort reflexively propose more education as the 
answer to just about anything you care to bring up. College can conquer unemployment 
as well as racism, they say; urban decay as well as inequality. Education will make us 
more tolerant […]. (33-34)  
According to Frank, then, the machinations of late capitalism have enforced the notion that the 
academy is the principal gateway to upward mobility and self-improvement. Never mind, 
however, that higher education is less accessible to the middle and lower classes via cyclical 
implementation of austerity measures,5 or that student-loan debt makes up one-third of the 
national debt of the United States at $1.3 trillion.6 The material reality of the academy’s role, or 
lack thereof, in contemporary western society matters very little to those who have chosen to 
quarantine themselves to the poorly lit classrooms and offices of their respective institutions to 
analyze cultural output for traces of bigotry.7 Mainstream liberalism in the academy, and 
																																																						
5 From “By the Numbers: President Trump’s 10 Biggest Proposed Cuts to U.S. Education, ranked”: 
While the budget overall proposes spending increases for key Trump campaign promises, such as 
expanding the military and immigration enforcement, the president’s proposal looks to slash the 
Education Department’s budget by more than 5 percent, cutting back the agency’s $63.2 billion in 
discretionary funding by $3.6 billion.” See: https: //www.the74million.org/by-the-numbers-president-
trumps-10-biggest-proposed-cuts-to-u-s-education-ranked/ 
6 Statistics taken from February 21st 2017 Forbes article “Student Loan Debt in 2017: A $1.3 Trillion 
Crisis.” Author Zack Friedman reports that: As of 2015, more than 42 million student loan borrowers 
have student loan debt of $100,000 or less. More than 2 million student loan borrowers have student loan 
debt greater than $100,000, with 415,000 of that total holding student loan debt greater than $200,000. 
The largest concentration of student loan debt is $10,000 - $25,000, which accounts for 12.4 million 
student loan borrowers.” 
7 Social critic Irving Howe identified the atrophying of the intellectual’s role outside of the academy in 
his 1954 essay “This Age of Conformity” from The Partisan Review Anthology: “The truly powerless 
people are those intellectuals — the new realist — who attach themselves to the seats of power, where 
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especially in the literary humanities, is galvanized by its opposition to racism. As Frank writes, 
“Nothing is more characteristic of the liberal class than its members’ sense of their own elevated 
goodness, […] a combination of virtue and pedigree, a matter of educational accomplishment, of 
taste, of status… of professionalism” (224).  
Though Frank’s book is largely about the state of the contemporary American political 
spectrum, it provides a useful treatment of the state of contemporary liberalism. The members of 
this class, as Frank outlines them, are university educated professionals, innovators, and 
academics who seem to be “forever traveling on a quest for some place of greater righteousness, 
[…] always engaged in a search for some subject of overwhelming, noncontroversial goodness 
with which it can identify itself and under whose umbrella of virtue it can put across its self-
interested class program” (228). A liberal-class virtue-quest, however, is a far cry from 
progressive politics. It is, rather, an ersatz politics that feels political because it is exceedingly 
moralistic, and facilitates a comforting melodrama of absolutes, good versus bad. Ergo, the ego 
investment in the project of studying someone such as Flannery O’Connor, which is to say a 
white upper-middle class woman from the postbellum South, demands that, in an academic 
environment captivated by virtue-quests, there be procedures of checks and balances to diagnose 
the racism (or sexism, or homophobia) of the studied subject so as to absolve the critics 
themselves of any kind of guilt by association. For, there are few accusations that can be leveled 
at a member of the liberal class that can be as professionally damaging as that of racism. Such an 
allegation is a stigma that is nearly impossible to disprove once it has been dispensed since 
																																																						
they surrender their freedom of expression without gaining any significance as political figures. For it is 
crucial to the history of the American intellectuals in the past few decades — as well as to the relationship 
between ‘wealth’ and ‘intellect’ — that whenever they become absorbed into the accredited institutions of 
society they not only lose their traditional rebelliousness but to one extent or another they cease to 
function as intellectuals” (148). 
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racism is not about what one does, but, rather, is fundamentally about who one is and therefore 
the denunciation issues shame on the accused rather than guilt, where shame is bound to who or 
what we are, while guilt to what we do. This cycle of diagnosis and shame echoes the 
hermeneutics of suspicion that Foucault argues surrounded the sexually deviant subject in an 
earlier period: a constant kind of inquisition and surveillance that watches out for the signs of 
racism whereby every white person is equally suspect (HS 35). The policing of microaggressions 
thus becomes an obsession in academic culture and the critical industry of institutional 
micropolitics. Critics, in a sense, have come to serve the same purpose as Mary Grace, the 
college student visiting her mother in O’Connor’s “Revelation,” who physically attacks the 
story’s protagonist, Mrs. Ruby Turpin, because of her racist and classist attitudes. What is of note 
is that Mrs. Turpin is attacked because of who she is, not because of what she does; it is her 
personality to which Mary Grace objects rather than her actions. By the story’s end, she is faced 
with an unfamiliar sense of shame with which she has great difficulty deciphering: “‘Why me?’” 
(CW 652). 
Asad Haider takes this criticism of the culture of the liberal class a step further in a 2017 
article for Viewpoint Magazine titled “White Purity,” echoing Frank’s denunciation of liberal 
virtue-quests. Haider argues that the most deceptive form of white pseudo-politics is “white 
guilt,” an ideology that he argues is necessarily complemented by what he terms “white purity,” 
which is, he continues, “a kind of ideology of racial hygiene which embraces multiculturalism 
and diversity, but attempts to eliminate undesirable elements from the white identity itself.”8 
Haider’s description of white purity echoes Frank’s description of the liberal class: well-educated 
professionals who “listen to NPR, and have many POC friends.” Yet, for this sense of white 
																																																						
8 Asad Haider “White Purity.” See: https://www.viewpointmag.com/2017/01/06/white-purity/ 
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purity to properly function, there must be those whites who are not pure, that is, bad whites who 
did not go to university: 
They listen to country music and eat factory farmed meat. They are offensively 
overweight, and go to church instead of yoga on Sundays. Most disgusting of all, they 
work in dirty manual labor jobs and have a petty fixation on making more money, 
unaware that at Harvard an English major of color is being forced to endure the trauma of 
reading Huckleberry Finn.9 
These bad whites exist to confirm the purity of the good whites who are of course soldiers in the 
fight for the integrity and dignity of oppressed people of colour. The success of white purity thus 
relies not only on the evils of bad whites, but on the romanticizing of non-whites as noble 
victims. Without these two necessary elements, the foundation of white purity collapses. 
Moreover, the entire point of view is incredibly suspect, as Haider notes, to non-whites who have 
experienced the soft racism of the mild-mannered liberal class as regularly as the more overt 
racism of the bad whites, “because,” he writes, “we have never benefitted from the 
condescending and patronizing attitudes of white multiculturalists.”10  
The above arguments made by Frank and Haider provide a useful framework for 
introducing what I have termed, following Michel Foucault, the incitement to diagnose racism.11 
Following Frank and Haider’s assessment of the manners of college educated liberals, I argue 
																																																						
9 Haider, “White Purity.” 
10 Haider, “White Purity.” 
11 The concept of the incitement to diagnose racism was conceived in private casual conversations 
between Dr. Éric Savoy and Dr. Steven Bruhm, and was in turn suggested as a possible line of inquiry for 
my research by Dr. Savoy. My use of this concept in relation to my research on trends in O’Connor 
studies owes a great deal to the direction provided by both Dr. Bruhm and Dr. Savoy. Any future 
iterations of the present study will include no musings whatsoever on the concept of the incitement to 
diagnose racism.  
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that critics are controlled by a version of Foucault’s model of the economy of the perverse 
implantation, as introduced in his seminal text The History of Sexuality vol. 1.:  
But this often-stated theme, that sex is outside of discourse and that only the removing of 
an obstacle, the breaking of a secret, can clear the way leading to it, is precisely what 
needs to be examined. Does it not partake of the injunction by which discourse is 
provoked? Is it not with the aim of inciting people to speak of sex that is made to mirror, 
at the outer limit of every actual discourse, something akin to a secret whose discovery is 
imperative, a thing abusively reduced to silence, and at the same time difficult and 
necessary, dangerous and precious to divulge? (34-35)  
To ask my own rhetorical question, does this model not also describe the imperative to diagnose 
the secret of racism? Foucault’s repressive hypothesis states that the relationship between power 
and sex is one of repression whereby power is exerted to suppress and control the discourse on 
sex. This regulation is the unavoidable result of the “will to knowledge,” a theory developed by 
Foucault that posits that the more we know about something, the more power we have over it. 
But power also brings sex increasingly into discourse, into a broader and more analytic focus, 
and so this very act of learning is itself an exercise of power insofar as learning is a cumulative 
process and so is an application of a knowledge that is already held to a knowledge that is in the 
process of being acquired. Ergo, as the imperative to learn about sex has developed, the ways we 
can speak about it have become more firmly controlled.  
Likewise, as general awareness of the racial divide in the United States has risen, so has 
the scrutiny of the discourse on race proliferated. It is of course not as simple as substituting sex 
and sexuality with race and racism in Foucault’s work on the repressive hypothesis, but there is a 
notable consonance between the discourse on sexuality in the 17th century onward and the 
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contemporary discourse on racism. In other words, there reigns over contemporary culture and 
the critical industry a prohibition that consigns the discourse on racism to be regulated by strict 
conditions, which, in the enterprises of literary and cultural criticism, are conditions which are 
economically useful and politically conservative.12 
Given that Foucault’s model necessitates the existence of a normative group—the 
reproductive heterosexual married couple—who are not the object of scrutiny and who are free 
from the regulatory gaze, my adaptation of his model therefore requires an equivalent group, a 
group that believes itself to be above suspicion, but which is sharply scrutinized by O’Connor in 
her texts: the complacent white liberal. As we witness through the depictions of Julian in 
“Everything That Rises Must Converge,” Asbury in “The Enduring Chill,” and Rayber in “The 
Barber,” the incitement to diagnose cannot be a neutral act. In other words, that which is 
scrutinized—in this case, the racial divide and the various forms of resulting racism—is not an 
objective specimen that will remain unaffected in the process. The more we know of something, 
or at least the more we believe that we know, and, more to the point, how we come about 
knowing it, has a direct effect on not only how that thing can then be discussed moving forward, 
																																																						
12 This stance has been the attitude towards the racial divide in the United States since the Civil War. For 
example, as Howard Zinn demonstrates in his essay “Lincoln and Emancipation,” Honest Abe’s 
motivation to end slavery was not the belief that all men are created equal, but was rather the political 
hurdle that slavery presented: “I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. […] My paramount object in 
this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy Slavery. If I could save the Union 
without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and 
if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about Slavery 
and the colored race, I do because it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do 
not believe it would help to save the Union.” As David Brown and Clive Webb show in Race in the 
American South, we see this very same attitude a hundred years later in President John F. Kennedy: “At 
the time of the Freedom Rides, President Kennedy was preparing for a summit meeting in Vienna with 
Soviet premier Nikita Krushchev. Her feared that his Cold War adversary would use the violence in 
Alabama to demonstrate the hypocrisy of American claims to leadership of the free world, and to portray 
Kennedy himself as a weak politician who could not maintain law and order. It was these pragmatic 
considerations, more than any principled recognition of the Freedom Riders' cause, that led the 
administration to intervene. Reluctantly forced to side with the activists, Kennedy nonetheless confided 
that 'this whole thing and the people behind it were a giant pain in the ass'” (300-301). 
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but on how it evolves and proliferates. Further to this point, the incitement to diagnose does not 
effectively engage with the evils that it sets out to remedy because its position is fundamentally 
one of reproof and censure, and as such, it is antagonistic in nature and thus cannot properly 
function as a reparative practice. The incitement to diagnose racism becomes instead a system of 
policing that fails to fully understand the underlying causes of the problems that it attempts to 
confront. Consequently, the authority that drives the pedantic conditions of a diagnosis is 
fundamentally underscored with the patronizing presumption that “I know better than you what 
you really want,” where the “you” corresponds to the person, or group of people, whose dignity 
is ostensibly being protected. Racism, like sexuality, is therefore “not a thing which stubbornly 
shows itself, but one which always hides, the insidious presence that speaks in a voice so muted 
and often disguised that one risks remaining deaf to it” (HS 35). And if racism is not confessed, 
then it must be diagnosed, enabling the logic of the superego to take over—that is, the more we 
obey the commandment of the law, the more we are guilty. This guilt is then appropriated by the 
college-educated idealists, like Julian, Asbury, or Rayber, and implemented in their moral 
grandstanding as they preach, like false prophets, to those who have not yet had the privilege of 
being converted to the church of post-secondary education.   
 
 
Complacent Idealists as False Prophets 
In her essay entitled “The Catholic Novelist in the Protestant South,” O’Connor makes clear that 
when she writes about backwoods prophets, she does so earnestly and is in no way mocking 
them. “Their concerns are [my] own” she continues, “and, in [my] judgment, central to human 
life” (204). Such is not the case, however, when she writes about college-educated idealists who 
wear their moral superiority on their sleeves, or, as I term them, her ersatz-prophets—that is, 
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characters who view themselves as holding some superior vision of the world and of the people 
in it, but who, in their self-idolization, need to be returned to reality by some violent prophetic 
intervention. O’Connor explores this character-type in a number of her texts, from Rayber in her 
novel The Violent Bear It Away, to Hulga, Julian, and Asbury in her short-stories “Good Country 
People,” “Everything That Rises Must Converge,” and “The Enduring Chill” respectively, and 
each of them is returned to reality at a considerable cost. But her interest in treating the 
character-type and exposing his modern bias for reason over mystery can in fact be traced back 
to one of her earliest texts, “The Barber,” which is collected in her master’s thesis entitled The 
Geranium.  
“The Barber” is set in the fictional town of Dilton, presumably a play on the city of 
Dalton in Northwest Georgia, where a college professor by the name of Rayber, a nascent 
version of the character with the same name and profession in her novel The Violent Bear It 
Away, is overtaken by his political angst. Convinced of his intellectual and moral superiority, he 
becomes obsessed with the political disputes he has with the men at his local barbershop and 
spends much of the action of the story preparing a speech that he hopes will convert the men to 
his point of view. The story culminates with Rayber not only failing to express his carefully 
curated ideas, but in his resorting to physical aggression against his barber which ultimately only 
serves to amplify his humiliation as he escapes the barbershop. O’Connor’s lampooning of 
academics and progressive idealists in this early text is heavy handed in her depiction of 
Rayber’s condescension towards people who do not share his level of education. He is 
patronizing towards anyone who is outside of the academy, and, in his view, out of reach of 
reason and of logic. His disregard for the uneducated is emphasized by his adulation for his 
colleague Jacobs, a “philosophy man” whose approval Rayber seems to be pursuing like a dog 
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chasing a car. By contrast, he expresses nothing but disdain for the barber’s intelligence, proven 
by his emphasis on wanting to discuss with him “sanely.” For the discussion to proceed, it must 
be had on Rayber’s terms, otherwise it is not sane, and thus void. This arrogance trickles into his 
condescension towards the barbershop’s Black employee, George, when Rayber thinks to 
himself that he would like to “say something that George would understand” (715), later 
wondering whether “demagogue” is too obscure a word to use in his presence: “Should have said 
‘lying politicians’” (715). Rayber’s incitement to diagnose is in full effect insofar as he attempts 
to control the discussion of the election, and by extension, of all the economic and racial politics 
involved, by regulating both the context of the exchange and the vocabulary used.   
The story’s opening sentence, “It is trying on Liberals in Dilton,” thus serves two 
functions: first, it performs the basic task of establishing the story’s setting and the political 
context in which the narrative will unfold. By the following paragraph, the reader learns that the 
town is in the midst of an election, the results of which have forced Rayber to find a new barber. 
We can thus infer that Rayber is the aforementioned liberal who is experiencing trying times. 
The second, more important function of the opening sentence, however, is to emphasize the 
protagonist’s self-absorption: the reader is informed that the focus is on the liberals themselves 
rather than on the issues that they purport to champion—it is trying on liberals, and not on the 
unemployed, or the uneducated, or on those whose rights are supposedly at stake in the 
Democratic White Primary. Indeed, Rayber is so self-involved that he fails to recognize the 
social cues of uninterest exhibited by his colleagues, his wife, and, most significantly, George, 
whose attention and alliance he obsessively tries to gain. When, for example, Rayber attempts to 
discuss politics with his colleague Jacobs, “a man of his education” (CW 714), Jacobs tells him 
to “Skip it” before running off to supposedly teach a class: “His classes frequently occurred, 
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Rayber noticed, when Rayber was about to get him in argument” (714). But Jacobs’ apathy does 
nothing to deter Rayber’s appetite for intellectual sparring as he again tries to reel his colleague 
in with the written argument he has painstakingly prepared for his barber. Jacobs again responds 
with disinterest, though now he appears to also be veering toward annoyance: “‘Well,’ Jacobs 
said, ‘so what? What do you call yourself doing?’” (720). Undeterred, or more properly, 
oblivious, Rayber insists that he is faced with a level of ignorance that Jacobs has never himself 
experienced. Jacobs’ response to Rayber’s claim is telling: 
Jacobs snorted. “Oh yes I have,” he said. 
“What happened?” 
“I never argue.” 
“But you know you’re right,” Rayber persisted. 
“I never argue.” (721) 
The ignorance to which Jacobs’ snort refers is of course Rayber’s inability to register that his 
colleagues have no interest in discussing politics with him, likely because they do not share his 
views. This possibility is lost on Rayber, however, because he assumes that men of his education 
must inherently share his logical reasoning, for he has already settled on the veracity of the 
inverse position with regards to the men at the barbershop: they do not agree with his political 
views because they are not as educated as he is. Jacobs ultimately succumbs to Rayber’s 
pestering and tells him to leave the paper on his desk. “Don’t spoil your complexion arguing 
with barbers” (721), he advises Rayber, though in light of his earlier assertion that he never 
argues, he is likely only placating his colleague so that he may move on with his day.  
 This pattern is repeated when Rayber demands that his wife listen to him recite his paper 
in preparation of its delivery to the barber. Though she has already made clear to him that 
	 47	
politics is a precarious topic of conversation by telling him, every time he mentions the election, 
that “Just because you teach doesn’t mean you know everything” (721), he nevertheless persists 
in using her as a sounding board for his postulations. Resistant at first, she, like Jacobs before 
her, succumbs so to placate: “She came in wiping her hands and said all right; all right, she was 
there, wasn’t she? Go ahead” (722). As Rayber begins to read his paper to his wife, her attention 
almost immediately shifts to a magazine on a nearby table, and when he pauses to take note of 
her reaction to his reading, she assumes his silence indicates that he has finished: “‘That was 
very nice,’ she said and went back to the kitchen” (722). Rayber’s wife, like his colleague, 
accords him the minimum amount of her concentration before dismissing him and returning to 
her tasks. Yet, their combined minimal attention is still more than Rayber receives from George, 
the effigy for whom he believes himself to be advocating. 
George’s uninterest in the back and forth between Rayber and the men at the barbershop 
is emphasized, to Rayber’s chagrin, by his reflex to agree with whatever position his employer 
has taken. Whether this impulse reflects his personal opinions, or is simply a safeguard against 
his employer’s ire, is up for debate, but either way, Rayber is isolated in his crusade. Thus, when 
Rayber and the barber begin to argue about the integration of schools, George expresses 
uninterest in having to attend a white school before directly changing the topic of conversation: 
“‘Wouldn’t like that,’ George said. ‘We needs sommo powders. These here the las’ in this box’” 
(718). As with Jacobs and Mrs. Rayber, the political discussion is but a distraction from his tasks 
at hand. Yet, again, Rayber is incapable of registering George’s disregard and continues to vie 
for his attention and, more importantly, for recognition that he is an ally. Rayber’s struggle to 
project himself as a civil rights activist receives its deathblow when, after finally delivering his 
prepared argument to the men at the barbershop, George reveals that if he could vote, he would 
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cast his ballot for the very candidate Rayber finds so revolting: the demagogue Hawkson. 
George’s confession incites Rayber’s fit of violence upon the barber, but even in this feeble 
attempt of ferocity does the college professor exude his ineptness, for it is he who must 
ultimately retreat both physically and intellectually.   
While the story’s narrative arc is constructed around Rayber’s political disagreement with 
the men at his barbershop and the ensuing mania that overtakes him as he desperately tries to 
assert his moral superiority, the essence of the story is his total failure to deliver his message. His 
egotism is so acute that he fails to recognize that not one of the three people he assumes to have 
in his corner is interested in acknowledging his intelligence and thus humouring his self-idolatry. 
Though he believes himself to be bearing witness to the folly of the men at his barbershop, and 
by extension of all those who support Hawkson, he is revealed by story’s end to be intellectually 
and socially impotent. It is this very impotence that makes of him an ersatz-prophet and, 
therefore, unequipped to be delivering the carefully curated revelations that he composes in his 
home office. 
In consequence, I contend that the main distinction between O’Connor’s early and late 
texts is the absence and presence, respectively, of prophetic figures, and thus of the moment of 
grace made possible by gestures of prophetic violence. Where no revelation is made, no moment 
of grace is accepted or refused. Thus, in “The Barber,” Rayber, who, as I have shown, represents 
the self-deception of false prophets, is barred from earning the epiphanic moment experienced by 
self-deceived characters in O’Connor’s late texts, such as Mrs. Turpin, Asbury, or Julian. Nor is 
the barber returned to reality as Rayber’s violent interjection confuses rather than reveals. 
Moreover, it is Rayber who works himself up into a frenzy before ultimately accosting the barber 
— there is no outside force that interferes to return him to reality, no violent action except his 
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own hysterical outburst, and so he experiences no transformative moment save for a bruised ego 
as he escapes the barbershop humiliated.  
O’Connor’s career-long fixation with the character-type of the ersatz-prophet leads one to 
wonder about what provokes her repeated portrayals. Operating under the assumption that all 
fiction is to varying degrees biographical, I put forth that O’Connor’s ersatz-prophets are farcical 
composites of not only the teachers, classmates, and peers she encountered during her time in 
college and at the Yaddo residency, but of herself as well. In “On Her Own Work” she notes that 
when a writer “has a freak for his hero, he is not simply showing us what we are, but what we 
have been and what we could become,” and that, moreover, “[his] prophet-freak is an image of 
himself” (MM 118). Thus, if the prophet-freak is an image of the author, then I argue so can the 
ersatz-prophet be an honest representation of some less divine aspects of the writer’s personality. 
So considered, Rayber, Asbury, and Julian become illustrations of who O’Connor was or who 
she could have become, if she had not nurtured her prophetic vision. As she writes in “Novelist 
and Believer,” the security of her beliefs allows her to provide honest representations of her 
failures in her fiction, and as such, she does not seek to justify the actions of her characters on a 
“sliding scale of values” (168)—she simply lets her prophet-freaks, her prophets gone wrong, as 
it were, perform the prophetic operations that return the self-deceived to reality.   
 
O’Connor and The Black Prophetic Tradition 
Cornell West begins his introduction to Black Prophetic Fire by asking if we have witnessed 
“the demise of the Black prophetic tradition in present-day America” (1). He goes on to lament 
that since the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., Black America has slowly shifted from a 
“we-consciousness” to an “I-consciousness” characteristic of the “seductive myth of 
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individualism in American culture” (1). To West, the Black prophetic tradition serves as an 
antidote to the contagion of individualism, and so, to this end, his book attempts to fan the dying 
flames of Black prophetic fire by investigating the prophetic roles of Black men and women such 
as King, Ida B. Wells, and Malcolm X. “Without the Black prophetic tradition,” writes West, 
“much of the best of America would be lost and some of the best of the modern world would be 
forgotten” (2). I believe that West’s anxiety over with the capitulation of Black Americans to the 
“individualistic projects in pursuit of wealth, health, and status” (1), insofar as this surrender 
relates to a kind of cultural depreciation, echoes that expressed by O’Connor with regards to the 
South when, in her speech entitled “The Regional Writer”, she states that “prophets have already 
been heard to say that in twenty years there’ll be no such thing as Southern literature” (MM 59). 
Where West decries an individualistic American society “ruled by big money” (1), O’Connor 
cautions the loss of individuality as everything is “reduced to the same flat level,” further 
prophesizing that one day all writers will “be writing about men in gray flannel suits” 
(Conversations with Flannery O’Connor 30). While their points of departure obviously differ, 
O’Connor and West both acknowledge the social and cultural value of prophets, and, moreover, 
bespeak the prophetic vision required for bearing witness to a society hebetated by 
homogenization. Of course, their conceptions of the prophet are not entirely congruent: West 
sees the prophet as a positive force for social change, while prophets in O’Connor’s texts are 
typically failed prophets, and so their prophetic gestures are liable to be shrouded in mysterious 
violence—though, as she observes in her speech “A Reasonable Use of the Unreasonable”, “a 
prophet gone wrong is almost always more interesting [to readers] than your grandmother” (MM 
110). Despite this divergence, both writers ultimately arrive at the same understanding that “the 
prophetic is predicated on critiques of idolatry” (Black Prophetic Fire 125), and that prophetic 
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interventions, or what West calls parrhesia,13 are essential to the mission of offering gestures 
that transcend neat allegories, which is to say gestures that make contact with mystery so to 
provide the countermeasure to idolatry, or, as O’Connor would say, to return us to reality. What 
is more, I aim to show how, despite O’Connor’s expressed skepticism towards some of the more 
prominent Black prophetic figures of her time, her late texts, including private letters composed 
in the final year of her life, reveal an affinity for Black prophetic fire. 
In a May 21, 1964 letter to Maryat Lee, approximately two and a half months before her 
death, O’Connor writes: 
About the Negroes, the kind I don't like is the philosophizing prophesying pontificating 
kind, the James Baldwin kind. Very ignorant but never silent. Baldwin can tell us what it 
feels like to be a Negro in Harlem but he tries to tell us everything else too. [Martin Luther] 
King I don't think is the age's great saint but he's at least doing what he can do & has to do. 
[...] My question is usually, would this person be endurable if white? If Baldwin were 
white nobody would stand him a minute. I prefer Cassius Clay [...] Cassius is too good for 
the Moslems. You can have half interest in Mary Grace. (HB 580) 
There is quite a bit to unpack here, from O'Connor's lukewarm recognition of Martin Luther 
King, to her admiration of Muhammad Ali despite her use of his forsaken birth name Cassius 
Clay, to her distaste for James Baldwin. The diatribe is a veritable hit list of the movement's most 
popular leaders, the 'philosophizing prophesying pontificating' kind that are never silent; the 
unruly, uppity kind who, as Julian's mother expresses in “Everything That Rises Must 
Converge,” can very well rise, “but on their side of the fence” (CW 488). Curious that Malcolm 
X, a very public and very controversial Black rights activist whom West describes a “the great 
																																																						
13	From West: “The term parrhesia goes back to line 24A of Plato’s Apology, where Socrates says, the 
cause of my unpopularity was my parrhesia, my fearless speech” (112).	
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figure of revolutionary parrhesia in the Black prophetic tradition” (Black Prophetic Fire 112), 
manages to escape the list considering that his personality fits perfectly with O'Connor's profile 
of the “philosophizing prophesying pontificating kind.” In fact, O'Connor does not discuss 
Malcolm X, or the Nation of Islam, in any of her collected letters, save for her assertion that 
“Cassius is too good for the Moslems” (HB 580). The omission could be the result of O’Connor 
simply not knowing all that much about either Malcolm X or “the Moslems.” After all, Malcolm 
X only became a cultural icon after his murder, which occurred approximately 6 months after 
O’Connor’s death.14 Moreover, as Baldwin indicates in The Fire Next Time, few Americans15 
knew anything at all about Islam or the Black Muslims. Of his meeting the with members of the 
Nation of Islam, he writes:  
[in] a way, I owe the invitation [to meet with Elijah Muhammad] to the incredible, 
abysmal, and really cowardly obtuseness of white liberals. Whether in private debate or 
in public, any attempt I made to explain how the Black Muslim movement came about, 
and how it has achieved such a force, was met with a blankness that revealed the little 
connection that the liberals' attitudes have with their perceptions or their lives, or even 
																																																						
14As David Remnick notes in the April 25, 2011 issue of the New Yorker, though vivid, Malcolm was a 
secondary figure in his own time and it was not until the massive success of Alex Haley's biography of 
Malcolm that he became an icon. Between 1965 and 1977, “The Autobiography of Malcolm X” sold six 
million copies worldwide. 
15 With the exception of some more cosmopolitan Americans such as, for example, investigative journalist 
I.F. Stone who in an essay titled “The Pilgrimage of Malcolm X” displayed a sensitive and nuanced 
understanding of the appeal of the Nation of Islam to Black Americans: “There is a special reason for the 
efficacy of the Black Muslims in reaching the Negro damned. The sickness of the Negro in America is 
that he has been made to feel a nigger; the genocide is psychic. The Negro must rid himself of this feeling 
if he is to stand erect again. He can do so in two ways. He can change the outer world of white 
supremacy, or he can change his inner world by “conversion.” The teachings of the Black Muslims may 
be fantastic but they are superbly suited to the task of shaking off the feeling of nigger-ness.” (New York 
Review of Books, November 11, 1965). It should be noted, however, that Stone was considered to be a 
radical. 
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their knowledge—revealed, in fact, that they could deal with the Negro as a symbol or a 
victim but had no sense of him as a man. (The Fire Next Time 72) 
O’Connor’s potential obliviousness with regards to Malcolm X and the Black Muslim 
movement, however, is an unsatisfying and, I argue, unlikely possibility. The purpose of my 
reference to the above citation is thus not to align her with the described obtuse white liberals, 
but to posit the inverse argument: O’Connor was not obtuse in the least.  
Given her cultured intellectual life, by which I mean not only her New Critical education at 
the University of Iowa, but also the vigour with which she kept abreast with contemporary 
writers and thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, François Mauriac, or Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, I 
believe it is fair to assume that O’Connor was also up to date with current events, including the 
rising popularity of the Nation of Islam and various other Black empowerment movements 
across the country. Surely she was aware of, for example, Elijah Mohammad’s now famous 
speech in Atlanta in 1961, which had been advertised as a major confrontation between the 
Nation of Islam and the Ku Klux Klan16 and which drew thousands of spectators. Louis Lomax 
describes the scene in When the World is Given: “With a seating capacity of only five hundred, 
the auditorium was jammed hours before the meeting began; another two thousand people lined 
up along the dirt road leading to the auditorium and heard the speech over loud-speakers” (110). 
In response to the fervour with which the NOI was received by Atlanta’s Black population, the 
																																																						
16 The rise of white supremacy, particularly in O’Connor’s state of Georgia, served only to exacerbate 
these already volatile social tensions. As Stephen G.N. Tuck writes: “In parallel with the renewed 
dominance of the [Herman] Talmadge faction, the Associated Klans of Georgia remerged from a wartime 
low of 12 Klavern to over 110 Klaverns, with an estimated 100,000 members by the summer of 1949. At 
a time when Klan activity was decreasing across the South and even in Mississippi, Klan membership, 
therefore, almost equaled the number of Black registered voters across the state. The growth of the Klan 
translated into renewed racial violence. During the first six months of 1948, the Southern Regional 
Council documented an unprecedented dozen reported attacks in Georgia. The following year, Georgia 
led the South in extralegal racial violence” (“The Struggle for Racial Equality in Georgia” 314).	
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Klan organized a boycott of businesses run by Muslims, as well as a rally of its own in 
opposition, to be held on the same day and at the same time.17 Thus, with such turmoil brewing 
in Atlanta only 100 miles away from her home in Milledgville, it is more likely than not that 
O’Connor was at least tangentially familiar with the uprising of the Nation of Islam and with the 
corresponding fear percolating in the country that the Black Muslims were a menace that 
exacerbated the already tenuous state of race relations.  
But if O’Connor was not paying attention to the rise of Black Muslims in 1961, she is 
certainly aware of their influence by 1964 when she asserts, even if only superficially, that Clay 
is “too good for the Moslems.” This assertion suggests that the writer shared the prevailing point 
of view that the Black Muslims were a band of derelicts who, as Lomax notes, represented “an 
extreme reaction to the problem of being a Negro in America” (The Negro Revolt 77) in the 20th 
Century. As historians Randy Robert and Johnny Smith detail in the finely researched biography 
Blood Brothers: The Fatal Friendship Between Muhammad Ali and Malcolm X, this 
understanding of the Black Muslims is also what leads many Americans to vehemently reject and 
deride Ali’s decision to forsake his birth name: 
Muhammad Ali […] sounded too foreign and too subversive. Skeptical of his sincerity, the 
Chicago Tribune printed an editorial assailing his religious beliefs: “It needs to be made 
quite clear that the ‘Islam’ which heavyweight Champion Cassius Clay has adopted is a far, 
far cry from the religion practiced in the Arab world.” (223) 
A widespread distrust of the unknown other combined with an innate fear of Black revenge thus 
breeds a dismissive attitude towards Ali’s self-affirmation.  
																																																						
17 Imperial Wizard J.B. Stoner wrote a letter to the Honorable Elijah Muhammad on April 10 1961 to 
dissuade the Nation of Islam from holding their rally in Atlanta: 
http://mdah.ms.gov/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/photo.php?display=large&oid=610 
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In the case of O’Connor’s use of Clay over Ali, however, I would note that she deserves the 
benefit of the doubt, even if the general confusion surrounding the prize fighter’s disavowal of a 
name that held direct ties18 to slavery reveals how just detached many Americans were from the 
conditions of Black Americans. As Ralph C. Wood twice indicates, the name change had not yet 
occurred at the time of writing of the May 21 letter:  
O'Connor felt that the brash young boxer who later renamed himself Muhammad Ali 
understood [the complex matter of racial manners] as many others did not. In a televised 
interview with Eric Sevareid, Cassius Clay (as he was then called) had lamented the hatred 
of whites that the civil rights movement had spawned [...] (Christ Haunted South 111). 
Moreover, many news publications19 and radio broadcasters continued to use Ali’s birth name for 
several years, in some cases out of negligence,20 while in other cases out of resistance.21 To make 
matters even more confusing, Cassius Clay was typically very misleading with reporters, 
constantly emphasizing that he was not a “Black Muslim” and that he was not a member of the 
Nation of Islam. But as Robert and Smith note, Clay had been intrigued by the “Black Muslims” 
since he was a teenager and had even travelled to Detroit to see Elijah Mohammad and Malcolm 
																																																						
18 Ali's namesake was 19th Century Kentucky planter, journalist, and politician Cassius Marcellus Clay, a 
prominent emancipationist who, like many of the white liberal allies to the civil rights activists of the 
1950s and 60s, was a pragmatist who favoured gradual emancipation over the immediate abolition of 
slavery. 
19 Although O’Connor did have little patience for journalists, calling them in a September ‘63 letter to 
“A” the “slobberheartedest lily-mindedest piously conniving crowd in the modern world” (HB 537).  
20 Victor Mather notes in a June 9, 2016 article for the New York Times that between 1964 and 1968 the 
Times, the perceived standard bearer for journalistic integrity, used ‘Cassius Clay’ almost ten times as 
often as they used ‘Muhammad Ali’. In some cases, the negligence is almost laughable: “A Times article 
in 1966 noted that Ali balked at accepting an award because it was inscribed to Cassius Clay, not 
Muhammad Ali. The article’s headline was “Clay Gets Award as Boxer of Year.” On page 36 of the Feb. 
6, 1967, edition, there were three stories about Ali. A preview of his fight with Ernie Terrell and a Sports 
of The Times column about the match referred to him as Clay. A news story about his speech at a 
Houston mosque called him Muhammad Ali in the headline, but Clay in the text.”  
21 As Roberts and Smith note in Blood Brothers: “Mocking Ali, columnist Jim Murray referred to him as 
“Abdul the Bull Ameer.” Sonny Liston also dismissed the champ’s new name: ‘Ahmed Mali, Mamud 
Wally, who’s that? I met you as Cassius Clay and I’ll leave you as Cassius Clay’” (223). 
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X speak in 1962. Privately, Clay became close friends with Malcolm X and his family, while 
publicly he deflected the growing suspicions of savvy reporters and developed a “nonthreatening 
image—an image of a smiling, jovial “Negro,” an entertainer cracking harmless jokes and 
reciting poems, an act encouraged by his white managers” (Robert and Smith 140). Only after he 
defeated Sonny Liston for the world heavyweight championship in February of 1964 did Clay 
begin to publicly address his association with the Nation of Islam and his friendship with Elijah 
Mohammad and Malcolm X. Interestingly, it is precisely this empowered Ali for whom 
O’Connor expressed admiration in letters to A. (28 March 64) and Maryat Lee (21 May 64). Her 
claim that “Cassius is too good for the Moslems” is therefore ironic since it is through the 
teachings of the Nation of Islam that Ali developed the very rhetoric that she admired.  
I suggest that there is a second layer of irony to O’Connor’s take on the Nation of Islam 
insofar as she and Malcolm X shared some similar views with regards to the forced integration of 
whites and Blacks and the hypocritical nature of Yankee liberals in general.22 Malcolm X 
regularly spoke of his distrust of government-sanctioned integration in his speeches, 
understanding it to be nothing more than token integration,23 a few crumbs of social equality that 
did not solve any of the deep-rooted problems that affected the Black communities of the United 
States. Integration was to Malcolm X’s mind but another method of social control, no different 
																																																						
22 Malcolm X uses the term 'White Liberal' instead of O'Connor's 'Yankee Liberal', but I think it is fair to 
say that both terms more or less refer to the same group of people.  
23 Amiri Baraka describes tokenism thus in “Tokenism: 300 Years for Five Cents” Home: Social Essays: 
“Tokenism is that philosophy (of psychological exploitation) which is supposed to assuage my natural 
inclinations toward complete freedom. For the middle-class Negro, this assuagement can take the form it 
takes in the mainstream of American life, i.e., material acquisition, or the elevating of one “select” coon to 
some position that seems heaped in “prestige.” [...] But the lower-class Negro cannot use this kind of 
tokenism, so he is pretty much left in the lurch. But so effective is this kind of crumb-dropping among the 
soi-disant Black middle class that these people become the actual tokens themselves, or worse” (98).  
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from the chains that bound his ancestors. 24 While their point of departure differs greatly, I 
believe that we find within the kernels of Malcom X’s skepticism of the white liberal the very 
same distrust O’Connor feels toward liberal idealism. Let us remember the letter to Dawkins in 
which she grumbles that the “Liberal approach is that man has never fallen, never incurred guilt, 
and is ultimately perfectible by his own efforts” (303). O’Connor is strictly opposed to the notion 
of the perfectibility of man and views the ministrations of metropolitan intellectuals as self-
serving gestures of vanity. In this sense, her point of view on the racial divide is much more 
aligned with that of Ali, Malcolm X, or even Amiri Baraka than might at first glance be obvious. 
Take as reference Baraka’s objection to the delusions of progressive ideals in his 1962 essay 
“Tokenism: 300 years for five cents”:   
Liberals, as good post-Renaissance men, believe wholeheartedly in progress. [...] The 
liberal is in a strange position because his conscience, unlike the conscience of his richer 
or less intelligent brothers, has always bothered him about these acts, but never 
sufficiently to move him to any concrete action except the setting up of palliatives and 
symbols to remind him of his own good faith. […] But, for me, the idea of “progress” is a 
huge fallacy. An absurd Western egoism that has been foisted on the rest of the world as 
an excuse for slavery and colonialism. (H 95-96) 
Baraka’s distrust of liberal ideals of progress echoes misgivings expressed by O’Connor 
throughout her life. The major difference is of course that while O’Connor expresses her distrust 
																																																						
24 This is a sentiment that Malcolm X expressed in many of his speeches and interviews, usually using as 
reference point the difference between the wolf and the fox: “No, the South is no different from the North. 
Let me tell you the only difference. The white man in the South is a wolf. You know where he stands. 
When he opens his mouth and you see his teeth he looks vicious. Well, the only difference between the 
white man in the South and the white man in the North is that one is a wolf and this one is a fox. The fox 
will lynch you and you won’t even know you have been lynched. The fox will Jim Crow you and you 
don’t even know you’re Jim Crowed. And this is the basic difference between the southern white man and 
the northern white man” (“The Old Negro and The New Negro). 
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of liberal ideals of progress from the point of a view that we are all fallen creatures and 
perfectible only by the grace of God in the afterlife, Baraka and company operate from a position 
that is fundamentally subversive. Perhaps it is this opposition of perspectives between Blacks 
and whites that leads O’Connor to state that harmony between the two races “requires 
considerable grace” and that the particular history of the South requires a strict adherence to a 
code of manners for people to get along and live their lives peacefully. “Formality,” O’Connor 
expresses in an interview with C. Ross Mullins, Jr., 
preserves that individual privacy which everybody needs and, in these times, is always in 
danger of losing. It’s particularly necessary to have in order to protect the rights of both 
races. When you have a common code of manners based on charity, then when the 
charity fails—as it is going to do continuously—you’ve got those manners there to 
preserve each race from small intrusions upon the other. The uneducated Southern Negro 
is not the clown he’s made out to be. He’s a man of very elaborate manners and great 
formality which he uses superbly for his own protection and to insure his own privacy. 
 (Conversations with Flannery O’Connor 103-04) 
O’Connor’s description of code of manners based on the Catholic virtue of charity, or ‘caritas’ 
which refers to the Christian love of humankind, bears a striking resemblance to one expressed in 
Malcolm X’s autobiography where he urges for a spirit of mutual charity to help end “the basic 
causes that produce the racial explosions in America today.” 25 Contrary to popular belief, 
brotherhood is central to Malcolm X’s philosophy, particularly after he returns to the United 
																																																						
25 From Alex Haley & Malcolm X’s The Autobiography of Malcolm X: “In our mutual sincerity we might 
be able to show a road to the salvation of America’s very soul. It can only be salvaged if human rights and 
dignity, in full, are extended to Black men. Only such real, meaningful actions as those which are sincerely 
motivated from a deep sense of humanism and moral responsibility can get at the basic causes that produce the 
racial explosions in America today. Otherwise, the racial explosions are only going to grow worse” (384). 
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States from his pilgrimage to the Mecca in November 1964, three months after O’Connor’s 
death, and 4 months before his murder. Thus, while there is no record of O’Connor engaging 
with Malcolm X’s prophesying, and, conversely, Malcolm X likely never read a page of 
O’Connor’s work, the two share synchronous points of view on two fronts: their distrust of 
liberal ideals of progress, and their belief in the healing power of mutual charity. With that said, 
O’Connor does engage with Malcolm X by proxy—that is to say, she engages with his ideas, or 
at least with versions of his ideas, through her admiration for his most famous student, 
Muhammad Ali.    
In the aforementioned May 21 letter to Lee, O’Connor delights in Ali’s answer to the 
question of whether he and his Muslim brothers and sisters hate white people: “Cassius Clay 
says he don't like all this talk about hate. Says a tiger come in the room with you gonna either run 
or shoot him. That don't mean you hate the tiger. It just means you know you and him can't make 
it out” (HB 571). Wood observes that O’Connor “obviously relished the colorful language of 
Clay [and] suspected that the uneducated ring-fighter from Louisville struck deeper truth than the 
cultured integrationists who had no real understanding of Southern Blacks” (Flannery O’Connor 
and the Christ Haunted South 111). The critic’s phrasing suggests that O’Connor’s preference for 
Ali over King and Baldwin appears to be predicated on his not being like the cultured 
integrationists—in other words, on his being uneducated and uncultured, and most importantly, 
on not being an advocate for integration. One may counter-argue that it is Ali’s commonality 
with Southern Blacks as a Southern Black man that endears O’Connor to the prize fighter, but 
this argument would be inadequate since King was also a from the South, and Baldwin, though 
from the North, was raised by Southerners, and so was not exactly a stranger to the particularities 
of the Southern Black experience. I thus contend that it is O’Connor’s distrust of, and distaste 
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for, cosmopolitan intellectualism, or what she perceives as such, that leads her to dismiss King 
and Baldwin’s respective prophesying in favour of Ali’s captivating street smarts. Indeed, his 
layman wisdom has more in common with that of characters like Coleman from “Judgment Day” 
or the farm hands in “The Enduring Chill” and “Revelation” than it does with the learned 
reasoning of characters like Rayber, Julian, or Asbury. Of course, Ali is much more verbose than 
Coleman and the farm hands, but it is their shared ability to outwit the white man that the writer 
finds so alluring.  
Conversely, O’Connor decrees Baldwin a sophist and writes him off as an ersatz-prophet 
akin to her pontificating characters: “Baldwin can tell us what it feels like to be a Negro in 
Harlem but he tries to tell us everything else too” (HB 580). Blinded by her distaste for 
cosmopolitan intellectualism, she dismisses Baldwin outright and consequently deems his 
prophetic operations of bearing witness as the confabulations of someone who is “very ignorant 
but never silent.” O’Connor thus likens Baldwin to Rayber, when, I would argue, he has much 
more in common with Mary Grace. You will recall that Mary Grace’s attack upon Ruby Turpin in 
the waiting room of a doctor’s office serves as the prophetic intervention by which Mrs. Turpin 
consequently experiences an action of grace as she later hoses down her hog pen. Thus, just as 
Ruby Turpin has difficulty accepting Mary Grace’s prophetic message, so does O’Connor 
struggle with accepting Baldwin’s prophetic role.  
Interestingly, however, O’Connor seems to acknowledge this very struggle near the end of 
the May 21 letter. After declaring her preference for Clay over Baldwin, she concludes her 
meditation on philosophizing, prophesying, pontificating Black men with the following: “You 
can have half interest in Mary Grace” (HB 580). This reference to Mary Grace in the context of 
comments on Baldwin, King, and Clay is quite revelatory insofar as the writer here associates the 
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prophetic function of these three men with that of her own prophetic character, the pimple-faced 
college student who thrusts her Human Development textbook at the self-idolizing Mrs. Turpin. 
While this is the only reference to “Revelation” in the letter, O’Connor had written to Lee about 
the text a week earlier on May 15 (HB 577), seemingly in response to her friend’s reading of the 
story, confirming that Mrs. Turpin does indeed experience a mysterious Jacobian vision. In fact, 
O’Connor adds that this purgatorial vision of the “vast horde of souls [rumbling] to heaven” (CW 
654) is the entire point of her story. She further comments that Mrs. Turpin operates as a country 
female Jacob, and just like many an O’Connor character before her, she wrestles with her 
moment of grace, confused, bitter, and self-pitying before ultimately experiencing her humbling 
epiphany. Thus, while Mary Grace’s prophetic intervention, in terms of narrative structure, is but 
the inciting incident that sets the story’s true conflict in motion—which is to say, Mrs. Turpin’s 
coming to terms with her spiritual conflict—it is nonetheless a critical element of O’Connor’s 
narrative poetics: the prophet first bears witness to Mrs. Turpin’s self-idolatry, and then, in her 
frustrated rage, repudiates that which has been witnessed with a violent gesture of provocation 
before finally revealing her prophetic message that Mrs. Turpin should “Go back to hell where 
[she] came from” (CW 646). This pattern, or a close variation of it, is repeated in both 
“Everything That Rises Must Converge” and “Judgment Day” in the comportment of her Black 
prophets, Carver’s mother and Tanner’s neighbour respectively: they bear witness to behaviour 
they deem unacceptable, respond to it with violence, and pronounce a revelatory message, the 
sum of these events suggesting that the protagonists have been offered a moment of grace, 
which, in both cases, comes with the “considerable cost” of their lives. O’Connor’s Black 
prophets thus express a Black rage, or to return to West, a parrhesia, that, “viewed through the 
narrow lens of the American mainstream as Black revenge, sits at the center of Malcolm’s soul” 
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(114). Thus, while O’Connor may only have had (at best) a half interest in the prophetic 
functions of Baldwin, King, or even Malcolm X, I put forth that the fire of the Black prophetic 
tradition nevertheless glimmers in these late texts as both Carver’s mother and Tanner’s 





The Geranium Variations  
 
 
Though bits and pieces of Flannery O'Connor's oeuvre would trickle out in the years following 
her death, from her occasional prose and private letters to her cartoons and book reviews, there is 
something undeniably uncanny about her career beginning and ending with variants of her early 
story “The Geranium”—something that invites her readers to approach the different versions not 
simply as vaguely related drafts of the same thing, but rather as movements of a larger text. In 
her introduction to the final section of The Habit of Being, Sally Fitzgerald expresses a similar 
opinion when she writes that through her last few stories, O'Connor had “achieved her form as a 
writer, the realization of that potential body of work, uniquely her own, to which everything she 
had written before had contributed” (559-60). In the case of “The Geranium,” Fitzgerald's claim 
becomes quite literal given the story's different incarnations over the course of twenty or so 
years, culminating in the aptly titled “Judgment Day.” Yet, the stories to which Fitzgerald refers 
are “Revelation” and “Parker's Back,” the latter having first been conceptualized in early January 
of 1961, and then completed an hour at a time twice a day in the last weeks of her life. I contend, 
however, that “Judgment Day,” which, as Fitzgerald notes, would be completed alongside 
“Parker's Back” while “she was more or less in extremis” (HB 559), deserves to be included with 
	 63	
these form-achieving stories for two reasons: first, because of the complex nature of its poetics, 
and second, because it is O'Connor's most in-depth portrayal of the racial divide.  
 The protracted composition of “Judgment Day” is an atypical chapter in O'Connor's brief 
career, especially when we consider that the story is a complete re-write of “The Geranium,” her 
first published work26 as well as the titular story of her master's thesis in creative writing for the 
University of Iowa. In fact, she would draft four versions of the story between the original 1946 
publication and the 1964 version from Everything That Rises Must Converge.27 Yet, despite the 
time and effort she devoted to the story, it would continue to lodge in the back of her mind like 
buzzards in a tree, evolving first from 1945's “The Geranium” to “An Exile in the East” 
sometime between late 1954 and early 1955. O'Connor submitted this second variation as part A 
Good Man Is Hard to Find with the conviction that draft had undergone enough changes to be 
considered a different story, further justifying her decision by pointing out that she had not been 
paid by Accent for the first version: “[...] I enclose both stories so [the editor] can see what she's 
doing. I don't want to go to the penitentiary for selling a story twice (but if I do I would like to 
get a good price for the story)” (HB 74). The story would ultimately be cut from the collection, 
leading O'Connor to retrieve the copies she had shared with friends but promising to send them 
“back in some better shape” (88) after injecting them with shots of ACTH.28 Her attempts to 
breathe new life into the text would result in the third variation, “Getting Home,” which would 
never be developed beyond the manuscript phase. 
																																																						
26 Published in Accent: A Quarterly of New Literature (1946). 
27 All four of which collected in Flannery O'Connor: The Growing Craft (1992). 
28 Adrenocorticotropic hormone. Used to regulate levels of cortisol. O’Connor was likely familiar the 
hormone due to her lupus, a disease which primarily attacks the body’s immune system. Low cortisol 
levels are typically an indication of a weakened immune system.  
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 By the end of 1963 O'Connor's health had begun to deteriorate and she no longer had the 
energy necessary to produce new work, leading to the plodding composition of “Parker's Back,” 
which she describes in a 15 July letter to editor Catherine Carver as having been drug out of 
herself (HB 593). And so, with the turn of the new year she enlisted the help of editor Robert 
Giroux and set out to prepare a final collection, Everything That Rises Must Converge, originally 
scheduled for a Fall 1964 publication. But as transfusions became more frequent and her 
condition continued to worsen, O'Connor's letters to Giroux began to reveal, on the one hand, a 
sense of urgency in wanting to complete and collect the strongest work possible, while on the 
other, a solemn awareness that she would not likely survive her deadline. Perhaps it was this 
dread of not producing enough suitable material for a new book that motivated O'Connor to 
return to her Geranium Variations a final time to see if she could at long last fashion the material 
into a well-crafted story worthy of inclusion in her last collection. In a letter to Giroux from May 
21, she refers to a story, without mentioning its title, on which she had been intermittently 
working for several years that might be ready for inclusion, but claims that she “would rather 
have six or seven good stories than six or seven good and one bad....” (HB 579-580). Roughly a 
month later, once again omitting the title, she tells Giroux that she has completed a story that she 
believes can replace the inferior “The Partridge Festival,” but that she is still unsure about it and 
that she would like to ruminate on it a while longer before sending it along. Around the same 
time, she expresses in a June 17 letter to Carver that she continues to feel displeased with the 
story: “I've got one that I'm not satisfied with that I finished at the same time as “Revelation” and 
when I get home I'm going to send it to you as is, and ask you to let me know what you think of 
it” (HB 585). I believe that it is worth noting that O'Connor first mentions being at work on 
“Revelation” in a November 5, 1963 letter to playwright Cecil Dawkins. Four days later, in a 
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letter to her pen pal “A”, she declares that she has written a story about which she is undecided, 
but by November 29, she tells Maryat Lee that she is “pleased pleased pleased” (547-551) with it 
and submits it to the Sewanee Review for the Spring issue of 1964. The story takes O'Connor 
about eight weeks to complete and is published within six months, a germination period that 
stands in stark opposition to that of “Judgment Day.” It goes without saying that there is no 
accounting for the elusive spark that makes the production of one piece of work more expedient 
than another—for the perfect blend of luck and timing that converts the seed of an idea into a 
floret of fine art. In the words of Leonard Cohen, “If I knew where the good songs came from, 
I'd go there more often.”29 
 The amount of time devoted to “Judgment Day” in comparison to that given to 
“Revelation” suggests that the cause of O'Connor's discontent with the story must have been 
stirred by more than aesthetic dissatisfaction. In a June 27 letter to Carver, O'Connor asks the 
editor if she thinks the story is “fitten[sic] for the collection” or if she thinks it can at least be 
made so. “It's a re-write of a story that I have had around since 1946,” she continues, “and never 
been satisfied with, but I hope I have it now except for a few details maybe” (HB 588). In her 
final letter to Carver, she thanks the editor for her notes, explains a passage that she claims only 
someone born south of the Mason Dixon line can fully appreciate30 and maintains that she will 
continue to work on the story when she is able to climb out of bed and sit in front of her 
typewriter. This is sixteen days before her death, and given that we know she wrote her last letter 
																																																						
29 Leonard Cohen repeats a version of this in an October 2016 interview with Billboard: “I’ve often said if 
I knew where the good songs came from, I’d go there more often. Everybody has a kind of magical 
system… that they employ in the hopes that this will open up the channels.”  
30 O'Connor attempts to make clarification about the line: “You make a monkey out of one of them and he 
jumps on your back and stays there for life, but let one make a monkey out of you and all you can do is 
kill him or disappear.” According to O'Connor, this a cherished white Southern expression which, she 
explains, is true since the “Negro is on [the White man's] back” (HB 593).  
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on July 28 in what Fitzgerald calls “an almost illegible scrawl,” we can surmise that not very 
much was accomplished between the promise to Carver to keep labouring away at “Judgment 
Day” and her passing on August 3. While “Parker's Back” and “Revelation” were, strictly 
speaking, the last two stories O'Connor conceived, “Judgment Day” remained in progress till 
nearly her last breath. 
 Giroux would complete the work on Everything That Rises Must Converge and ultimately 
decide to include “Judgment Day” as the final story in the book. O'Connor's last piece of work is 
thus the last story in her last collection, and, moreover, recounts the final hours of a sickly old 
man. With all of this in mind, the story's title is suddenly charged with considerable meta-textual 
force and the poetic parallels become almost too melancholy to bear.31 The Variations reveal 
O'Connor's deep sense of artistic dissatisfaction, a disquiet she confesses regularly feeling to “A” 
on July 11 1964: “Would you mind casting your eye over [“Parker's Back”] and returning it on to 
me. I never know if what I do works until at least a year after it's written, at least I'm never sure” 
(HB 592). There are, of course, other examples of O'Connor revisiting early drafts of her work 
and developing them into something else altogether, such as her early story “The Train” 
becoming the first chapter of her first novel Wise Blood, or “You Can't Be Any Poorer Than 
Dead” becoming the first chapter of The Violent Bear it Away, but those edits are expansions 
rather than re-drafts or complete re-writes. And while her letter to “A” proves that a lack of 
confidence in her work was standard fare, her repeated re-examinations of the source material for 
the Geranium Variations confirms that this case of discontent was particularly acute. The source 
of these unabating feelings, however, remains unclear. There is certainly much to dislike in “The 
Geranium” from a stylistic point of view, from short staccato-like sentences and unfocused 
																																																						
31 At no point in her letters does O'Connor refer to the story by this title, which, to my mind, suggests that 
Giroux gave the story its final title. 
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paragraphs to an inconsistent narrator, to a lazy deployment of narrative details, such as, for 
example, a grandson that is mentioned once near the beginning of the story and then discarded. It 
is unlikely, however, that her nagging discontent with the story was solely driven by the stylistic 
shortcomings of her earlier drafts. A comparative reading of the first and final versions could 
yield a convincing argument about the dubious characterization of her Black characters 
necessitating revision, yet, given her distinct Southern point of view, it would be surprising if this 
was the tell-tale fault that burdened her over the course of her career.  
In a 1965 review of Everything That Rises Must Converge, Warren Coffey proposes that 
most writers, O'Connor included, have a paradigm story; that is, a story that they write again and 
again over the length of their careers, returning to the same themes, ideas, and character-types in 
an effort to at last express whatever it is that they feel they have struggled to properly capture. 
Coffey describes O'Connor's paradigm story as being a “kind of morality play in which Pride of 
Intellect (usually Irreligion) has a shattering encounter with the Corrupt Human Heart (the 
Criminal, the Insane, sometimes the Sexually Demonic)” (CR 385) and either learns from the 
errors of their ways, or else perishes, or, in some cases, both. Coffey is accurate in pointing out 
that O'Connor had a preferred set of themes and ideas to which she repeatedly returned in her 
fiction, as the formula applies to stories such as “Good Country People”, “The Comforts of 
Home”, and “Everything That Rises Must Converge.” I believe, however, that his assessment of 
her paradigm story is wanting in that it does not adequately account for “Judgment Day,” a story 
that I believe is not only the writer’s most accomplished, but, more importantly, wholly distinct 
from any of her other writing, novels included. While certain details of the story do fit within the 
identified paradigm in a very general manner, the equation, PI + CHH= Transformation, is more 
complex. Pride of Intellect is present, yet takes the form of Tanner’s daughter (as symbol for the 
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secular North and homogenization of the country in general) rather than the main protagonist, 
Tanner himself. Moreover, the Corrupt Human Heart is not readily identifiable, as it is, for 
example, in “The Comforts of Home” where Thomas (PI) is confronted by the “sexually 
demonic” Sarah Ham (CHH). The facile answer would be the (black angry) actor neighbour who 
refuses Tanner’s camaraderie and ultimately expedites his downfall and death. But such a 
distillation would be a shallow and, quite frankly, lazy reading of the text. I argue that the figure 
of the Corrupt Human Heart is a much more abstract and all-encompassing spectre that haunts 
Tanner throughout the majority of the story; that is, the social and political changes sweeping 
over the country, for better or worse.  
So, where does this position Tanner within O’Connor’s paradigm story’s algebraic 
equation PI + CHH= T? At the risk of exhausting the analogy, Tanner is a constant (a) which 
does not depend on the main variables (PI and CHH) of the studied problem, the equation 
thereby becoming a(PI + CHH)= T. In other words, unlike any of O’Connor’s other stories, the 
variables of Pride of Intellect and the Corrupt Human Heart are compounded into a single value, 
rather than the regular protagonist versus antagonist, while Tanner functions in opposition to 
their conjoined narrative representations. Yet, from a narrative point of view, this is precisely the 
conflict that plagues Tanner and drives the action of the story: the constant nature of his purview 
and outlook directly results in his demise, insofar as he will not adapt to the changing South and 
thus opts to move North with his daughter, and then once North, cannot adapt to the inhospitable 
culture of the city.  
Another element that sets this story apart from the rest of O’Connor’s writing is her use 
of an intricate narrative temporal frame: an imbricated series of flashbacks bookended by 
Tanner's final moments before his hapless death. The flashback is interesting because it appears 
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late in her career and evolves rather quickly. Yet, it is not so much the complexity of the narrative 
frame that merits our attention as it is O'Connor's use of the flashback in general. It is a literary 
device uncommon to her usual narrative poetics, appearing exclusively in “Parker's Back,” The 
Violent Bear It Away, and “Judgment Day,” though used more conventionally in the two former 
texts than in the story in question.32 We know from her letters that even in her dying days she 
was surrounded by a sea of redrafts and edits, desperate as she was to complete Everything That 
Rises Must Converge in the limited work time that remained. In this sense, “Judgment Day” 
becomes O'Connor's white whale, and the Geranium Variations her life-long chase after the 
perfect expression of an imperfect perspective, that of the Southern white in relation to her Black 
counterpart. Furthermore, since the device begins to appear only in her later work, and in a 
notably more experimental form in “Judgment Day,” there is reason to believe that these late 
texts provide her readers with a glimpse of the direction her writing may have taken had she not 
succumbed to complications from her surgery for fibroma. Her premature death33 therefore 
robbed her readers of what appeared to be an evolving literary practice that became more 
complex and conceptual as her confidence grew and her sensibilities matured. 
 
 
On “Everything That Rises Must Converge” 
The placement of “Judgment Day” as the closing piece of Everything That Rises Must Converge 
establishes it as a kind of diptych to the titular story that opens it: both are centred on quarrels 
between ageing parents and thankless offspring; both delve into the complexities of race 
																																																						
32 In his essay “In 'Parker's Back': A Technical Slip by Flannery O'Connor,” James J. Napier argues that 
O'Connor in fact misuses the device, but ultimately suggests that the author's mistake was a purposeful 
subversion of narrative conventions. 
33 Her 1952 diagnosis of systemic lupus erythematosus had estimated only five more years to live, yet she 
survived for another fourteen, and thus in this way her death was not premature at all. That being said, 
thirty-nine years old is an early death by any stretch of the imagination. 
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relations; both reflect Southern attitudes of the times and the clash between traditional values and 
social progress; and both conclude with violent deaths and guilt-ridden children. To take this 
point a step further, I claim that “Everything That Rise Must Converge” serves as an introduction 
to “Judgment Day” as it prepares the readers for stories that involve Black characters who serve 
as more than labourers, or children, or extras in a crowd; that is, Black characters with more 
agency than in any other of O’Connor’s stories or novels. 
The two texts share another crucial detail: in both cases, the white characters who are 
attacked are entirely unaware of their complicity in their undoing — that is, they fail to 
understand why their Black counterparts vehemently reject their social advances and confront 
them with violence. Moreover, the acts of violence in these stories differ considerably from many 
of the other acts of violence in the rest of her fiction. They are not of some random occurrence or 
unlucky encounter. The violence in these stories is not the same as that in, say, “A Good Man is 
Hard to Find” where the Misfit must kill the grandmother and her family because he is on the 
lam and has been recognized. Neither does it resemble the violence at the conclusion of “The 
Displaced Person” where the farmhand Shortley commits the first-degree murder of the Polish 
refugee Guizac by staging a tractor accident. The violence we witness in “Everything that Rises 
Must Converge” and “Judgment Day” is much more furious, much more profound; provoked by 
a sudden need of indemnification, of a quick, passionate response in the form of aggression. Or 
so it is, at least, from the perspective of a white Southern upper middle-class woman. 
Jean W. Cash reveals in Flannery O'Connor: A Life that as O’Connor was working on 
“Everything That Rises Must Converge” in the spring of 1961, “she told several of her 
correspondents—Maryat Lee, Roslyn Barnes, and Brainard Cheney—that she was using Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin’s ‘proposition’ to “comment on a certain topical issue in these parts” (468), 
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referring to the racial integration of public services and, by extension, the various labours of the 
Civil Rights movement in general. John D. Sykes Jr. believes that an un-ironic reading of the 
title suggests that “racial reconciliation lies in the future,” basing his reading on Teilhard’s 
theory that “evolution and the progressive development of human consciousness [point] toward 
an ultimate unity in an Omega point in the future” (CR 137). The reconciliation between whites 
and Blacks fails to occur within the timeframe of the stories, leading Guy Davenport to counter 
that the title was in fact meant to be ironic: “All that rises does converge, but the risings she 
shows us are from such shallow and depressed beginnings that their convergences are merely 
pitiful” (271). Davenport’s description of the risings’ beginnings being “shallow and depressed” 
seems needlessly judgmental towards O’Connor’s characters and offers no real critical insight 
beyond supporting his claim that the allusion to Teilhard must be ironic. The critic’s negative 
appraisal of the characters is not all surprising since he has already established his opinion of the 
South earlier in his review: “[it] is not a place in the sense that France is a place; it is a disaster 
[without] natural law, gods, norms of honesty, dignity, and so on” (271). Davenport is himself 
from the South, so he is well acquainted with its undeniably dreadful history. Yet, his 
demonization of the region and its people serves only to reinforce the notion of the South as a 
repository for national shame, a phenomenon Teresa Goddu outlines in Gothic America: 
Narrative, History, and Nation:  
Identified with gothic doom and gloom, the American South serves as the nation’s 
‘other’, becoming the repository for everything from which the nation wishes to 
dissociate itself. The benighted South is able to support the irrational impulses of the 
gothic that the nation as a whole, born of Enlightenment ideals, cannot. (3-4) 
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Goddu’s argument is further supported by O’Connor’s oft-quoted claim that “Southern writers 
particularly have a penchant for writing about freaks” because they are still able to recognize one 
(MM 44). The claims of each woman are essentially congruent: where Goddu states that, 
culturally, the South can support the “irrational impulses of the gothic,” O’Connor asserts that 
Southern writers can recognize these very impulses. Conversely, all that Davenport can 
contribute to the discussion is defamation. I thus contend that, at its strongest, O’Connor’s 
poetics are above such banal applications of irony insofar as it would insinuate a certain degree 
of cynicism in the blasé, pejorative sense (rather than the philosophical sense). While 
O’Connor’s writing is often acerbic in tone, her artistic vision is fundamentally sincere insofar as 
she believes that the writer’s obligation is “to the truth of what can happen in life” (172). Thus, 
while she may portray dysfunctional, and sometimes even despicable, characters, she does so 
without judgment, and simply presents them as fallen beings that they are. Referring to her 
backwoods prophet characters, she writes, “it is very difficult to get across to the modern reader 
that you take these people seriously, that you are not making fun of them” (204). I believe that 
this sentiment applies to all of her characters, from the backwoods prophets to the stupid Yankee 
liberals smacking their lips, for though they may be incomplete and prone to evil, they are 
nevertheless redeemable when their “efforts are assisted by grace” (197). Walter Sullivan’s 
September 1965 review of Everything That Rises Must Converge provides an insightful 
treatment of the complex condition of O’Connor’s characters who, he writes,  
may not be distinguished as good or bad, or as guilty or innocent. All are guilty; all are 
evil. The distinctions are between those who know of God's mercy and those who do not, 
between those who think they can save themselves, either for this life or the next, and 
those who are driven, in spite of their own failings, to do God's purpose. In the general 
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retreat from piety, man and the conditions under which he lives have been perverted. 
(Flannery O'Connor: The Contemporary Reviews 295)  
Another contemporary reviewer, Richard B. Duprey, further acknowledges that her 
understanding of man’s fallen nature is so profound that she can forgive every one of her 
characters even as she sends them off to the slaughterer’s knife (CR 300). Thus, to return to 
Davenport’s criticism, the convergences between O’Connor’s characters, whether at the bus stop 
of “Everything That Rises Must Converge,” or in the stairwell of the overcrowded apartment 
building in “Judgment Day,” are not pitiful in the least; they are brief eruptions of pure 
authenticity, or, in psychoanalytic terms, interventions of the Real. By departing from a position 
of pity, Davenport restricts his appraisal of O’Connor’s work, and so it is not the risings’ 
beginnings that are shallow, as he suggests, but rather his criticism. If Davenport had resisted 
passing judgment on the various circumstances in which the characters exist and converge, he 
might have understood that O’Connor did not have much use for pity, either for her characters or 
for anyone else. What is more, his attitude epitomizes O’Connor’s caricature of the self-
important intellectual, a character type that she uses in “Everything That Rises Must Converge” 
with Julian Chestny, whom I will discuss in detail below. I hence insist that “Judgment Day” and 
“Everything That Rises Must Converge” masterfully depict the inevitable violence of the 
convergence of whites and Blacks within the particular context and atmosphere of the Civil 
Rights Movement of the mid 20th century. 
While outbursts of violence may be typical of many of O’Connor’s characters, they are 
completely out of the ordinary for her Black characters specifically. This is not to say that the 
actions of two characters are commensurate; the Black woman’s attack upon Mrs. Chestny in 
“Everything That Rises Must Converge” is considerably less sinister in nature than the actions of 
	 74	
the Black Yankee neighbour at the end of “Judgment Day.” But this is precisely the point: her 
swing of the purse, I argue, intertextually paves the way for the Yankee actor’s defilement of 
Tanner’s corpse. Within the context of the collection, and indeed within the scope of O’Connor’s 
oeuvre, the Yankee neighbour’s act of violence cannot occur, or at the very least cannot be taken 
as seriously, without the prefatory clash of the two mothers. Though the actions of both 
characters are presumably charged by similar cultural, social, and political frustrations, the 
Yankee actor’s reaction to Tanner, compared to that of Carver’s mother to Julian’s mother, is so 
excessive, so malevolently gratuitous that, without the context of the collection’s title story, it 
would be ridiculous.  
Naturally, the aggressive behaviour of either Black character would have been outright 
shocking to most contemporary readers of O’Connor’s work, the shocking nature of their 
outbursts twofold: on the one hand, such bold expressions of anger would be abhorrent to the 
typical racists who believe that non-whites are second-class citizens that belong in a permanent 
state of submission, while on the other, the outbursts are shocking insofar as they are reminders 
of a national burden—that is, they trigger a sense of cultural guilt for the historical, as well as 
ongoing, mistreatment of Black men and women. Both viewpoints germinate from the very same 
source of anxiety: the inevitability of retributive acts of violence by Blacks upon whites. The 
shock, therefore, is born not so much of the violent actions themselves, but rather of the 
realization of the advent of a reckoning. 
 “Everything That Rises Must Converge” culminates with Julian’s attempt to explain this 
very reckoning to his mother after her confrontation with her Black double:  
He saw no reason to let the lesson she had had go without backing it up with an 
explanation of its meaning. She might as well be made to understand what had happened 
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to her. “Don’t think that was just an uppity Negro woman,” he said. “That was the whole 
colored race which will no longer take your condescending pennies.” […] “What all this 
means,” he said, “is that the old world is gone. The old manners are obsolete and your 
graciousness is not worth a damn.” (CW 499)  
Julian sermonises that the Black woman’s outburst is an augury of the changing social and 
cultural dynamics in the South, that “the whole colored race” is poised to rise and claim their 
sovereignty from the white race. Yet, the integrity of his sermon is compromised by his persistent 
fixation with teaching his mother a lesson and so it is difficult to ever be certain which of his 
opinions are sincere and which are affectations that he flaunts to spite his mother. His scant 
moments of authenticity come only in his day-dreams of his great-grandfather’s bygone 
plantation, or in his desperate reaction to his mother’s death at the end of the story; otherwise, his 
behaviour is laden with superficial posturing. Despite these strained efforts, Julian’s actual 
temperament falls somewhere between the two poles of the racist and the rueful, for though he is 
quick to shame his mother for her perceived ignorance, he is unable to recognize his own faults, 
which are uncannily similar in nature. Julian’s cultural and social consciousness is therefore 
stunted; he may be able to appreciate that they are on the precipice of a great reckoning, yet he 
has deluded himself into believing that he is exempt from any resulting consequences by virtue 
of the frustration he feels towards his mother and, by extension, his long-lost inheritance. 
O’Connor thus constructs Julian’s character to be not merely the text’s liberal gadfly, but, more 
astutely, the narrative representation of the convergence of the Old and New South, that is, of the 
culture of Jim Crow and the empowerment of the Civil Rights movement.  
The setting for this convergence, that of the newly integrated public transit system, would 
have been immediately familiar to O’Connor’s contemporary readers since the racial tensions of 
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desegregation were unavoidable at the time of the story's publication. Moreover, the 
Montgomery bus boycott has become an important cultural touchstone in American history, and 
Rosa Parks an icon of the Civil Rights Movement, so the implications of the story’s setting and 
characters continue to be immediately recognizable to most readers. The very impetus of the 
story’s action, that is, Julian accompanying his mother to the YMCA for her reducing class, is 
precisely her discomfort with the desegregation laws since “[she] would not ride the buses by 
herself at night since they had been [integrated]” (CW 485). As they travel from their decrepit 
apartment to the bus stop and finally onto the bus, her antebellum sensibilities excite his sense of 
moral superiority, which incites him to find ways to provoke her prejudices so as to flaunt his 
enlightened social attitudes and reprimand her for what he judges to be her boorish behaviour. 
Julian thus exhibits, in all his cultured glory, the typical character traits of one of O’Connor’s 
favourite motifs: the intellectual who is not as smart or as good as he thinks he is and who will 
inevitably be humbled in some unexpected and mysterious way.  
Much like Asbury from “The Enduring Chill” or Hulga from “Good Country People,” 
Julian is college educated and fancies himself an intellectual, but has no sustainable means of 
income, forcing him to live with his mother, a widow who “[had] struggled fiercely to feed and 
clothe and put him through school and was supporting him still” (CW 485). Julian also has 
ambitions as a writer, yet in spite of his mother’s encouragement and regular reminders that 
“Rome wasn’t built in a day” (486), he believes that he is too intelligent to ever be successful 
and so has resigned himself to a life of bitter resentment. What exactly he means by success is 
vague, however, since he warns his mother that “some day [he’ll] start making money” (486) and 
she will be able to buy whatever ridiculous clothing she wants whenever she sees fit. He intends 
this remark as an insult to her frivolous purchase of a green and purple hat that looks “like a 
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cushion with the stuffing out” (485), yet by implying that he will provide for his mother with his 
future income, he reveals that he might not despise her as much as he projects he does. In his 
subsequent daydreaming that his future revenue will also allow him to buy some property “where 
the nearest neighbours would be three miles away on either side” (486), he again includes his 
mother in his plans: “But first they would move” (486). Given that he expects one day not only 
to buy a home but also to provide for his mother’s every need, Julian’s claim that he is too 
intelligent to ever be successful must then refer to literary or artistic success. The depth of his 
pathology is striking here as his lament implies that he believes his talent is too prodigious to be 
properly appreciated by his contemporaries, a genius the likes of, for example, Edgar Allan Poe 
or Henry David Thoreau. Yet, unlike Asbury who is working on a play, or even Hulga who 
dreams of one day teaching philosophy at a university, Julian shows no indication of having any 
literary or intellectual pursuits. Instead, consumed with self-pity and resentment, he latches on to 
his mother’s racism and his family’s ties to the slave economy and tries desperately to fulfil his 
fantasy of martyrdom by appropriating the indignation of the Civil Rights Movement. He thus 
adopts the guise of the liberal idealist so that he is necessarily in opposition to his mother’s 
nostalgic conservatism, a position that he secretly shares. 
Further to this point, Julian believes that the true triumph of his education is that he is an 
autodidact; that is, that he has cultivated his intellect by his own determination, with no thanks to 
the college education financed by his mother: 
The further irony of all this was that in spite of her, he had turned out so well. Despite 
going to only a third-rate college, he had, on his own initiative, come out with a first-rate 
education; in spite of growing up dominated by a small mind, he had ended up with a 
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large one; in spite of her foolish views, he was free of prejudice and unafraid to face 
facts. (CW 492) 
Julian’s account of himself is wildly inaccurate; his mind is sheltered rather than large, and he is 
not free of prejudice so much as he is guilty of the same mild-mannered soft racism as his 
mother, even if it may manifest itself in slightly different ways. But his delusions of grandeur are 
contingent upon his contempt for his mother; he cannot be the great mind that he dreams himself 
to be without the conviction that his mother is his inferior. He is thus quick to diagnose his 
mother’s racism, yet is completely heedless of his own selfish behaviour. Moreover, his assertion 
that he is unafraid to face facts is as dubious as it is vague. What exactly are the facts he is brave 
enough to confront? His liberal intellectual persona might project the courage to face the fact of 
racial equality and the changing social dynamics in the South, and the United States more 
generally, but his behaviour and his daydreams suggest that the only fact of import to him is that 
of their poverty and of their family’s lost legacy. Painfully aware of their insolvency though he 
may be, he is unwilling to accept the reality of their codependency.  
The resentment he expresses for his mother throughout the text is rooted in his inability 
to properly establish his independence from her, rather than, as he struggles to convince himself, 
in what he perceives to be her moral short-comings. Julian only cares about her bigotry insofar as 
it can give him just cause to blame her for anything at all. This is evidenced by his belief that he 
would have had an easier time accepting his family’s poverty if his mother had been a lesser 
parent, if “she had been selfish, if she had been an old hag who drank and screamed at him” (CW 
486). Unfortunately for Julian’s sense of victimization, however, she is and always has been, 
supportive, generous, and kind. Recognizing that he has no real reason to despise her, Julian 
becomes despondent since his mother’s graciousness impedes the realization of his fantasy of 
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selfless sacrifice: “He walked along, saturated in depression, as if in the midst of his martyrdom 
he had lost his faith” (486). This is the second reference to martyrdom in the text, the first being 
his comparison to Saint Sebastian as he awaits his mother to leave for the YMCA, as though 
waiting for a storm of arrows to pierce him. O’Connor’s choice of Saint Sebastian is significant 
because the details of his sainthood emphasize Julian’s total lack of integrity or conviction. Saint 
Sebastian, as you may recall, is famous for being martyred twice, as he survived his initial 
persecution only to confront the authorities of the pagan majority with his sermonizing and be 
again persecuted and clubbed to death. Julian, on the other hand, is easily dispirited, by his 
mother’s graciousness no less, because, much like Asbury, his principles are entirely superficial. 
The ideals of the Civil Rights movement are but a convenient alibi for his contempt, and his 
mother’s racism little more than low-hanging fruit. 
Julian’s only problem with his mother’s racist opinions is not the opinions themselves but 
rather the frequency with which she expresses them. In typical nostalgic conservative fashion, 
she believes that contemporary society is falling apart and that things were better off back in her 
day. Such is the essence of her lament that the world is in a mess, which refers specifically to the 
tumult of the civil rights efforts and the ensuing rise of racial tensions: “With the world in the 
mess it’s in,” she said, “it’s a wonder we can enjoy anything. I tell you, the bottom rail is on the 
top” (CW 487). Strictly speaking, for families like the Chestnys and the Godhighs and anyone 
else who profited from the slave trade, her assertion is dreadfully accurate; life was better for the 
upper class of Southern society before the ratification of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th 
amendments, the federal rulings of the Brown v. the Board of Education, and Browder v. Gale 
cases, and so on and so forth. Mrs. Chestny’s opinions on matters relating to the Civil Rights 
Movement are therefore inextricably linked to her classist prejudice, for any allusion she makes 
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to the plight of Black Americans is quickly followed by a reminder that it is important to know 
who you are: “‘Of course,” she said, “if you know who you are, you can go anywhere’” (487). 
Mrs. Chestny repeats this conviction every time that Julian accompanies her to her reducing 
class, which she attends because it is free, because she believes that she is above the other ladies 
who attend: “Most of them in it are not our kind of people […] but I can be gracious to anybody. 
I know who I am” (487). It is not clear what she means by “our kind of people,” but it can only 
really be one of two options: she is either referring to Black Americans specifically, or to 
anybody she perceives to be of a lower social class. Given her strong expression of confidence 
about knowing who she is, which is a descendant of former governors, prosperous landowners, 
and slaveholders, as well as the implausibility of her exercise class being integrated, the most 
likely conclusion is that her classist prejudices are more acute than any feelings of white 
supremacy, and that her racist attitudes are a product of her classism.  
While her intention in reminding her son of who they are is to instill within him a sense 
of pride and belonging, her chorus instead serves to remind him of everything their family has 
lost and to reinforce the reality of their ongoing economic destitution: 
“Your great-grandfather was a former governor of this state,” she said. “Your 
grandfather was a prosperous landowner. Your grandmother was a Godhigh.” 
“Will you look around you,” he said tensely, “and see where you are now?” and 
he swept his arm jerkily out to indicate the neighbourhood, which the growing darkness 
at least made less dingy. 
“You remain what you are,” she said. “Your great-grandfather had a plantation 
and two hundred slaves.” (CW 487)  
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Mrs. Chestny is proud to acknowledge how many slaves their family owned for it validates just 
how wealthy and important they had been in their community. The number of slaves owned is 
especially telling when you consider that in 1860, which is approximately when Julian’s great-
grandfather would have been living and operating his plantation, only “11,000 Southerners, 
three-quarters of one percent of the white population, owned more than 50 slaves [and that] a 
mere 2,358 owned as many as 100 slaves.”34 Now it could be that Mrs. Chestny is exaggerating 
their family’s majesty given she has already demonstrated a propensity for conservative 
nostalgia, but even if the true number is half of what she claims it to be, the Chestnys/Godhighs 
would still be among the wealthiest families, not only in the state of Georgia (assuming this is 
where the story is set), but in the South as a whole. Julian and his mother’s economic status is 
therefore not just a common case of working-class whites struggling to make ends meet in the 
postbellum reconstruction of the South’s economy, but a dramatic downfall from excessive 
wealth to a life of penny pinching that has forced them to move homes regularly, to settle in 
dingy neighborhoods, to attend third-rate colleges, and so on and so forth. Julian mockingly 
reminds his mother that there are no more slaves, but she responds by claiming that Black 
Americans would be better off if slavery had persisted. She does not elaborate on her argument 
but one can assume that the implication is deeply paternalistic; if slavery still existed, the 
economy would still be thriving35 and slaveholders would be in a position to care and provide for 
																																																						
34 Statistics obtained from: http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=2&psid=3557 
35 According to the website digitalhistory.uh.edu, in the years preceding the Civil War, “the South was 
richer than any country in Europe except England, and it had achieved a level of wealth unmatched by 
Italy or Spain until the eve of World War II. The southern economy generated enormous wealth and was 
critical to the economic growth of the entire United States. Well over half of the richest 1 percent of 
Americans in 1860 lived in the South. Even more important, southern agriculture helped finance early 
19th century American economic growth. Before the Civil War, the South grew 60 percent of the world’s 
cotton, provided over half of all U.S. export earnings, and furnished 70 percent of the cotton consumed by 
the British textile industry. Cotton exports paid for a substantial share of the capital and technology that 
laid the basis for America’s industrial revolution.”  
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their slaves. In other words, Mrs. Chestny is a prototypical exponent of trickle-down economics. 
The reality is that it is the downtrodden elites of yore who would be better off if slavery had 
never been abolished, and not the emancipated slaves. If Julian were truly as outraged as he 
projects himself to be, he would here have had the perfect opportunity to serve his mother the 
lesson he has been fantasizing about, but his only criticism is that he knows her diatribe by heart.  
He groaned to see that she was off on that topic. She rolled onto it every few days like a 
train on an open track. He knew every stop, every junction, every swamp along the way, 
and knew the exact point at which her conclusion would roll majestically into the station: 
“It’s ridiculous. It’s simply not realistic. They should rise, yes, but on their own side of 
the fence.” 
“Let’s skip it,” said Julian.  
  “The ones I feel sorry for,” she said, “are the ones that are half white. They’re 
tragic.”  
“Will you skip it?” (CW 487) 
Julian does not want to listen to his mother’s ramblings not primarily because they disturb him 
them, but because he has heard it all before. While her conventionally conservative interpretation 
of the Civil Rights Movement, her nostalgia for chattel slavery, and her complete lack of tact 
may indeed offend the ideals he garnered at school, his opposition to her behavior comes in the 
form of annoyance rather than indignation. 
Mrs. Chestny’s last comment in the above passage before her son implores her to “skip 
it” is very suspicious and cannot be but an off the cuff remark. As we know through Julian’s 
impatience for her gift of the gab, Mrs. Chestny repeats herself often and always about the same 
general topic. Thus, if she is expressing empathy for “the ones that are half white” while they are 
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idly waiting for the bus to arrive, it is because she does so regularly. But why is this? Why are 
people of mixed race one of her returning concerns, along with the majesty of the Chestnys and 
the Godhighs, the importance of knowing who you are, and the bottom rail being on top? 
Furthermore, she emphasizes that she feels no deep-seeded rancour towards Black Americans by 
referencing her fond memories of her “old darky nurse Caroline” and her claim that she “always 
had a great respect for her colored friends” (CW 488). She even goes so far as to claim that she 
would do anything in the world for them, but before she can complete her thought, Julian 
interrupts her, again pleading with her to change subjects. At this point in the story, the narrator 
reveals that whenever Julian gets on a bus by himself, he makes a point to “sit down beside a 
Negro, in reparation as it were for his mother’s sins” (489). Once again, Julian’s frustration is 
suspiciously focused at his mother, and not at his heritage in general, and so the sins to which he 
refers must therefore not be the guilt by association to ancestors who profited from chattel 
slavery. So, what is the nature of his mother’s sins then? He has already indicated that she has 
been a supportive and generous mother all his life and that her charity is a source of frustration 
for him because he would have had an easier time accepting their financial destitution had she 
been “an old hag who drank and screamed at him” (486). But she is not an old hag who drinks 
and screams at him and so the sins that he believes she is guilty of committing are not 
immediately clear to the reader and are only made decipherable through imagination and 
intuition.  
I want to emphasize that the lineage to which Mrs. Chestny proudly refers throughout the 
text is strictly Julian’s maternal family. This detail is important because, traditionally, a child 
takes the last name of his father, and so Julian is not, strictly speaking, a Chestny. But his mother 
insists that he is a Chestny, and nothing else, and is adamant about him behaving in a manner 
	 84	
appropriate to his name and class. She thus makes a concerted effort to fortify this identity by 
labouring to provide him with everything she believes a Chestny deserves: 
All of her life had been a struggle to act like Chestny without the Chestny goods, and to 
give him everything she thought a Chestny ought to have; but since, said she, it was fun 
to struggle, why complain? And when you had won as she had won what fun to look back 
on the hard times! He could not forgive her that she had enjoyed the struggle and that she 
thought she had won. (CW 491) 
Julian’s bitterness is further exacerbated by his mother’s lax attitude towards their plight and her 
insistence that despite their reduced circumstances they have maintained the dignity of their 
blue-blooded descendants. But again, the emphasis is on their Chestny/Godhigh descendants, 
with no allusion at all to his paternal lineage. Further to this point, aside from the brief mention 
on the first page of his mother being a “widow who had struggled fiercely” (485) to raise him, 
there is no other allusion in the story of Julian’s father. Though his mother speaks with deference 
and admiration about the other patriarchal members of the family, she never once makes any 
reference to the deceased father of her son. This omission is curious in very much the same way 
that her proclamation of empathy for those who are “half-white” is; that is, the detail, or in this 
case the omission of the detail, is a coded narrative device meant to draw the attention of the 
reader, even if subconsciously, to the peculiarity of the struggles of the characters. The 
implication, in my estimation, is that Julian’s father, and by extension his family, are of at least 
second class, and perhaps lower than that. The following question therefore arises: could Julian’s 
father be the source of his frustration towards his mother? His accusation that they were forced to 
make sacrifices because she had made “a mess of things” (491) through her lack of foresight is 
highly ambiguous, especially since we know that she has been a good parent who worked hard to 
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provide for her son. This lack of foresight, then, cannot refer to something as banal as poor 
financial decisions or the selfish prioritization of whatever vices. So, the question remains: what 
is the source of Julian’s contempt? The assumption is that they are poor because their family, 
like so many formerly wealthy Southern families, have suffered the economic consequences of 
the postbellum restoration. But could it be that their poverty is instead the result of having been 
disowned by the Chestnys? Could it be that her lack of foresight was to couple with a man from 
the underclass? And finally, could it be that the death of Julian’s father is a fabrication and that 
he is simply absent, for whatever reason? After all, Mrs. Chestny does claim that she can be 
gracious to anybody since she has the privilege of knowing who she is (487).  
Unfortunately, this graciousness is not a trait that Julian has inherited. He is instead petty, 
self-absorbed, and hypocritical. In sum, Julian does not know who he is.  As such, his acquisition 
of liberal-intellectual principles and his superficial judgment of his mother’s conservative 
attitudes are particularly precarious, and, moreover, are compromised even further by his own 
feelings of longing and second-hand nostalgia for the lost Godhigh estate. He would of course 
never openly admit as much, but he believes that he is entitled to the Chestny/Godhigh legacy 
and is consumed with bitterness over what he believes is his unmerited penury. To make matters 
worse, Julian is haunted by the high-ceilinged halls of the plantation not only in his dreams but 
also in his waking life through his mother’s incessant recollections of the double stairways and 
worn rugs and faded draperies. For example, when Mrs. Chestny attempts to shift their 
conversation to a more pleasant subject after their usual spat over the bottom rail being on top, 
her go-to topic is her reveries of visits to her Grandfather’s as a young girl, which doubtless do 
little to quell her son’s frustrations. Julian’s only personal memory of the plantation is of visiting 
it once as a child, before the property had been sold, and finding it dilapidated and inhabited by 
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Black squatters. But Julian remembers it as his mother remembers it and constructs his fantasies 
from her memories. In fact, so seized is he by his longing for the regality of his family’s past that 
he comes to believe that he would have appreciated it more than his mother did:  
It occurred to him that it was he not she who would have appreciated it. He preferred its 
threadbare elegance to anything he could name and it was because of it that all the 
neighborhoods they had lived in had been a torment to him—whereas she had hardly 
known the difference. (CW 488) 
Julian believes his sensibilities are better suited for the majesty of the plantation, but he has again 
misjudged himself. As implied by his mother’s objection to his removing his tie, he does not 
possess any of the manners of a gentleman. If he truly was as refined as he believes he is, he 
would take pride in the details of his constitution, would adhere to traditional Southern manners 
and demeanour. Mrs. Chestny is offended by her son’s casual appearance because it obscures the 
social dignity she knows a Chestny should project. The offense is so serious that she threatens to 
stay home unless he puts his tie back on. Julian finally submits after some bickering: “Rolling his 
eyes upward, he put his tie back on. “Restored to my class,” he muttered. He thrust his face 
toward her and hissed, “True culture is in the mind, the mind,” he said, and tapped his head, “the 
mind” (489). Once again, Julian’s assessment is off mark: culture is indeed of both our customs 
and our minds, which is to say, our shared ideologies. Mrs. Chestny strictly adheres to these 
small formalities because they reinforce her conviction of knowing who she is. Without these 
small rituals, she would be no different from any of the other ladies in her reducing class. Julian 
might believe that he would have better appreciated the spoils of the plantation, but he is without 
the proper manners and dignity of a Chestny, manners to which his mother, despite her reduced 
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circumstances, adheres. Thus, Julian is without not only his family’s fortune, but their class as 
well, and so his fantasies about the Chestny legacy are totally superficial. 
As Julian’s fantasies are devoid of substance, so are his judgments of his mother. Though 
it is certainly justifiable for a child to feel frustration with his parent’s limitations, particularly 
when those limitations include overt classism and racism, Julian’s frustrations are counter-
balanced by his complete lack of self-awareness. For example, when they finally board the bus, 
Mrs. Chestny promptly makes idle conversation with her fellow passengers by commenting on 
the weather, and once she establishes a rapport with the other ladies on the bus, quickly remarks 
that they have the bus to themselves, meaning, of course, that there are no Black passengers. A 
woman wearing red and white canvas sandals takes Mrs. Chestny’s bate and bemoans a recent 
incident: 
“For a change,” said the woman across the aisle, the owner of the red and white 
canvas sandals. “I come on one the other day and they were thick as fleas—up front and 
all through.” 
“The world is in a mess everywhere,” his mother said. “I don’t know how we’ve 
let it get in this fix.” (CW 490) 
Julian reacts to their lamentations by retreating behind his newspaper and fading away into the 
comfort of his various delusions. Chief among them is his conviction that he is morally superior 
to Southerners like his mother by virtue of his willingness to befriend, or date, a person of 
colour. Mrs. Chestny, having fallen for her son’s charade, believes that her son’s radical ideas, 
that is those that he projects to have, come from his lack of practical experience and that despite 
his disenchantment with life, has not yet “entered the real world.” Naïve though she may be, we 
must at least concede this point to Mrs. Chestny, for Julian is in fact totally delusional. His 
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intellectual quirks are but a disguise that he uses to retreat to his fantasies of the bygone elegance 
of his great-grandfather’s estate. Ironically, Julian believes that it is his mother, and not he, who 
lives “according to the laws of her own fantasy world, outside of which he had never seen her set 
foot” (CW 491). Once again, Julian’s assessment is incorrect. While it is clear that Mrs. Chestny 
is detached from the cultural moment insofar as she is entrenched in her traditional antebellum 
sensibilities, she is not detached in the same way that Julian himself is. That is, her detachment is 
generational, or cultural, whereas Julian’s detachment is pathological. Mrs. Chestny does not live 
according to the laws of a fantasy world, as her son surmises, but of a real world the customs of 
which are rapidly disappearing. Julian, on the other hand, operates in a world entirely of his own 
imagining and fits in neither with the grandeur of the Chestny legacy nor with the progressive 
swell of his contemporary moment.  
  The frivolity of Julian’s convictions is made most evident when a large well-dressed 
Black man carrying a briefcase boards the bus. To the horror of the white women on the bus, the 
new passenger sits near the woman with red and white canvas sandals with whom Mrs. Chestny 
had been chatting, and retreats to the privacy of his newspaper. Nevertheless, Mrs. Chestny is all 
at once perturbed and promptly notifies her son that this is why she refuses to ride the bus by 
herself. The woman in the canvas sandals, herself dismayed, straightaway changes seats, to 
which Julian’s mother gives her an approving look. Julian’s seizes the opportunity to take the 
vacated seat with the intent of striking up a conversation with the man, purely to aggravate his 
mother’s antebellum sensibilities. Julian’s action pays immediate dividends as Mrs. Chestny’s 
face twists from approval to anger. Julian hopes to break into a discussion about “art or politics 
or any other subject that would be above the comprehension of those around them” (CW 492-93) 
yet his advances are ignored as the man does not look away from his newspaper, leaving Julian 
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to lament his inability to “convey his sympathy” (493). In his desperation to maintain his 
mother’s distress, he asks the man for a light and the man acquiesces again without looking away 
from his paper. Yet, not only is there no smoking allowed on the bus, but Julian is not even a 
smoker in the first place since he cannot afford to buy cigarettes, so he is forced to sheepishly 
return the matches to the man who finally lowers his paper to reveal an annoyed glare. Julian is 
unsuccessful because his spiteful congeniality is the opposite version of the gesture his mother 
later makes when she offers the little boy a nickel: rather than condescendingly offer a favour, he 
condescendingly asks for one, establishing that he is in a position of disadvantage and that it is 
the turn of the Black man to help a white man. If O’Connor believed that the purpose of manners 
was to help mend the harsh realities of life, then Julian’s vain behaviour is a complete disgrace to 
her aspiration. He is incapable of engaging with the well-dressed Black man in any meaningful 
way and, in his desperation to punish his mother, perverts the Southern code of manners. He 
missteps and fails because the interaction is predicated upon insincere intentions. Julian’s code of 
manners is compromised by his vanity, and his liberal sensibilities are once again proven to be 
nothing but theatre. 
After failing to engage with the well-dressed Black man, Julian attempts to console 
himself with various fantasies of teaching his mother a lesson. His first idea is to abandon his 
mother at her reducing class and leave her to fend for herself. Satisfied with the thought of 
making her realize that she ought not depend on him, he then retreats to dreams of his 
grandfather’s mansion whereupon his soul momentarily expands before again being interrupted 
by his mother’s glare of reproach. But Julian has convinced himself that he is completely 
detached from his mother’s expectations, and so is not negatively affected by her 
disappointment, but instead thrives on it. Thus, in riposte to her reproachful glare, he returns to 
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imagining the “various unlikely ways by which he could teach her a lesson” (CW 494), and drifts 
into a daydream about becoming friends with a distinguished Black man. Julian’s fantasy is 
quickly interrupted by reality, however, as he is soon reminded of his previous failures to recruit 
the perfect candidate: 
He had tried to strike up an acquaintance on the bus with some of the better types, with 
ones that looked like professors or ministers or lawyers. One morning he had sat down 
next to a distinguished-looking dark brown man who had answered his questions with 
sonorous solemnity but who had turned out to be an undertaker. Another day he had sat 
down beside a cigar-smoking Negro with a diamond ring on his finger, but after a few 
stilted pleasantries, the Negro had rung the buzzer and risen, slipping two lottery tickets 
into Julian’s hand as he climbed over him to leave. (CW 494)  
Julian is faced with a Goldilocks dilemma and fails to find the appropriate token Black friend, 
one of “the better types,” for his specific purpose. That he ranks people of colour based on their 
use to him incontrovertibly proves that the empathy he projects to have for their condition and 
his support for their fight for civil rights and liberties is a complete fabrication. He cares about 
the condition of Black men and women in the United States only insofar as it serves to feed the 
animus he feels towards his mother. He finally shifts his daydreams to “the ultimate horror” of 
meeting a “beautiful suspiciously negroid woman” (494) who is intelligent, dignified, and good. 
“Now persecute us,” he fantasizes telling his mother, fulfilling his earlier fantasy of martyrdom, 
“go ahead and persecute us.” The difference between Mrs. Chestny thinking that “little Negroes 
were on the whole cuter than little white children” (495) and Julian’s spiteful fantasy of one day 
having a distinguished Black friend, or a “beautiful suspiciously negroid” love interest, is 
ultimately marginal at best. Both outlooks objectify the Black other and are thereby equally 
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guilty of racial fetishization. Moreover, Julian’s fantasy is an inversion of the unofficial, but 
swiftly punishable, Jim Crow offence of Black men having sexual interactions,36 or, in the case 
of Emmett Till, even flirting with white women.37 Every single one of Julian’s interactions with 
people of colour is devoid of any of the charity O’Connor stressed was necessary for the 
maintenance of community between whites and Blacks. 
Critic Richard Giannone sees things slightly differently. In Flannery O'Connor: Hermit 
Novelist, he writes,  
To Julian's credit, he sees the evil of racism and tries to correct its injustices. But Julian's 
works and actions, however well-intentioned, are the gestures of sentimental politics. […] 
Julian seeks in ideology the gratification he cannot find either in writing or in social 
relations. He rebels on principle and anxiously conforms [to] a prefabricated norm for 
virtue. The 1960s version of political correctness finds an adherent in Julian. (178) 
Giannone’s analysis of Julian is very gracious, yet his argument is inherently flawed: we cannot 
credit Julian for seeing the evils of racism if we already know that he longs for the inheritance he 
believes is due to him, an inheritance that was erected, and subsequently wrecked, by the rise and 
fall of the slave economy. Giannone’s reading of Julian, much like Julian himself, is superficial. 
																																																						
36 From Jennifer Ritterhouse’s Growing Jim Crow: “In a Depression-era interview, one ex-slave described 
with particular eloquence (despite the transcriber's use of dialect) the stress that resulted from never 
knowing quite how whites would behave or what the consequences of one's actions, intentional or 
unintentional, might be. […] Black men had to be especially careful, especially around white women, lest 
they be accused of sexual impropriety in addition to “uppitiness,” which whites found more threatening in 
Black men than Black women in any case. White southerners' intolerance for any sign of sexual 
aggressiveness on the part of Black men was, of course, abundantly obvious in events such as the Atlanta 
race riot of 1906” (40-41). 
37 Vanity Fair reported in the winter of 2017 that Emmett Till’s accuser, Carolyn Bryant Donham, 
admitted that her accusation was entirely fabricated: “In a new book, The Blood of Emmett Till (Simon & 
Schuster) Timothy Tyson, a Duke University senior research scholar, reveals that Carolyn—in 2007, at 
age 72—confessed that she had fabricated the most sensational part of her testimony. “That part’s not 
true,” she told Tyson, about her claim that Till had made verbal and physical advances on her. As for the 
rest of what happened that evening in the country store, she said she couldn’t remember.”  
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It is as if the critic’s goal is to fit Julian into his preconceived notions of politically correct 
liberals of the 1960s and on. Julian’s fault is that moral struggle is performative insofar as his 
goodwill towards people of colour is merely a means of humiliating his mother to thereby enable 
himself to feel superior to her. But his charade falls apart when his mother suffers her stroke 
following her confrontation with her Black double. Desperate to save his mother, Julian, for the 
first time in the text, expresses his most genuine self, and, suddenly, no longer feels disconnected 
from her. Unlike Asbury or Mrs. Turpin, however, Julian arrives at his epiphanic moment 
without having to have suffered a violence himself. Instead, it is his mother who is sacrificed for 
his benefit, which is fitting given that, despite his being unappreciative, she has sacrificed her 
material comforts all his life so that he may build a life befitting a Chestny/Godhigh. Yet, in 
typical O’Connor fashion, Julian’s epiphany comes a moment too late, and he is swept into “the 
world of guilt and sorrow” (CW 500). Perhaps he would have been a good son if there had been 
somebody there to whack his mother with a purse every minute of his life.  
 
The Curious Case of Dudley/Tanner 
  
What is it about “The Geranium” that drove O’Connor to revisit and remould the kernels of this 
story over a twenty-year period? There are a handful of texts in her bibliography that contain 
Black characters who remain on the periphery of the main action and who are passive in their 
roles as farmers or labourers or waiters. She could have redrafted the changing social dynamic 
between Blacks and whites in any of her early stories, making the Black characters either bolder, 
or less patient, or angrier—in short, give them more agency.  
Take, for example, “The Enduring Chill” where Asbury, very much like Julian, is an 
aspiring writer who has returned to his rural roots, and who, despite his fumbling attempt at a 
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career, believes that he is smarter than he is. He also, like Julian, interacts with people of colour 
purely out of spite to his mother. But why is he not as clever as he thinks he is? Because by 
drinking unpasteurized milk in a failed attempt to goad the farmhands into disobeying his 
mother’s orders, he is the author of his own misery. What he presumes to be his death rattle is 
nothing more than the consequence of his spiteful behaviour, of his efforts to aggravate what he 
perceives to be his mother's bigoted sensibilities—by feigning comradery with the farmhands, 
Morgan and Randall, by drinking raw dairy in a spectacle of communion. Asbury’s compassion 
is insincere, which in turn transform Morgan and Randall into tools for his animus. Much like 
Julian’s superficial request for a match, Asbury’s pantomime of fraternity reveals the true nature 
of his character—that is, his actions reveal his narcissism. “The narcissistic subject,” as Žižek 
notes in Looking Awry, 
“knows only the "rules of the (social) game" enabling him to manipulate others; social 
relations constitute for him a playing field in which he assumes "roles," not proper 
symbolic mandates; he stays clear of any kind of binding commitment that would imply a 
proper symbolic identification. He is a radical conformist who paradoxically experiences 
himself as an outlaw. (82) 
Žižek’s definition describes Julian and Asbury perfectly: both men manipulate their interactions 
with the Black characters to feed their sense of intellectual and moral superiority over their 
mothers and, by extension, over the lingering cultural traces of the antebellum South. More 
importantly, both men appear to remain unaware of their participation in the social order that 
they purport to reject, each satisfied with the spectacle of their attempted fraternizations with 
Black Americans. In this sense, they are conformists who paradoxically experience themselves as 
outlaws, that is as progressive-minded writers struggling with the antiquated social structures 
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from which they benefit. Asbury fails to realize that Morgan and Randall’s refusal to drink the 
milk is not because of the iron fist with which his mother rules the farm, but because they know 
better than to ingest unpasteurized dairy:  
Asbury swung around and held the glass out to Morgan. “Here boy, have a drink 
of this, he said. 
Morgan stared at him; then his face took on a decided look of cunning. “I ain’t 
seen you drink none of it yourself,” he said. 
Asbury despised milk. The first warm glassful had turned his stomach. He drank 
half of what he was holding and handed the rest to the Negro, who took it and gazed 
down inside the glass as it contained some great mystery; then he set it on the floor by the 
cooler. 
“Don’t you like milk?” Asbury asked. 
“I likes it but I ain’t drinking noner that.” (CW 559) 
Were it not for the combination of his self-idolatry and his contempt for his mother, Asbury may 
have heeded her mother’s observation38 that “Those two are not stupid […] They know how to 
look out for themselves” (CW 551). Unable, or unwilling, to consider anything but his own point 
of view, however, Asbury gets his just deserts. What is more, his ignorance of the repercussions 
of drinking raw milk reveals that though he grew up on a dairy farm, he clearly was never 
expected to work on it, for if he had been, he would have known better. The only reason that he 
works on it upon his visit from New York is as research for a play he has been working on “about 
																																																						
38 This remark by Asbury’s mother echoes a sentiment expressed by Regina Cline O’Connor about one of 
her employees, as related by O’Connor in a letter to Sally and Robert Fitzgerald: “Regina has a policy 
which takes care of all his accidents but he has one too and never fails to collect on it at the same time. He 
made four dollars on his last cut. She says these niggers are smart as tacks when it comes to looking out 
for No. 1” (CW 915). 
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the Negro and he [wants] to be around them for a while to see how they really [feel] about their 
condition” (551). But the would-be playwright fails to learn how they “really feel” as his erratic 
actions do little more than puzzle the farm hands and earn him the undulant fever that will 
deliver his moment of grace.  
We see a similar yet more nuanced dynamic between the Black and white characters in 
“Revelation.” Yet, instead of being objectified for spiteful indulgences, the Black characters 
serve more actively to flatter the protagonist Ruby Turpin’s ego, to reassure her of her good 
standing in society, and of her strong moral fibre. In short, they confirm and maintain Mrs. 
Turpin’s understanding of her privileged position in the social hierarchy of her community. In 
Lacanian terms, they preserve the symbolic order, that is, the laws that structure and regulate the 
circuit of exchange in our relations with each other. The problem, however, is that the symbolic 
order has been disrupted by her violent and mysterious encounter with Mary Grace39—her 
convictions have been disrupted by a mysterious force that she does not understand and she is 
unable to return to the natural order of her life. Likewise does Asbury experience some kind of 
divine awakening that rattles the very core of his being and makes him realize the shallow nature 
of his performances of communion with both the dairy farmers and with God via the Jesuit 
priest:  
																																																						
39 In other words, with the Lacanian real. The symbolic order is composed in terms of oppositions, such as 
presence and absence, inside and outside, and indicates the indefinite possibility of a lack or gap, that is, 
that something may be missing in the symbolic order. Conversely, there is no absence in the real as it is 
opposed to the symbolic and located beyond the imaginary. The real is outside of language and resists 
symbolization. It is thus impossible to imagine, and it is this impossibility that gives it its traumatic 
quality. Finally, the basis of the imaginary is the formation of the ego in the mirror stage through the 
process of identification; the turning-point in the mental development of a child, “the fundamental aspect 
of the structure of subjectivity.” Identification is therefore a crucial aspect of the imaginary order, as are 
imagination, deception, and seduction, making it the order of surface appearances that conceal an 
underlying structure, which is the structure of the symbolic order. For Lacan, the three interdependent 
orders of the Borromean Knot, the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real, constitute the reality of the 
human being.  
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The old life in him was exhausted. He awaited the coming of the new. It was then that he felt 
the beginning of a chill, a chill so peculiar, so light, that it was like a warm ripple across a 
deeper sea of cold. His breath came short. The fierce bird which through the years of his 
childhood and the days of his illness had been poised over his head, waiting mysteriously, 
appeared all at once to be in motion. Asbury blanched and the last film of illusion was torn as 
if by a whirlwind from his eyes. (CW 572) 
Yet, while Asbury realizes that he will live out his days “in the face of a purifying terror,” and 
Julian is wracked with the sudden onset of guilt at having helped to cause his mother’s death 
with his selfish and self-righteous behaviour, Mrs. Turpin is caught in a kind of limbo: though 
she has been offered a moment of grace that has shaken her preconceptions of the social 
hierarchy of her society, she has not fully assimilated the message: “‘Why me?’ […] ‘There was 
plenty of trash there. It didn’t have to be me’” (CW 652). Moreover, Asbury and Julian are, more 
or less, the authors of their own misfortune insofar as they face the consequences of their selfish 
actions. Mrs. Turpin, however, is attacked because of who she is, not because of what she does. 
Strictly speaking, Mrs. Turpin does not do anything in the waiting room of the doctor’s office 
besides chat with the other patients. Mary Grace attacks her because of her personality, because 
of her obnoxious and condescending attitude. Mrs. Turpin’s air of Old South politesse does not 
fool Mary Grace who sees her for the casually racist and classist snob that she is and Mrs. Turpin 
quickly notices in the girl’s eyes an air of mysterious reckoning: “She looked straight in front of 
her, directly through Mrs. Turpin and on through the yellow curtain and the plate glass window 
which made the wall behind her. The girl’s eyes seemed lit all of a sudden with a peculiar light, 
and unnatural light like night road signs give” (637). Mrs. Turpin senses that all is not as it 
should be, or rather, as it has been, and so is haunted by the student’s perspicacious gaze for the 
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remainder of the scene in the waiting room until the girl finally hurls her textbook and attacks 
her: 
The book struck her directly over her left eye. It struck almost at the same instant that she 
realized the girl was about to hurl it. Before she could utter a sound, the raw face came 
crashing across the table toward her, howling. The girl’s fingers sank like clamps into the 
soft flesh of her neck. She heard the mother cry out and Claud shout, “Whoa!” There was 
an instant when she was certain that she was about to be in an earthquake. […] All at 
once her vision narrowed and she saw everything as if it were happening in a small room 
far away, or as if she were looking at it through the wrong end of a telescope. (CW 644) 
Mary Grace’s prophetic intervention ruptures Mrs. Turpin’s smug, culturally sanctioned sense of 
self and society and lets emerge a sense of absence that affirms the frailty of her symbolic 
edifice. The idyllic texture of her life is disrupted by the unexpected change in the symbolic 
texture of intersubjective relations. But, as the attack occurs before we meet Mrs. Turpin’s 
employees and before we get to observe the nature and tone of their limited interactions, the 
reader does not get to witness the heretofore version of their relationship where Mrs. Turpin still 
believes in her superiority. We are thus left to fill the void created by this rupture with the tone 
and context of Mrs. Turpin’s present displeasure:    
“She sho shouldn’t said nothing ugly to you,” the old woman said. “You so sweet. 
You the sweetest lady I know.” 
“She pretty too,” thet one with the hat on said. 
“And stout,” the other said. “I never knowed no sweeter white lady.” 
“That’s the truth befo’ Jesus,” the old woman said. “Amen! You jes as sweet and 
pretty as you can be.” (CW 650) 
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After Mary Grace’s attack, the flattery Mrs. Turpin receives from her employees no longer has 
the same affirming effect it once had on her sense of self.  Her response to her employees reveals 
the sum of her fate, the collapse of the symbolic order of her classist understanding of the world: 
“Mrs. Turpin knew exactly how much Negro flattery was worth and it added to her rage” (CW 
650). Mrs. Turpin ultimately finds herself powerless and confused as the altercation in the 
waiting room of the doctor’s office has amplified her insecurities about her place in the world, 
thereby inciting an identity crisis. “Why me?” she laments to her pen of pigs,   
“How am I a hog?” she demanded. “Exactly how am I like them?” […] “Go on,” she 
yelled. “Call me a hog! Call me a hog again. From hell. Call me a wart hog from hell. Put 
that bottom rail on top. There’ll still be a top and a bottom!” […] “A final surge of fury 
shook her and she roared, “who do you think you are?” (CW 653-54) 
But while her final exclamation is intended for Mary Grace, and perhaps by extension for God 
Himself, the spirit of the question is in fact most appropriate for Mrs. Turpin herself, as she is no 
longer sure of who she is. Her revelation at the conclusion of the story, that the Kingdom of 
Heaven has no concern for class or race and that it is the lame who shall enter first, reinforces 
Mary Grace’s indictment that she is no better than any of the freaks and lunatics she believes are 
below her in the social order. Though Mrs. Turpin’s spirituality may have matured, her sense of 
self, based on her classist and racist prejudices, has dissipated. 
I began this section by asking what it was about “The Geranium” that led O’Connor to 
redraft the source material over a span of twenty or so years, and this, I believe, is the answer: 
Dudley/Tanner is neither an arrogant intellectual, like Julian or Asbury, nor a classist snob like 
Mrs. Turpin or Mrs. Chestny; he is but an out-of-touch elderly outcast. Though his earliest 
incarnation is hatefully racist, he is nevertheless as destitute as the poor Black men with whom 
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he interacts, or, as with Rabbie/Coleman, with whom he lives. I therefore argue that O’Connor’s 
preoccupation with the material of the “Geranium Variations” stems from these significant 
differences. Dudley/Tanner is more complex, more sympathetic, and more tragic than any of the 
above-mentioned protagonists, and so filtering the topic of the racial divide through the 
experiences of his character makes for a more nuanced narrative representation of race relations 
in the South, and by extension, in the United States as a whole.  
 
The Variations 
Before we discuss “Judgment Day” in detail, let us first look at the story’s first three 
incarnations, “The Geranium” from 1946, “Exile in the East” from 1955, and “Getting Home” 
from 1964. O’Connor’s overwrought poetics in the first variation are the stylistic crutches of an 
ambitious young writer who has not yet mastered her craft. The integrity of the central story, that 
of the Old Dudley’s struggle with his displacement, essentially remains the same throughout the 
drafts. What makes the character’s conflict so compelling is that his sense of displacement is in 
fact the result of his social inertia; that is, the world has passed him by. Moreover, though 
subsequent versions of Old Dudley vary in their construction, the character is consistently 
tormented by this same failure to adapt. The magnificence of the final version of the story is that 
it synthesizes this theme of failing to adapt into a refutation of the very concept of having to 
adapt, or as put above, a refutation of the liberal ideals of social progress. 
O’Connor’s prose is predictably less polished in “The Geranium,” her narrative poetics 
green with inconsistency and often overwrought in execution. For example, a teenage grandson, 
a detail which is excluded from all other versions, is mentioned early in the story but then 
abandoned altogether. O’Connor even specifies that the old man and the teenager share a small 
	 100	
bedroom and do not get along, but that is all. The only function of the grandson is to exaggerate 
the cramped nature of Old Dudley’s new surroundings so to emphasize the theme of suffocation 
that persists throughout the story. O’Connor forces details like the proximity of Old Dudley’s 
family, or of his neighbours, or of strangers in the street to create a claustrophobic atmosphere 
and to evoke the threat of suffocation that haunts the old man: 
Once she took him shopping with her but he was too slow. They went in a subway—a 
railroad underneath the ground like a big cave. People boiled out of the trains and up 
steps and over into the streets. They rolled off the street and down steps and into trains—
black and white and tallow all mixed up like vegetables in soup. Everything was boiling. 
The trains swished in from tunnels, up canals, and all of a sudden stopped. The people 
coming out pushed through the people coming in and a noise rang and the train swooped 
off again. […] He felt like his tongue had slipped down in his stomach. (CW 19) 
O’Connor belabours her descriptions of the tight spaces of the subway platforms and apartment 
buildings alike and so Old Dudley’s anxiety increases throughout the story as he is overwhelmed 
by the “swishing and jamming” (CW 18) of the big city. She pushes this theme of claustrophobia 
even further by plaguing Old Dudley with regular fits of suffocation throughout the story, 
starting at the very beginning when the old man expresses his frustration over what he believes to 
be his neighbour’s poor maintenance of a potted geranium: “Old Dudley felt his throat knotting 
up. Lutish could root anything. Rabie too. His throat was drawn taut. He laid his head back and 
tried to clear his mind. There wasn’t much he could think about that didn’t do his throat that 
way” (10). Old Dudley’s primary reaction is a physical one as he feels his throat begin to tense 
up as if he were choking. The physical manifestation of his anxiety is then followed by nostalgic 
memories of his friends Lutish and Rabie, who we later discover are servants at the boarding 
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house in which Dudley had previously lodged. Lutish and Rabie are of course Black, and nearly 
every subsequent catalyst for Old Dudley’s anxiety is in some way related to an interaction with 
a person of colour. Thus it would seem that Old Dudley’s reservations with the northern Black 
Americans are more a question of culture or class than it is of skin colour; it is the context of his 
interactions with his neighbour(s) in New York that distresses him.   
Old Dudley’s anxiety towards city life is unsurprisingly rooted in a boyhood fantasy of 
big towns as being “important places [that] had room for him” (CW 17). The old man recalls this 
fantasy after he has already moved in with his daughter’s family and has been overwhelmed by 
the stark contrast of his new home to his Southern heritage, concluding that he must have been 
sick to have agreed to the arrangement in the first place. The brutal conditions of the city do not 
match young Dudley’s reveries, thus leaving Old Dudley to daily ruminate, regretfully and 
nostalgically, as he sits by the apartment window waiting for his neighbour to set out a potted 
geranium that reminds him of home. The symbol of the geranium in this first variation is 
contrived in its triple function as title, framing device, and catalyst for Old Dudley’s nostalgic 
bethinking. O’Connor emphasizes its symbolic reference in two drafts of the story where Dudley 
jumps out of the window after the fallen flower. The detail of the geranium remains in “Exile in 
the East” yet is no longer a focal point for the old man’s mix of nostalgia and neurosis, and by 
the time O’Connor drafts “Getting Home” and “Judgment Day,” it is altogether removed from 
the story and the season is changed from summer to winter. 
O’Connor also alters Dudley/Tanner’s physical ailments between the variations, 
deemphasizing the symptoms of claustrophobia and anxiety in “Exile in the East,” and then 
shifting completely to a series of strokes, a concussion, and the effects of kidney disease in 
“Getting Home” and “Judgment Day.” The modification of Dudley/Tanner’s ailments 
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corresponds to the modification of his personality. As the character’s attitude towards people of 
colour becomes more nuanced and complex, the symbolism of social anxiety as represented by 
his claustrophobia and symptoms of suffocation is no longer appropriate. 
There is also much more of New York in the first variation, as Dudley explores the city 
with his daughter while she runs her errands, accompanying her on the L train,40 implying that 
they likely live in either Brooklyn or Queens, two of the city’s most populous Black 
neighbourhoods in the 1950s and 60s, with Harlem being the other. Dudley’s hard-headed 
ignorance and lack of awareness are cartoonish, and his failure to recognize the reality of his 
economic condition is much more severe than Tanner’s recognition of the very same dilemma in 
“Judgment Day.” In fact, Dudley’s outburst over his integrated living conditions is almost the 
exact the same lecture the daughter gives to Tanner in “Judgment Day” when she discovers that 
he shares his shack with a Black man. In “The Geranium,” Old Dudley tells his daughter that he 
did not raise her to live alongside people of colour:  
“You ain’t been raised that way!” he’d said thundery-like. “You ain’t been raised to live 
tight with niggers that think they’re just as good as you, and you think I’d go messin’ 
around with one er that kind! If you think I want anything to do with them, you’re crazy.” 
[…] He knew Yankees let niggers in their front doors and let them set on their sofas but 
he didn’t know his own daughter that was raised proper would stay next door to them. 
(CW 21-2)   
In the final variation of “Judgment Day” the scolding is reversed:  
																																																						
40 “The went on an overhead train too. She called it an ‘El.’ They had to go up on a high platform to catch 
it.”  “The Geranium” Collected Works (19-20). 
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“If you don’t have any pride I have and I know my duty and I was raised to do it. My 
mother raised me to do it if you didn’t. She was from plain people but not the kind that 
likes to settle in with niggers.” (CW 537) 
The expression of intolerance is thus shifted from the bigoted old man in “The Geranium” to the 
young integrated woman in “Judgment Day.” We see the germs of this transfer in “Exile in the 
East,” yet in this variation, the daughter’s attitude is much more acrid: “‘How do you stand that 
nigger?’ she had wailed. ‘How do you stand that drunk stinking nigger right there beside you? 
[…] Do you think I want to see my own father living off a nigger?’” (GC 58). Her vexation is 
maintained in “Getting Home” save for a wording change here and there such as, for example, 
changing “drunk” for “the filthy stinking old nigger” (CW 58).  
What is most notable about the first variation of the story is the difference in the 
characterization of all the Black characters compared to their equivalents in later variations. 
Where the neighbour in “The Geranium” is almost exhaustingly friendly, talkative, and 
charitable, his incarnation in the final draft is the complete reverse: antisocial and contemptuous. 
For example, whereas the neighbor in the first draft stops Dudley from falling down the stairs, 
the actor in “Judgment Day” defiles and mocks Tanner once he has already fallen. Interestingly, 
Dudley’s neighbour across the alley, the man to whom the titular geranium belongs, and who we 
must assume is white given that he is referred to by both the narrator and Dudley as ‘the man’ 
and not by a slur, is a considerably less civil and amiable person than the Black neighbour. 
Furthermore, the impression is that most if not all of the neighbours are equally inhospitable 
since the very idea of leaving his daughter’s apartment gives Old Dudley anxiety: “[He] was 
always afraid that when he went out in the dog runs, a door would suddenly open and one of the 
snipe-nosed men that hung off the window ledges in his undershirt would growl, ‘What are you 
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doing here?’” (CW 22). Old Dudley is nevertheless completely shaken by his interaction with the 
Black neighbour, even though he is pleasant and attempts to relate to the old man by discussing 
hunting, a soft spot for the protagonist who day-dreams about hunting with Rabie in the South 
throughout the story. But Old Dudley is not in any way interested in the repartee and is 
immediately overwhelmed by the social interaction.   
There is also a sharp difference between Rabie and Coleman. In “The Geranium,” Rabie’s 
attitude is deferential as he follows Old Dudley around like a pet and relishes all the things that 
this wise white man can teach him about the world. In “Judgment Day,” Tanner and Coleman are 
portrayed on much more equal terms, even though their initial meeting is an absurd display of 
the mental gymnastics required of people of colour when interacting with whites. Aside from 
their convoluted introduction, however, the two men are more or less equals who establish a 
fellowship in their destitute circumstances. O’Connor makes this change in “Exile in the East” 
and trades Dudley’s anxiety over interacting with neighbours for a deep sense of resentment and 
disappointment directed at his daughter whereby he even has difficulty looking her in the eye. 
Though the source of this resentment might simply be the impatience of old age paired with his 
forced displacement, it is also possible that he resents his daughter for implying that he was in 
the charge of Coleman, for when she exclaims disgust over their living arrangement he remarks 
to himself that “it was true that he had been on a nigger’s hands more or less but he had not 
thought about it that way until she appeared” (GC 58). This revelation leads Dudley to justify to 
his daughter, as well as to himself, that the shack belongs to him and that even if it is Coleman 
who typically provides their meals, it is still he who provides the roof and gives the orders. 
Dudley/Tanner maintains this sense of domestic superiority in “Getting Home” and “Judgment 
Day” yet shifts to a slightly more inclusive tone by stating they he and Coleman built the shack 
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together. Moreover, by “Judgment Day” Tanner no longer seeks to justify Coleman’s domestic 
responsibilities but rather understands them as being owed to him: “‘Who you think cooks? Who 
you think cuts my firewood and empties my slops? He’s paroled to me. That scoundrel has been 
on my hands for thirty years. He ain’t a bad nigger’” (CW 679-680). 
Another notable aspect of this draft is the sustained conflation between the narrator and 
the protagonist in the use of a racist slur over the course of the narrative. Take, for example, 
when Dudley walks by the neighbour’s apartment: 
The door to the nigger’s apartment was open and he could see a woman sitting in a chair 
by the window. “Yankee niggers,” he muttered. She had on rimless glasses and there was 
a book in her lap. Niggers don’t think they’re dressed up till they got on glasses, Old 
Dudley thought. (CW 708). 
Both the narrator and Dudley use the slur, blurring the two perspectives and complicating any 
kind of distinction between the prejudices of the characters and those of the narrator. In the three 
later variations, however, the narrator generally uses the term ‘Negro’ and only ever slips into the 
use of the aggressive variation when clearly echoing the protagonist’s frame of mind, such as, for 
example when Dudley/Tanner is confronted by Dr. Foley: “He was everything to the niggers 
[….]” (GC 65). The narrator returns to the use of “negro” a few pages later once we are 
distanced from Tanner’s initial frustration with the disintegration of his living situation and get a 
sense of Dr. Foley’s ominous business acumen: 
“It don’t pay to make this kind of mis-take,” the doctor said. 
“I never found nothing that payed yet,” Tanner muttered. 
“Everything pays,” the negro said, “if you knows how to make it,” and he 
remained there smiling, looking the squatter up and down. (GC 73) 
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It is worth noting that immediately before this exchange, Dr. Foley also refers to Coleman by the 
racial epithet: “‘I know that nigger,” he said. “Coleman Parrum—how long does it take him to 
sleep off that stump liquor you all make?’” (GC 73). This context, as well as Tanner’s subsequent 
defensiveness, suggests that the vacillation between usages is directly related to class concerns. 
Thus, when Dudley/Tanner realizes upon Dr. Foley’s arrival that the jig is up, his frustration 
gives way to his use of the racist slur, just as it does when he is defending his living condition to 
his daughter. Yet, when he is attempting to negotiate his board on Dr. Foley’s land, 
Dudley/Tanner is considerably more muted: “‘The governmint ain’t got around yet to forcing the 
white folks to work for the colored,’ Tanner said” (76). Further to this point, once Dudley/Tanner 
decides that he cannot go on living with his daughter in the strange and cold society of North, he 
decides that would have no problem working for Dr. Foley and that “He would have been a 
nigger’s white nigger any day.” Thus, in the variations, the slur signifies not necessarily race, but 
rather, social status.   
 
 
On “Judgment Day”   
“Judgment Day” does not represent the pride of intellect in the same way as it is featured in the 
titular story, or in “Good Country People,” or “The Enduring Chill.” One would be hard-pressed 
to label the protagonist Tanner as an intellectual, or as an artist, or even, in very general terms, a 
liberal. The old man, for better or worse, is very much representative of the Old South. What is 
more, Tanner's faith is one of his defining characteristics, and so irreligion must also be 
precluded from this iteration of the paradigm. Conversely, however, the story does portray 
encounters with characters who could be interpreted as the Corrupt Human Heart portion of the 
equation, the most obvious example being the actor who lives next door in the New York City 
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apartment. But then again, I believe that the actor is not so much a corrupt human heart as he is 
Tanner's opposite. He is not, for example, corrupt in the sense that Sarah Ham from “The 
Comforts of Home” or Mr. Shiftlet from “The Life You Save May Be Your Own” are corrupt; he 
is simply different from Tanner in every conceivable way, beginning with his secularism. As 
Tanner's daughter tries to warn him, “They ain't the same around here” (CW 688). In fact, a more 
accurate nominee for the Corrupt Human Heart character-type would be Tanner's daughter 
herself, since she is of the South but, in Tanner's eyes, has been spoiled by the North, or as 
O'Connor might say, secularized. It is only after her father's death, and moreover only after 
weeks of sleeplessness, that she delivers on her promise to return her father's corpse home to 
Corinth, Georgia, in turn ever so slightly re-establishing her ties to her homeland. But again, this 
is stretching out thinly the details of the story to adapt it to Coffey's premise.   
 So, if “Judgment Day” fails to meet the parameters of Coffey’s paradigm, how can I 
claim that it is O'Connor's most important? It is precisely because the story does not properly fit 
into this framework that it is worthy of our attention. Because it diverges from O'Connor's usual 
narrative habits, it is arguably her most accomplished piece of writing. This is not to say that the 
story is a complete outlier. As I outlined above, “Judgment Day” nevertheless deals with 
O'Connor's favourite topics, such as heritage, want of self-awareness, and death, and is rich with 
the wit and gloom typical of her writing. But it is unlike any of O'Connor's other work in that it is 
suffused with the social and political tension between whites and Blacks in the South, and indeed 
the North as well. The characters of colour are not merely at the periphery of the story's action in 
the form of a fellow passenger in transit or a farm-hand or a pickaninny; rather, the three 
different Black men are the fuel that powers the engine of the story. Tanner’s interactions with 
Coleman, Dr. Foley, and the actor are more than incidental encounters between protagonist and a 
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selection of tertiary characters: the three different relationships represent three different types of 
Black men in the American imagination, from the lackadaisical labourer, to the criminal hustler, 
to the angry Black man. As Tanner’s daughter tells her husband in the “Getting Home” variation, 
her father “knows there’s different kinds” of Black men: “‘You haven’t come from where there’s 
lots of niggers’ she said. ‘A nigger is just a nigger to you” (GC 23). In the “Judgement Day” 
variation, she assures him that “it takes brains to work a real nigger” (CW 677), brains that her 
father has. Yet, Tanner was able to build a relationship with Coleman purely because the latter 
knew what was expected of him and was clever enough to play along. What is more, their 
relationship only develops beyond that of employee/employer because of their alcoholic co-
dependency. With Dr. Foley, however, Tanner is unable to comply in like manner and opts to 
vacate the land on which he and Coleman are squatting and move North rather than be in the 
employment of a Black man. It does not matter to Tanner that Foley is “only part black” since a 
fraction is enough to dissuade him from accepting the role of subordinate. Interestingly, in one 
draft of the variation, the narrator notes that Dr. Foley’s meanness comes from his white blood 
and “his shut mouth craft from the Indian” (GC 65). Finally, Tanner’s punishment for his refusal 
of Dr. Foley comes in the form of the bespeckled actor with the barely visibly facial hair in the 
North who unequivocally rejects his Southern modus operandi and mocks him even in his final 
moments.   
 The life-blood of the story, as it is in most of her best work, is one of O'Connor's great 
annoyances, that is, presumptuous attitudes of superiority and the moral judgments of “stupid 
Yankee liberals” who smack their lips in satisfaction at the failures of the South. But what 
elevates this story above the rest of her work is that her critique is embedded in the narrative 
details of the story rather than in any kind of clash of ideologies between different characters. 
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For example, there is no arrogant college graduate or artist-type, no ersatz-prophet to have his 
presumptions thrown back in his face. Tanner has already been humbled when he suffers his 
final stroke; he has already given up on living in Northern society and has resolved to make his 
way back to Coleman in the South. He is neither outraged idealist nor disgruntled bigot. He is 
certainly prejudiced insofar as he refuses to be subservient to a Black man, even if it means 
turning down work and shelter, but he is not so intolerant that he is repulsed by the idea of living 
alongside Black neighbors if they are equally destitute. In fact, that he shared his dilapidated 
shack in Corinth with Coleman is an issue for his daughter more than it is for him, as noted 
above. Tanner has been squatting on Foley's land for an indeterminate amount of time and has 
been accused of illegally producing liquor on the property by his new landlord the “brown 
porpoise-shaped figure” of Dr. Foley.41 Tanner's prospects are either to work for Dr. Foley, who 
it would seem is some kind of hustler in the Black community who serves as “druggist and 
undertaker and general counsel and real estate man” (CW 250), or to move to New York with his 
daughter. It is convenience that ultimately pushes Tanner to leave Coleman, not his daughter's 
moral outrage. 
 The integrated apartment building in New York is an important narrative detail as it 
reveals the material conditions in which Tanner and his daughter live. Though many different 
nationalities and communities converge in New York City, it has always been, and remains one 
of the most segregated cities in the United States. In fact, until the rise of Harlem as a cultural 
hub in the twenties, whites were quick to escape any neighbourhood that had a sudden influx of 
																																																						
41 O’Connor makes a final edit for the version of the story that would end up in the Library of America 
edition of her Collected Works where Tanner is confronted by Dr. Foley a few months after his daughter’s 
initial visit. The son in law accompanies the daughter to Corinth in this version, and leans against a tree 
smoking a cigarette as she castigates her father and his roommate. 
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Black Americans.42 Thus, if Tanner's daughter and her husband live in a neighbourhood where 
people of colour can move in next door without causing a disturbance among the white residents, 
then the daughter's living conditions are, socially speaking, only marginally better than his 
shared shack with Coleman in Corinth. This is important because it immediately indicates that 
the quality of life is not fundamentally better in the North than it is in the South, that the hubs of 
industrialization offer, not a better life, but a different kind of poverty. Notice the daughter's 
sharp orders to her father to avoid any kind of interaction: “You keep away from them. Don't you 
go over there trying to get friendly with him” (CW 261). She does not make some kind of outcry 
as if the arrival of Black neighbours were an extraordinary occurrence, as if propriety had been 
abandoned and that their living space has been invaded, but instead keeps to herself and avoids 
making any trouble. The old man's fatal mistake is that he does not mind his business — he is 
not wary of the danger that could come with engaging the actor. His mistake is that he assumes 
that they are on equal footing because they are neighbours, and from this fact presumes that they 
are more or less of the same economic background and thus social standing. Tanner then 
constructs a Southern identity for the actor so that he can establish and impose a familiar code of 
interaction, much as he had done with Coleman several years prior.  
  Moreover, the exact source of the conflict between the characters in “Judgment Day” is 
much more mysterious than it is in “Everything That Rises Must Converge.” In the latter story, 
there is a clear, familiar context established with the setting of the recently integrated public bus, 
which O’Connor emphasizes with her portrayal of Julian's moralizing attitude, whether it be 
overtly directed at this mother or indulged privately in his daydreams. O’Connor also employs 
the gothic device of doubling in her characterization of the two mothers, implying an inevitable 
																																																						
42 According to the statistics gathered at: http://blackdemographics.com/cities-2/new-york-nj-ny/ 
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clash between the two women. The actor's outburst in “Judgment Day,” however, is not so easily 
explained. Certainly, Tanner's general tone and attitude are patronizing, especially when he 
insists on calling him Preacher, but the actor seems agitated before their interaction even begins. 
The actor is unlike any other Black man Tanner has ever met and for this reason, Tanner is 
totally unprepared to deal with him. His neighbour’s impatience is so potent that it is almost as if 
any engagement from Tanner at all would have produced the same result. He is Coleman’s 
complete opposite: he is fierce of nature, remorseless, and eager for confrontation. To make 
matters worse, Tanner’s Southern code of manners, it turns out, does not apply in the progressive 
North43 where tensions are high because the population is dense and the material signs of poverty 
are barefaced in the downtrodden buildings, in the crumbling infrastructure, and in the violence 
of the law in both its constitution by politicians and its application by police officers.  
 Tanner's two previous encounters with Black men in the story establishes the historical 
context between white and Blacks in the South, while this final encounter suggests some 
uncertainties of the North’s counteroffer. Simply put, Tanner's relationship with Coleman 
represents the past, his refusal to comply with Foley represents the present tensions, and his clash 
with the actor represents a future for which he is fully unprepared. It is through the narrative 
progression of these three relationships that O'Connor attempts to confront what cannot be got at 
directly, that is, the racial divide in America. The material conditions of four hundred years of 
subjugation, humiliation, murder, and rape are unnameable, and so, O'Connor's inclusion of these 
																																																						
43 I again turn to Baraka for a description of life in a Northern city: “For many Negroes, whether they live 
in Harlem or not, the city is simply a symbol of naked oppression. […] But this is one of the weirdest 
things about the American experience, that it can oppress a man, almost suck his life away, and then make 
him so ashamed that he was among the oppressed, rather than the oppressors, that he will never offer any 




truths cannot be portrayed directly. Instead, they are embedded in the anger felt and expressed by 
the actor. This is because the wounds of the racial problem run deep and the injustices are 
systemic. It is against Tanner as a symptom of a systemic problem that the actor revolts when he 
vehemently rejects any form of interaction. Perhaps Tanner's judgment day is a version of the 
day of judgment of which Malcolm X warns in many of his speeches—the reckoning the 
American people must face if they do not attempt to seriously and genuinely offer restitution for 
past injustices suffered by the Blacks at the hands of the white majority: 
History must repeat itself! Because of America's evil deeds against these twenty-two 
million "Negroes," like Egypt and Babylon before her, America herself now stands before 
the "bar of justice." White America is now facing her Day of Judgment, and she can't 
escape because today God himself is the judge. God himself is now the administrator of 
justice, and God himself is to be her divine executor! (“God's Judgment of White 
America”) 
That O’Connor and Malcom X knelt before different Gods is to me unimportant, for their 
principles are essentially the same: symbolic gestures of idealism are not enough to mend the 
wounds of history. A great injustice has been committed, and continues to be committed in new 
but familiar forms, and if conditions do not soon change, there will be a reckoning. As Malcolm 
X noted after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, “The chickens have come home to roost.” 
This very sentiment is echoed at the conclusion of both the “Getting Home” variation, and an 
early draft of “Judgment Day” when Dudley/Tanner responds to the actor’s mockery that there 
“Ain’t no judgment day, old man. Cept this. Maybe this here judgment day for you” with “you’ll 
find out its another one, nigger, when you begin to burn in hell” (GC 120). In the final version, 
Tanner does not respond so violently, and instead asks the man to help him up as he has not yet 
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given up on his plan to return South. Unfortunately, confused and desperate, he again refers to 
him as Preacher and seals his fate. The old man’s moment of humility, however, is unlike that of 
other O’Connor protagonists who experience a violent encounter with a mysterious prophetic 
figure. Tanner’s moment of grace, if indeed he has one, is not described in the text; the narrative 
simply cuts from his final interaction with the neighbour to his daughter discovering his body in 
the stairwell. The neighbour’s message that “There ain’t no judgment day, old man. Cept this” is 
thus directed at both Tanner and the reader insofar as the narrative omission of Tanner’s death 
disrupts the cathartic moment of pity and fear whereby the reader levies his or her own judgment 
upon the protagonist. Moreover, Tanner’s final words “I’m on my way home!” are ambiguous 
enough to suggest both his physical home in the South, and his spiritual home in the Kingdom of 
Heaven. Readers thus cannot know if the actor has been “the unwilling instrument of grace” 
(MM 118) and if Tanner’s death is redeemed by an ultimate epiphany. 
Such is the principle difference between the neighbour characters in “The Geranium” and 
in “Judgment day”: in the first, the neighbour is a happy-go-lucky Uncle Tom44 type who 
attempts to befriend the protagonist, yet in the second, he is an abrasive heretic with no interest 
whatsoever in humouring Tanner's gesture of Southern manners, ultimately performing upon him 
some mysterious violence. Where the original character is a caricature of a subservient Black 
man who is delighted to be of use to a white man, his incarnation in “Judgment Day” is the 
complete opposite—he is the manifestation of what Baldwin claims, in his essay “The White 
Man’s Guilt,” is the white fear that the Black man's fight for equality is in fact a mission of 
retribution for the crimes committed upon his race over the course of American history: 
																																																						
44 Derogatory term for a person of colour who will do whatever it takes to gain the favour of whites. 
References the character of the same name from Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel Uncle Tom's Cabin 
(1852). 
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If black people fall into this trap, the trap of believing that they deserve their fate, white 
people fall into the yet more stunning and intricate trap of believing that they deserve their 
fate, and their comparative safety and that black people, therefore, need only do as white 
people have done to rise to where white people now are. But this simply cannot be said, not 
only for reasons of politeness or charity, but also because white people carry in them a 
carefully muffled fear that black people long to do to others what has been done to them. 
(Collected Essays 724-25) 
The neighbour in “Judgment Day” is therefore a representation of the white guilt that haunts the 
collective imagination of Northerners and Southerners alike. He is a Christ-denying heretic who 
not only assaults an elderly man, but who shows no mercy whatsoever in Tanner's final 
moments, going so far as to ridicule Tanner's faith in the eternal court of judgment, and defile his 
body by shoving his head and arms through the spokes of the staircase’s banister like some 
improvised pillory. He is O’Connor’s final “prophet gone wrong.”  
 
Conclusion 
In “The Teaching of Literature,” Flannery O’Connor writes that the student of literature must 
search for the intentions of the writer not in the biographical information made available to 
readers, but exclusively in the work itself. “Psychology is an interesting subject,” she continues,  
but hardly the main consideration for the teaching of English. Neither is sociology. […] 
Good fiction deals with human nature. If it uses material that is topical, it still does not 
use it for a topical purpose, and if topics are what you want anyway, you are better 
referred to a newspaper. (MM 126) 
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Given that the much of my analysis of O’Connor’s texts has been filtered through each of the 
sociological, the biographical, and the topical, there is little doubt in my mind that my research 
has betrayed her artistic principles. Of course, such is the case for much, if not all, O’Connor 
scholarship, from Guy Davenport and Alice Walker, to Ralph Wood and Mark Greif. O’Connor 
might say that this is the natural result of “a generation that has been made to feel that the aim of 
learning is to eliminate mystery” (125). My intention, however, has not been to eliminate 
mystery, or to dissect the narrative properties of each text to apprise their sociological value as 
case studies, or even to reach a judgment on O’Connor’s political leanings. Rather, my objective 
has been two-fold: first, to investigate the prophetic manifestations of said mystery and the 
corresponding violent epiphanies experienced by the protagonists; and second, to trace the 
evolution of her artistic expression as it relates to her portrayal of Black characters. I have thus 
made recourse to the topical and the sociological not because I prioritize the “examination of 
statistics rather than [the] examination of conscience” (MM 130), but because I believe that the 
topical, insofar as it relates to the racial divide in the United States, has heretofore been a 
neglected topic of research in O’Connor studies. Though I have shown and engaged with a 
number of critics who have explored the topic of the racial divide in O’Connor’s texts, their 
work, in my estimation, has shown to be unsatisfactory in that it largely fails to recognize the 
achievement of the writer’s late texts, insofar as they feature Black characters who have inherited 
the mantle of “prophet gone wrong.” As such, these characters also represent O’Connor’s most 
nuanced engagement with the topic of the civil rights movement and the associated racial 
tensions that may potentially emerge when Blacks and white converge.  
Moreover, some of the criticism that does engage with the topic of the racial divide in 
O’Connor’s work unfortunately reads as though it was composed by one of her self-idolizing 
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false prophets, such as Asbury or Julien, in that the studies are far too pre-occupied with 
determining the condition of the writer’s moral integrity. As such, I have used these studies to 
establish what, borrowing from Michel Foucault, I have termed the incitement to diagnose 
racism. I have argued that the impulse of literary critics to either defend or to condemn an artist’s 
perceived racism illustrates the elitist moralizing that O’Connor vilifies in her correspondence 
and lampoons in her fiction. 
By then reading O’Connor alongside the work of Black prophetic figures such as 
Malcolm X, and Amiri Baraka, I demonstrated that her political and social sensibilities are 
surprisingly congruent with those of the more radical voices of the Civil Rights movement. I 
argue that this nuanced sensitivity to the racial divide reveals itself in her later work not only 
through her portrayal of Black characters, but through the self-deception of her white characters 
as well.  
At last, I trace the evolution of her treatment of Black characters through the progress of 
the “Geranium Variations” and argue that the final variation, “Judgment Day,” offers her most 

























Bearing Witness to Violence  











My blood is all meridian; were it not 
I had not left my clime, nor should I be, 
In spite of tortures, ne'er to be forgot 
A slave again of love,---at least of thee. 










No Such Thing as Life Without Bloodshed 
 
 
Much of the critical attention that Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian has earned since its 
publication in 1985 has been preoccupied with the surfeit of violence described in awful detail 
throughout the novel. Given that the narrative is set on the American frontier in the period of 
aggressive territorial expansion of the 19th century, and that the timeline bookended by the 
Mexican-American war of 1846-48 and the American Civil War of 1861-1865, the book 
functions, in many respects, as an encyclopedia of violence. How a critic chooses to interpret the 
novel therefore becomes a question of his or her ability, or rather disposition, to bear witness to 
said violence, a question of whether one is prepared to reckon with the historical and social 
traumas of the United States of America. While there are useful and engaging readings of 
McCarthy's work by critics such as Justin Evans,45 or most recently, Lauren Brown,46 others, 
such as Peter Josyph or Mark Winchell, as I will show, get caught up in the idea that the novel 
itself enacts violence, or worse, that the point of the violence is that there is no point. As a 
rebuttal to these latter readings, the present study will use Slavoj Žižek’s Violence: Six Sideways 
Reflections to argue that the novel’s relentless descriptions of horrible violence are but a 
fragment of the violence that McCarthy strives to portray in his re-telling of the history of the 
																																																						
45 From “To Disenchant and Disintoxicate: Blood Meridian as Critical Epic”: “By analogy with critical 
theory, we can read Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian (1985) as a ‘‘critical epic.’’ It tries to make this 
most traditional literary form into a self-reflexive and self-critical but idealistic agent, one that respects 
the ideals of traditional literary forms but radicalizes them in order to criticize modern societies” (405). 
46 From “Existing Without Consent”: “I seek to offer a New Americanist reading that unites the 
theoretical implications of this violence with its political effects. I do this to explain how some of the 
“othered,” unassimilable populations not only survived violence similar to that which McCarthy 
chronicles in Blood Meridian, but persisted—even into the present—as living testimonials whose very 
existence contradicts the meaning conferred by the judge and the exceptionalist U.S. social, political, and 
historical narrative he symbolically records and controls” (76).  
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American frontier. I shall thus use Žižek’s typology of violence to argue that readers of Blood 
Meridian must “disenchant [themselves] from the fascinating lure of “subjective” violence,” 
which is to say, violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent, [and] perceive the contours of 
the background which generates such outbursts” (1). Following this line of thinking, I argue that 
in order to mitigate the transfixing effects of the escalating horror of the sundry violent acts, we 
must, in Žižek’s words, look at the problem of violence awry47 rather than attempt a direct 
confrontation with it. The aim of this sideways glance is to answer how and why the novel 
beckons its readers, with every successive act of rape, defilement, and murder, to reckon not only 
with the national mythologies it subverts, but also with the national ethos it portrays. 
Justin Evans’s essay “To Disenchant and Dis-intoxicate: Blood Meridian as Critical Epic” 
provides a useful point of departure for my analysis of Blood Meridian, as it too expresses 
suspicion of critical readings of the text that focus too narrowly on the “supposed human 
propensity for violence.”48 In Evans’s estimation, the conundrum with which the novel actually 
																																																						
47 Žižek originally uses this term in his book Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through 
Popular Culture. He develops the term to justify his application of Lacanian psychoanalysis to an 
investigation of popular culture in order to “discern the features that usually escape a straightforward 
academic look” (3). In other words, to look awry is to observe from a particular perspective so as to not 
be distracted by the sublime appearance of that which is being observed.    
48 From Evans’ footnotes to his discussion of the surplus of violence that surrounds Judge Holden, whom 
he compares to Milton’s Satan and Conrad’s Kurtz: “Many critics focus on the violence of the novel, 
understandably encouraged by McCarthy’s claim in an interview that ‘‘there’s no such thing as life 
without bloodshed . . . the notion that the species can be improved in some way, that everyone could live 
in harmony, is a really dangerous idea’’ (Richard B. Woodward, ‘‘Cormac McCarthy’s Venomous 
Fiction,’’ New York Times, April 19, 1992). Hungerford, (Postmodern Belief, 90,) quotes this as 
evidence against the possibility that the novel might be critical of violence. It is less common for critics to 
quote the follow-up claim, that ‘‘those who are afflicted with this notion are the first ones to give up their 
souls, their freedom’’ (Woodward, ‘‘Venomous Fiction’’). McCarthy’s stress on soul and freedom hardly 
squares with the claim that Blood Meridian is resolutely deterministic. The fear McCarthy expressed in 
this interview—that people will give up their freedom for the sake of avoiding violence—is bizarrely 
inverted by such critics, who seem to have read it as a demand that we give up the possibility of freedom 
for the sake of embracing violence. My reading here is not concerned with a supposed human propensity 
to violence, which seems to me quite a superficial element of the novel. The human propensity to give up 
freedom, I think, is the real target here” (421-422). 
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reckons is the “human propensity to give up freedom” in the name of avoiding violence, a 
reading of the text that he has culled straight from the horse’s mouth, so to speak, as McCarthy 
expresses this idea almost exactly in an interview with Richard B. Woodward for the New York 
Times, which I will further address below. Following McCarthy’s testimony, Evan’s principal 
argument is that the novelist borrows from the narrative poetics of the epic, which includes 
devices such as cataloguing, parataxis, and extended similes, to “defend the ideal of human 
subjectivity against a metaphysics of positivism” (406). Through this lens, the kid, the novel’s 
protagonist, is read as a symbol for the possibility of agency and idealism, while Judge Holden, 
the antagonist, is a logical positivist philosopher who commits himself to categorizing and then 
destroying everything he encounters, including eventually the kid, with the ultimate structuralist 
goal of disproving the existence of a gap between observation and theory.  
Rather than ratify social norms and buttress the national myths that are vital to the project 
of nation-building,49 the traditional forms of the epic instead work to unveil the nasty details of 
those very norms and myths in order to question not only their validity, but the very impulse to 
romanticise the history of American imperialism. I contend, then, that if, as Hegel believed, epics 
are tales a society uses to understand itself as a distinct and autonomous group,50 then so too is 
McCarthy’s novel, following not only the tradition of the epic, but that of the American jeremiad 
																																																						
49 From Evans: “With the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, critics came to read their own 
“national” epic as a founding text: Dies Nibelingenlied, Beowulf, El Cid, Roland, and so on could be 
taken to describe the essence of a nation. Critics of this bent tended to use social theory as interpretive 
tool; epics, which depicted simple and perfect societies (of the British or Germans or Franks or 
Spanianards), were considered to be as simple, and perfect as the societies they depicted” (407).  
50 From Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics. Part 3, Section 3: “As such an original whole the epic work is the 
Saga, the Book, the Bible of a people, and every great and important people has such absolutely earliest 
books which express for it its own original spirit. To this extent these memorials are nothing less than the 
proper foundations of a national consciousness, and it would be interesting to form a collection of such 
epic bibles. For the series of epics, excluding those which are later tours de force, would present us with a 
gallery of the spirits of peoples.” Accessed on the web at: 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ae/part3-section3-chapter3.htm 
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as well, meant to help American society to better understand itself. As Evans writes, “the book’s 
ulterior purpose, to echo Auden, is to tell the truth about, and thus to disenchant, the idea of the 
epic and of the society of which that idea is a part” (415). Blood Meridian’s ambition to tell the 
truth about American society is especially significant if one considers the time frame during 
which McCarthy worked on it, that being between 1978 and 1985 or, more precisely, the decade 
immediately following the end of the war in Vietnam.51 This detail is noteworthy for, as I will 
elaborate, the twenty-year conflict in Vietnam had detrimental effects on how Americans viewed 
not only their government (and by extension their military), but their society and its place in the 
world as a whole. Thus, if Blood Meridian indeed functions as an epic, as Evans convincingly 
argues, then, following György Lukács, the narrative, while inspired by the carefully researched 
history of the American frontier in the nineteenth century, is “essentially realistic and attached to 
the present rather than to the past” (Evans 409), a present, as I suggested above, that was 
wrestling with the burden of bearing witness to the carnage committed by its government.  
The present chapter shall therefore argue that readers must, like Odysseus stopping the 
ears of his crew with wax, avoid succumbing to the enchanting wail of the incessant violence 
described by McCarthy so that they may pay mind to the form of the novel as it pays homage to 
the traditional poetics of the epic, to the allusions to the Old Testament, and to the juxtaposition 
of detailed descriptions and narrative omissions. This is not to say that the scenes of violence 
must be ignored in favour of close a reading of the novel’s narrative poetics; such a thing would 
be akin to ignoring all references to whales in Moby-Dick in order to study Herman Melville’s 
use of the encyclopedic form. Violence, both described and omitted, is essential to Blood 
																																																						
51 This is the time frame according to Daniel Robert King’s research in Cormac McCarthy’s Literary 
Evolution (2016). 
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Meridian’s narrative structure insofar as the novel not only describes the violence of war and of 
nation-building, but bears witness to it.  
Moreover, I believe that McCarthy’s detached but detailed treatment of the brutality of 
American history is amplified by his narrative choice to omit the description of the kid’s murder 
at the end of the novel. In light of my analysis of the operation of prophetic violence in the texts 
of Flannery O’Connor, I will argue that the kid’s unnarrated death serves two separate but related 
narrative functions: on the one hand, it eliminates the protagonist’s opportunity to experience an 
epiphanic moment of grace whereby he would be returned to reality at a considerable cost, while 
on the other, his anticlimactic demise interrupts the reader’s cathartic payoff for having endured 
over three hundred pages of brutal, and often senseless, violence.  
 
 
Critical Readings of the Violence in Blood Meridian 
One of McCarthy’s more effective narrative methods of complementing the moments of 
barbarity is by employing a dark sense of humour that festers throughout the novel, 
simultaneously attracting and repelling the reader, leaving them unsure of whether to reject or to 
empathize with the characters. Consider Toadvine whose wit provides comic relief for most of 
the novel before his unceremonious, anti-climactic death by hanging. Take, for example, when 
Toadvine and the kid meet again in a Mexican town where they are both prisoners: “How do you 
like the city life” he asks the kid after the latter has returned from cleaning filth and excrement 
out of gutters. “I dont like it worth a damn so far,” answers the kid. “I keep waiting for it to take 
with me but it aint done it,” replies Toadvine (74-75). As Patrick W. Shaw so eloquently puts it, 
“humour and violence have blended like blood in creek water” (138), insofar as that humour is 
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used not to mitigate the violence, but to intensify it in order to further challenge how the reader 
will react and engage with it.  
Moreover, the pairing of humour with violence is progressive throughout the novel, 
evolving from seemingly harmless to deadly associations. The complete absurdity of the novel’s 
final scene is the ultimate evidence of this noxious pairing of comedy and cruelty. The kid, now 
in his forties, visits a dwarf prostitute yet is incapable of stimulating his libido and must settle for 
humiliating consolations from her. Moments later, he witnesses the drunken murder of a dancing 
bear, foreshadowing his approaching death and (probable) molestation at the hands of the judge. 
The chapter culminates with the massive, naked judge pirouetting and playing the fiddle to an 
adoring audience, repeating over and over again that he will not die. As Barcley Owens notes, 
McCarthy's use of language and humour in such moments, much like the judge himself, “smiles 
at death and laughs at its own horrible truths” (14).  
These horrible truths are too much for critic Peter Josyph who, in Cormac McCarthy's 
house: Reading McCarthy Without Walls, admits to initially feeling a strong resistance to the 
novel's amoralism. “Few readers, few authors,” he writes, 
would feel at home in McCarthy's milieu, and fewer would not envy McCarthy's genius in 
rendering it. But when a highly charged, richly textured novel driven by some of the most 
impressive American prose of this century features no major figure who is not, quite 
literally, a slaughterer, and offers scarcely a single act to inspire hope for the race, it is 
natural to ask questions about that talent and to wonder whether one is perceiving it 
rightly and judging it fairly. One gluts upon a baroque of thieving, raping, shooting, 
slashing, hanging, scalping, burning, bashing, hacking, stabbing... (170) 
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While Josyph ultimately professes a great admiration for McCarthy's craft, he nevertheless 
cannot help himself from criticizing what he believes to be a lack of morality, and, moreover, 
pronounces the novel ethically bereft. The critic argues that due to what he terms a “sense of 
emotional stinginess” and aridity (186), McCarthy's work is difficult to take seriously. “For a 
novel about blood,” he goes on, “it seems to be written in little of it” (186). Part of Josyph's 
disappointment stems from his expectation that the novel ought to assume a greater, more 
responsible role in portraying such monsters since the streets of his beloved Manhattan, for 
example, has such monsters of its own, and so Blood Meridian, or works like it, should therefore 
offer some sort of solace and reprieve to its readers by explicitly condemning the brutality of its 
characters. Yet, it seems to me that Josyph is missing the point entirely. As Žižek would say, he is 
“enchanted with the fascinating lure of this directly ‘subjective’ violence” (1). His liberal 
humanist discourse has devolved to excessive moral outrage: “and when the behaviour of those 
meant to enlist our sympathies reminds us of the monsters we will encounter on the streets this 
afternoon when we take the book out for a walk with maybe our wives and daughters too, one's 
reservations become a matter of life and death” (Josyph 186). Josyph concludes that while the 
novel is one of the better pieces of American fiction to be written in the twentieth century, it is, to 
put it in vulgar terms, socially irresponsible.  
 In her book entitled The Evil, the Fated, the Biblical: The Latent Metaphysics of Cormac 
McCarthy, Hanna Boguta-Marchel points to another critic who is stunted by Blood Meridian's 
excessive violence, Mark Winchell, yet in this case the critic’s aversion leads to a sense of 
detachment since, as he writes, “sustained and senseless violence [...] can shock for only so long 
before it begins to numb or even lead to a kind of boredom” (59). For Winchell, McCarthy's 
novel verges on camp as it delivers a type of exaggeration that cannot be taken seriously. Boguta-
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Marchel disagrees with Winchell's reading and argues that the novel lacks the sentimentality and 
“tone of purely aesthetic playfulness and detached elite dandyism” of camp literature and 
concludes that while McCarthy's novel approaches camp, as defined by Susan Sontag in her 
essay “Notes on 'Camp,” it does not quite reach it because it accomplishes in delivering the tale 
it set out to tell (59), that is, the integrity of the narrative does not drown in its own excess. 
In spite of Boguta-Marchel's refutation, with which I agree, Winchell's reaction to the 
text, as well as that of Josyph, in my opinion, points to a more pressing concern. The cynical 
indifference that arises in much of the scholarship52 on Blood Meridian seems to me to disavow 
the history with which the novel reckons, which is not only that of the American frontier and the 
consolidation of national power, but the recent history of American foreign intervention, as well. 
Lauren Brown believes that recent scholarship on McCarthy has attempted to remedy this trend 
of disavowal by endeavouring to “interpret the violence in Blood Meridian as the culminating 
manifestation of the very search for and implementation of meaning, order, and classification 
fundamental to the Western ontological tradition” (80). Brown’s observation echoes Evans’s 
reading of the novel as an epic narrative insofar as the implementation of meaning, order, and 
classification is the very function and purpose of the epic mode. The mimetic violence in Blood 
Meridian, then, is neither ethically bereft nor boredom-inducing, but revelatory.  
																																																						
52 Lauren Brown makes a similar observation in her essay “Existing Without Consent,” pinpointing John 
Cant, Dana Phillips, James Dorson, and Steven Shaviro, among others: “Yet the very descriptions offered 
by various critics of the novel’s violence suggest that the novel deliberately undermines such endeavors. 
Take, for example, Dorson’s claim that the “sheer accumulation of atrocities and their matter-of-fact 
representation tend to break down any semblance of a plot and make it difficult for readers to cognitively 
process the violence” (106), or Steven Shaviro’s observation that “the orgies of violence that 
punctuate Blood Meridian . . . fail to constitute a pattern, to unveil a mystery or to serve any 
comprehensible purpose. Instead,” Shaviro writes, “the book suggests that ‘a taste for mindless violence’ 
is as ubiquitous—and as banal—as any other form of ‘common sense’” (147). The descriptions 
deliberately draw our focus, instead, to the means by which such large-scale violence was effected and 
disavowed, not only during the period of McCarthy’s novel, but transgenerationally” (89-90). 
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Looking Awry at Violence 
As Patrick W. Shaw writes in The Modern American Novel of Violence, “in no other novel can 
we find a rhetoric of violence so lovingly applied” (133), which is to say that though scenes of 
violence are unrestrained in their depiction of the barbarity of man, they nevertheless do so 
beautifully. There is no shortage of examples from the novel that might stick out to readers and 
haunt them for pages until the next mugging, or murder, or rape. In fact, one could likely open 
the book at random and find such a scene described with the horrible beauty typical of 
McCarthy's prose. Take for instance the Comanche attack on Captain White's militia in chapter 
four: “A man near him sat with an arrow hanging out of his neck. He was bent slightly as if in 
prayer. [...] Everywhere there were horses down and men scrambling and he saw a man who sat 
charging his rifle while blood ran from his ears [...] and he saw men lanced and caught up by the 
hair and scalped standing [...]” (53). Or again, only a few pages later: “They followed the 
trampled ground left by the warparty and in the afternoon they came upon a mule that had failed 
and been lanced and left dead and then they came upon another. The way narrowed through the 
rocks and by and by they came to a bush that was hung with dead babies” (57). The 
senselessness and gratuitousness of the violence in such scenes urges readers to consider the 
context in which this violence erupts in order to appreciate the conditions that sponsor the acts of 
slaughter, for the novel’s narrative poetics ultimately reveal a much darker reality than any 
individual burst of violence. 
Our first intimate encounter with John Joel Glanton occurs on the outskirts of Chihuahua 
City, not long after the kid has joined the gang. Glanton and his men have come to purchase 
revolvers from a Prussian by the name of Speyer to carry out their contract with Governor Trias 
to eradicate the Apache and their leader Gómez who have been raiding Mexican ranches. As 
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Glanton examines the particulars of one of the revolvers, he begins to take aim at various 
animals and objects scattered about the courtyard and shoots at them. A cat, some chickens, a 
small goat, and a finally a clay decanter all succumb to the bandit’s ferocity, which he discharges 
with blessed indifference. Nearby soldiers emerge to investigate the violence but they are quickly 
assuaged by judge Holden’s reassurance that he and the men are conducting business for the 
Governor. This scene is significant for two reasons: the first is that it establishes a baseline for 
Glanton’s penchant for mindless violence as well as his complete disdain for authority. The 
second reason is that it reveals the machinations of the state that enable the mindless violence of, 
for example, semi-random shootings. The Glanton gang would not be terrorizing this courtyard 
were it not for Governor Trias’s ambition to cleanse his territory of Apache. Moreover, the 
contractual nature of the bounty-hunting provides the men in the gang with a grotesque economic 
logic for their actions: they are being paid to kill. As Lauren Brown puts it in “Existing Without 
Consent,” “the violence occasioned by the exceptionalist mythos and carried out by the gang is 
concealed by legal overwriting that accompanies this consolidation of the nation-state’s power 
and authority” (81).  
Yet, chickens and decanters are a pittance compared to the horrifying acts the gang will 
carry out thereafter, each subsequent act of violence more difficult to witness than the last. What 
is more, the gang’s barbarity quickly escalates, and the motivations behind their actions become 
murkier, as the men violently and mercilessly slaughter not only all the Apaches they encounter, 
but any dark-skinned soul who has the misfortune of crossing their path. With each turn of the 
page, the reader is thus forced to become familiar with rape, genocide, infanticide, 
disembowelment, torture, and sundry acts of savage murder. The villainy of these subsequent 
acts of violence upon innocents, which is to say upon people who do not belong to the targeted 
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Apache tribes as well as upon animals, exceeds the terms of their contracts — in other words, it 
is surplus violence. Their indulgence in bacchanalian barbarity does not contribute to the original 
purpose of accumulating capital; it is but violence for the sake of violence. In this regard, the 
Glanton gang’s violent demeanour recalls that of O’Connor’s Misfit from “A Good Man is Hard 
to Find” when he declares, shortly before killing the grandmother, that there’s “no pleasure but 
meanness.” Indeed, the Misfit’s uncanny charm and oratorical skills are traits shared by the 
judge, arguably the most dangerous of the men in the gang. Yet, unlike the judge, who reasserts 
his lust for grotesque violence upon the kid at the end of the novel, the Misfit seems to relent on 
his position when, after dispatching the last of the unfortunate family of travelers, he concludes 
that “it’s no real pleasure in life” (CW 153). Despite his claims to the contrary, the Misfit’s 
violence upon the family is entirely practical: he is on the run and cannot afford the risk of 
witnesses reporting his whereabouts to the authorities. In contrast, the judge’s senseless killing of 
puppies in chapter 14, which mirrors the murder of young Mexican girl in chapter 16, serves no 
other purpose than to satiate some grotesque appetite for violence.  
Our reactions to such acts of subjective violence are strongest only because they are the 
most visible of what Žižek identifies, in Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, as the three forms of 
violence, which include two objective forms: symbolic and systemic. The first, symbolic 
violence, is embodied in language and its application of definitions and meaning. It is the second 
form, however, which is of more interest to the present argument: systemic violence, or what 
Žižek terms as “the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic 
and political systems” (2). Yet, one cannot observe subjective and objective violence from the 
same standpoint since the former is experienced in relation to a moment of non-violence, or a 
normal state, while the latter sustains this same normal state and is therefore invisible. It is only 
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by emphasizing the analysis of this invisible violence that we can in turn understand what at first 
sight appears as random, irrational outbursts of subjective violence. 
The crux of Žižek’s argument is that the self-enhancing circulation of commodities is not 
the result of the antagonisms of “real life,” but rather, it is the self-reproducing capacity of 
capital itself that maintains the system and produces the real-life developments and catastrophes 
that ensue. Glanton and his gang are hired guns, after all, contracted by a politician to eradicate 
the Texas-Mexican borderlands of the intrusive Apache. The inherent racism of the job they must 
carry out, I argue, is incidental, i.e., incidental to the national project. At the outset of their 
hiring, Glanton and his men are first and foremost interested in the accumulation of capital, as 
made evident by their collecting as bounty any dark-haired scalp that has the misfortune of 
crossing their path, whether Aboriginal or Mexican. However, after having accepted payment 
from Governor Trias for the delivery of 128 scalps and 8 severed heads, the marauders, in the 
haze of a Dionysian feast held in their honour, double-cross their employer and overtake his 
village. Trias finds himself powerless in the wake of marauders’ celebrations and watches “like 
the sorcerer's apprentice who could indeed provoke the imp to do his will but could in no way 
make him cease again” (BM 171). As food and drink run out, violence erupts and Glanton's men 
kill and scalp thirty-six of the patrons they had previously been hired to protect. Having no other 
prospects, they move on and continue like this, plaguing village after village, collecting and 
consuming all that they can. By the close of the chapter, the men have negotiated a new contract 
with the governor of Sonora, and two weeks later, once again betray the terms of their agreement 
and massacre a Sonoran town. The men know that despite the recent conclusion of the Mexican-
American war, there is high demand for dark-haired scalps and thus they operate their trade 
within the borderlands and collect bounty with total indifference for the consequences. They 
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drift, consume, and adapt. But while the riders are gruesome, it is the avarice of the Governors 
who have hired them that has implicitly established the violent nature of the marketplace.  
Herein is the aforementioned type of objective-systemic violence, which is to say 
violence which is not attributed to any one person with selfish or evil intentions, but is instead 
anonymous and spectral. Though the individual acts of subjective violence are indeed committed 
by identifiable agents, that is, the various members of the Glanton gang, they are but expressions 
of an objective-systemic violence, state-sanctioned bounty-hunting, which fosters the violent 
climate. Žižek compares this distinction to the Lacanian difference between reality and the Real, 
where “reality” is the day-to-day interactions of people involved in productive processes, and the 
Real is the persevering logic of capital that determines social reality. Rather than attempt to 
remedy the “real problems of real people” we must instead examine the devious spectrality of the 
Real. Such is how we should approach Blood Meridian: by resisting the “fascinating lure” of the 
horrific violence, epitomized by the character of the judge, and focusing instead on the 




In her essay entitled “Through a Trauma Theory Lens: McCarthy’s Violence Reconsidered,” 
Christine Shearer-Cremean advocates for an application of trauma theory to Blood Meridian in 
order to reframe the epistemological foundations of the violent reality its narrative reconstructs. 
Shearer-Cremean's method is informed by Judith Herman's work in her book Trauma and 
Recovery, which provides analytical tools that help develop an understanding of the perspective 
of survivors of war and violence in order to make “meaning from such experiences in order to 
heal” (57). Shearer-Cremean’s exploration of the boundary between trauma theory and literature 
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allows her to distinguish violence from trauma so as to separate the act of violence from its 
psychological effects. As a result, her reading focuses on the emotional trauma of McCarthy's 
characters rather than on the acts of violence they have committed or have suffered. Reframing 
our reading in such a way, she argues, impels us to examine our own humanity, as well as that of 
society as a whole. As Herman writes,  
The knowledge of horrible events periodically intrudes into public awareness, but is rarely 
retained for long. Denial, repression, and disassociation operate on a social as well as 
individual level. The study of psychological trauma has an underground history. Like 
traumatized people, we have been cut off from the knowledge of our past. Like traumatized 
people, we need to understand the past in order to reclaim the present and the future. 
Therefore, an understanding of psychological trauma begins with rediscovering history. 
(qtd. in Shearer-Cremean 58) 
Cathy Caruth offers a very similar observation in “Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the 
Possibility of History” where she argues that encounters with trauma, both experienced and 
observed, obfuscate any straightforward references to history. “Through the notion of trauma,” 
she writes, “we can understand that a re-thinking of reference is not aimed at eliminating history, 
but at resituating it in our understanding, that is, of precisely permitting history to arise where 
immediate understanding may not” (182). Caruth concludes that history is thus the means by 
which our traumas are linked. The impulse of some literary critics to reject the details of the 
history that Blood Meridian represents, then, is a rejection of the trauma both experienced and 
observed.    
While the day-to-day details of the injustice committed by settler cultures upon 
Aboriginal peoples over the course of the last four hundred years are not common knowledge, is 
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it not safe to assume that there is a general concession within contemporary North American 
society, at the very least among the educated class, a class which includes Winchell, that 
colonizers and pioneers, to put it lightly, took advantage of Aboriginal peoples? The issue here is 
that Winchell's reaction to the trauma represented in the successive scenes of often senseless and 
brutal violence is indifference rather than, say, one of suspicion or analytic inquiry. This attitude 
of boredom differs from the dispassionate approach or sideways glance at violence I invoke 
above in that it avoids, or as Žižek would say, disavows a theoretical questioning of what causes 
the violence. Such a position leads us to question his zero-level outlook, the attitude that he 
fosters on a day-to-day basis towards the world in which he lives. 
 My aim is not to attack Winchell personally. I wish instead to address a problem that 
Herman describes as a denial, repression, and disassociation that operates on both social and 
individual levels with regards to the knowledge of horrible events, whether ongoing, recent, or 
long past. In the case of the events that Blood Meridian describes, it could be argued that the 
history it reconstructs is both too distant and too cruel for readers to fully comprehend. Yet, 
Shearer-Cremean adds that when faced with such a reality, readers are forbidden from remaining 
morally neutral. We are here presented with a kind of disjunction, an area of uncertainty where 
the events are too horrific for a reader to fully understand and accept, yet cruel enough to solicit 
a moral engagement or reaction. The reader, then, vicariously witnesses and experiences the 
trauma and is thereby forced into a position of discomfort that invites not a superficial sense of 
moral outrage, but a patient critical analysis of both the events portrayed and one's own 
uncomfortable and uncertain reaction to them. Trauma studies shift the reader’s analysis, as 
Shearer-Cremean writes, “from the violent act itself to human reaction and psychological 
consequences occurring as its result” (58). Shearer-Cremean's use of trauma theory dictates that 
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readers, as vicarious witnesses to the trauma, resist making general interpretations of the 
traumatic experiences of others, given that an analysis of this type would impose a language and 
structure that would minimize the survivor's needs to construct their own meaning from their 
traumatic experiences. We might understand such an imposition of language as a form of what 
Žižek refers to as symbolic violence, but I will return to this below when I discuss the Christian, 
or Abrahamic, language that defines concepts of law and property rights in the 19th Century 
United States. Žižek offers a similar warning as Shearer-Cremean with regards to making general 
interpretations of violence when he discusses the power of horrific events to prevent us from 
clear thinking and argues that the only appropriate approach is “one which permits variations on 
violence kept at a distance out of respect towards its victims” (4). Shearer-Cremean notes, and I 
agree with her to a point, that the tendency to impose our own interpretations of the traumatic 
experiences of another might help to explain why McCarthy generally avoids writing about what 
his characters think or feel. By thus limiting narrative access to, in the case of Blood Meridian, 
historical reconstructions, readers are able to form their own understanding without the 
interference of the narrator.  “From this perspective,” she explains, “readers are as close to 
history as they can be” (58). To summarize Shearer-Cremean's argument, readers vicariously 
experience the trauma portrayed in the novel, but given the limited narrative access to the 
thoughts or feelings of the characters, the writer avoids the symbolic violence of imposing an 
interpretation of the victim's trauma, and thus positions the reader as close to the historical 
reconstructions as possible. Such an approach provides the tools for a critical analysis of not only 
the events but, more importantly, the conditions that permit such events to occur. Unfortunately, 
none of this adequately explains, or even excuses, the nagging problem of Winchell's boredom. 
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Culture of Impunity 
I wish to offer an indirect explanation for such a banal reaction, which stems from what James A. 
Tyner terms, in War, Violence, and Population: Making the Body Count, a “culture of impunity.” 
Tyner develops this notion as he explores the violence of exclusionary practices that exert power 
and discipline over populations. Essential to his argument is a re-theorization of population 
geography that demands an engagement with the body. He writes: 
Through our daily activities we encounter other peoples and other places; our thoughts and 
actions are influenced by these encounters. Concurrently, however, our presence, our 
interactions, likewise reflect back upon those spaces. Just as we are transformed through 
our daily activities, so too are the spaces that we inhabit transformed. In short, we produce 
and are produced by space just as we produce and are produced by discourse. (33-34) 
The crux of Tyner's argument is that the manner in which spaces are used and defined are never 
separate from the contestations over bodies and populations. We hear echoes here of what Žižek 
defines as systemic violence through the implementing and enforcing of regulations for use of, 
and access to, certain types of spaces, which in turn represent the agenda of the ruling class. Our 
understanding of the representation of space is developed through a process of socialization that 
naturalizes and normalizes divisions of space, which ultimately exclude certain groups in favour 
of others. Yet, such groups are only defined in relation to other groups, which in turn leads to the 
inevitable process of marginalization. While concerns about rights and fairness determine our 
conduct towards others, not all social groups are privy to the same applications of justice, a point 
which I will further elaborate below when I explore the context of the treatment of Native 
American and Mexican peoples in the nineteenth century by white European Americans. By 
excluding certain groups from the scope of justice, we deem them as unworthy of the privileges 
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of which other groups may take advantage, and view these lesser people as disposable, 
exploitable, or irrelevant. Where Žižek defines this process as objective systemic violence, 
Tyner, via Susan Opotow, refers to it as structural violence, as compared to direct violence, 
which is understood to be immediate, physical, visible actions performed by and upon particular 
people — or, as defined above, subjective violence. Structural violence, which is much more 
encompassing, manifests itself in the form of social and economic inequality, involving, for 
example, the limiting of access to resources and social care upon which racial minorities and the 
working class often depend. As Tyner writes, referring to the work of Iris Young, a “whole 
category of people may be expelled from useful participation in social life and thus potentially 
subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination” (35). Both subjective violence 
and objective (or structural) violence are thus justified through the socialization and 
normalization of specific representations of difference between bodies in space. 
 Blood Meridian reveals the evils of American territorial expansion in the 19th century, 
from the systematic eradication of Aboriginal peoples from the frontier, to the noxious violence 
towards Mexicans in the wake of the Mexican-American war. The objections from critics such as 
Josyph that McCarthy's nihilist tone lacks a moral centre, paired with Winchell's dissatisfaction 
with McCarthy's narrative methods, suggest that their readings fail to recognize that the novel's 
strength is the manner in which it uses surplus violence to draw attention to the imperialist drive 
to commodify land, resources, and bodies — in short, the imperial history and the sociopolitical 
telos of the United States. McCarthy makes his point particularly clear in the novel's epilogue 
which describes a man walking across the barren landscape digging a series of holes, presumably 
in which will be placed fence posts for the demarcation of property lines or state limits or the 
like. With the herds of buffalo and packs of wolves (as described in McCarthy's The Crossing 
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(1994)) eradicated, the Aboriginal populations controlled and suppressed, and the Pacific coast 
claimed as land belonging to the United States of America, the spirit of appropriation disguised 
as progress is maintained in the mindless yet systematic action of physically dividing the land. 
The image of “the gatherers of bones and those who do not gather” (337) is especially haunting 
as it evokes, on the one hand, the compulsive need of the gatherers to clear the land for 
commodification fuelled by the inexorable logic of capital, and on the other, the spectre-like 
quality of those stragglers, possibly surviving Aboriginals, or simply survivors of the deadly 
frontier, who wander the plains abjectly. One gets the sense that the typically mythologized 
American frontier has, in McCarthy's estimation, died before even witnessing the turn of the 
twentieth century and entering the period of what is widely believed to be the country's ascension 
to greatness. 
 Rick Wallach's reading of the novel in “Judge Holden, Blood Meridian’s Evil Archon,” 
supports this argument. Wallach posits that the notion of the American dream that drives 
collective social being has in fact “been a nightmare of genocidal appropriation involving the 
effacement of oral cultures” (135). “It is doubtful,” Wallach laments, “whether any society, 
having chosen to pretend to a Christian ethos, could sustain the crushing burden of guilt such 
behaviour must entail without inscribing delusional histories to censor and repress its racist 
dream” (135). Wallach's point about the fallacy of the American dream and the “crushing burden 
of guilt” returns me to my previous argument regarding the link between Winchell's problematic 
boredom and the notion of 'cultural impunity'. In discussing the moral exclusionary practices of 
certain social groups towards others, Tyner refers to the individual's responsibility for, and 
response to, such practices, suggesting that one's engagement, or lack thereof, may include 
unawareness, active ignoring, facilitating, executing or devising moral exclusion. While the 
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notion of impunity, broadly speaking, refers to the exemption from accountability or punishment 
for the agent of violence, “cultural impunity” is institutionalized and systemic, where crimes 
against humanity, for example, can go unpunished and obliterated from the official historical 
record by amnesties or pardons, or even simply indifference. Tyner turns to Joseph Nevins who 
writes that “social distance and geographic distance combine to make the plight of others more 
peripheral and, by extension, less relevant” (qtd. on 40). An absence of engagement operates 
within, and simultaneously produces, a culture of impunity, which once established, legitimizes 
non-action. As Tyner writes,  
[this] occurs when impunity is institutionalized and widespread, when torture, crimes 
against humanity, and mass murder are overtly or tacitly condoned and unpunished as a 
result of amnesties, pardons, indifferences, or simply looking the other way. It is a culture 
of impunity that permits mass violence and genocide to continue unabated; it is a culture 
of impunity that allows other governments and global citizens to ignore — and 
consequently, condone — the continuation of direct and structural violence in other 
places. (40) 
In the case of Winchell's reaction to Blood Meridian, we might say that he is disaffected — he 
literally experiences, at least in his written account, no affect — possibly due to the temporal 
distance of the events portrayed in the novel. His non-reaction is exemplified in the cynical 
detachment he sustains towards the genocidal events of the novel. Again, we must differentiate 
what Žižek refers to as a dispassionate, sideways glance at violence, and the reaction of boredom 
Winchell expresses. Rather, we might view Winchell's position as a violent exclusionary gesture 
of refusing to see, or to acknowledge, that the frontier was a horrible place and the pioneers of 
his country were violent bigots. Žižek terms this gesture of active forgetting fetishistic 
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disavowal: “‘I know, but I don't want to know that I know, so I don't know.’ I know it, but I 
refuse to fully assume the consequences of this knowledge, so that I can continue acting as if I 
don't know it” (53). The violence portrayed in Blood Meridian, I argue, serves to counter such 
gestures of active forgetting, and reveals to readers the brutal reality of American history in order 
to break the spell of the disavowal necessitated to carry on believing and espousing manifest 
destiny. Mark Eaton makes a similar argument in “Dis(re)membered Bodies: Cormac 
McCarthy’s Border Fiction”: “Real violence in the borderlands is followed by the virtual 
violence of a sort of willed forgetting. What gets forgotten are not only the violent acts 
themselves but also the bodies left for dead” (159). Consequently, it is essential to keep in mind 
the context in which the novel was written, which is the aftermath of the horrific conflict in 
Vietnam and, as Ciaran Dowd notes in “Cormac McCarthy's Cultural and Historical Contexts,” 
during the Reagan administration’s escalation of American intervention elsewhere in the world: 
A reading of the novel in the context of US foreign policy during the Reagan years is 
justifiable insofar as it redresses a critical overemphasis on the novel's historical roots in 
the nineteenth century, which distances the contemporary reader from the novel's 
violence by the implicit suggestion that the passage of time confines that bloodshed to the 
past, safely shunted off from the reader's immediate environs. (77-78) 
The novel therefore bears witness not only to the disavowed history of the frontier, and to the 
more recent violence of the American presence in Vietnam that, at the time of the novel’s 
writing, was already in the process of being mythologized, but to the renewal and repetition of 





Practices of Dehumanization 
In Murder State: California's Native American Genocide, Brendan C. Lindsay explores in detail 
the dangers of mythologizing a national history that glorifies the pioneers and their destruction of 
Native American peoples, which in turn consolidated the ideology of white racial superiority 
over the 'savages,' while espousing, and indeed using as justification, the basic tenets of 
Christianity and a republican government. Lindsay cites the role of historians in the 1840s and 
1850s in moulding their accounts of history to reflect the popular mood of the demand of 
American citizens to expand the western frontier to California. Motivated by an idealized 
understanding of the past, as well as specific concepts of how they viewed their place in human 
history, Americans of the nineteenth century wished to continue in the footsteps of their 
ancestors and continue to settle and colonize the land in order to prove to themselves, and to 
history, that they were of the same mold as the pioneers before them. Take, for instance, the story 
of the 1676 Bacon Rebellion which was incited on pretense of avenging Indian atrocities, yet 
which in reality had for its main goal to disregard treaties with First Nations tribes in order to 
take possession of their land under the belief that they were not making proper use of it, failing 
to exploit it to its full agricultural potential. We already see the dark spectre of capitalist ideology 
at work here, the self-engendering monster operating in total disregard of human and 
environmental concerns. Euro-Americans, faced with an indigenous culture and practices of 
ownership at odds with its own, saw no other solution but to pragmatically exterminate, 
physically and through practices of moral exclusion, Native American peoples in order to, as 
Lindsay notes, “clear the way for the full exploitation of the land and resources” (45). 
 The writings of prominent nineteenth-century American historians, such as George 
Bancroft or D.G.W. Leavitt, were imperative for the propagation of the belief that it was the 
	 140	
divinely directed fate of Christians to conquer the New World and, as Lindsay writes, “[to 
invoke] the dominion of Christians over an imperfect state of nature to justify their actions” (47). 
Bancroft, for instance, wrote that before the arrival of the Euro-American settlers on the 
continent “the whole territory was unproductive waste. Throughout its wide extent the arts had 
not erected a monument. Its only inhabitants were a few scattered tribes of feeble barbarians, 
destitute of commerce and of political connection” (cited in Lindsay 48). Lindsay notes that such 
beliefs founded in religion also informed legal definitions, which ultimately led to the conviction 
that Euro-Americans in fact held legal title to the land they occupied, given that non-Christian 
non-whites were not viewed as ‘legal’ occupants. As such, settlers, soldiers, and miners held 
jurisdiction for killing infants, children, and women, raping young girls, executing prisoners 
without trial, and murdering whole groups of people at a time to avenge the loss of livestock. The 
dehumanization of Aboriginal peoples stigmatized them as alien in their own land, facilitating 
practices of exclusion, oppression, discrimination, and violence. To return to Tyner, once 
dehumanized, “one's body possesses no meaning. It is a waste, and its removal is a matter of 
sanitation. There is no moral or emphatic context through which the perpetrator can relate to the 
victim” (37).  
 I put forth that Blood Meridian, as critical epic, reckons with such practices of 
dehumanization. Therefore, the violence with which the novel is primarily concerned is 
ultimately a systemic and symbolic objective violence, rather than the clearly identifiable acts of 
subjective violence that make up so much of the narrative. Though it is directed at Mexicans 
more so than Native Americans, we need to look no further than the speech Captain White gives 
to the kid upon drafting him to his militia, which, in its significance, requires being cited at some 
length: 
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We fought for it. Lost friends and brothers down there. And then by God if we didn’t give 
it back. Back to a bunch of barbarians that even the most biased in their favor will admit 
have no least notion in God's earth of honor or justice or the meaning of a republican 
government. [...] Given up their crops and livestock. Mines shut down. Whole villages 
abandoned. [...] What we are dealing with, he said, is a race of degenerates. A mongrel 
race, little better than niggers. And maybe no better. There is no government in Mexico. 
Hell, there's no God in Mexico. Never will be. We are dealing with a people manifestly 
incapable of governing themselves. [...] I don't think there's any question that ultimately 
Sonora will become a United States territory, Guaymas a U.S. Port. Americans will be 
able to get to California without having to pass through our benighted sister republic and 
our citizens will be protected at last from the notorious packs of cutthroats presently 
infesting the routes which they are obliged to take. [...] We are to be the instruments of 
liberation in a dark and troubled land. (BM 33-34) 
Captain White has been wholly absorbed into the systemic, objective violence of the ideology of 
Manifest Destiny. He believes that his mission is one of liberation in a dark and troubled land. 
We see evidence here of Tyner's concept of moral exclusion: the “being” of the Mexicans is a 
socio-symbolic being. When they are treated by Euro-Americans as inferior, Žižek argues, it 
“does indeed make them inferior at the level of their socio-symbolic identity. In other words, the 
white racist ideology exerts a performative efficiency” (72). It is not simply an interpretation of 
what Mexicans, or Natives, or Black Americans are, but an interpretation that determines the 
very being and social existence of the interpreted subjects, enacting a symbolic objective 
violence. The Mexicans, who may stand in for any race that is not white, are dehumanized 
because of their inability to properly commodify the land, which runs counter to the Eurocentric 
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logic of capital. Finally, their concepts of property and government differ from those of Captain 
White, and so by default, they must be eradicated and their land must be claimed. The acts of 
subjective violence are thus the final step, the visible result of a culture and ideology that 
generate, and are generated by, the fundamental systemic violence of aggressive territorial 
expansion and predatory capitalism. Captain White’s clash with Mexican (and First Nations) 
ideology and way of life is, in a sense, a precursor for the Western capitalist war against the 
divergent ideology of Soviet communism some 80 years later, the apex of which was occurring 
while McCarthy composed Blood Meridian. 
 
 
The American War in Vietnam Reflected in Blood Meridian’s Frontier Violence 
 
On the morning of March 16, 1968, Charlie Company of the Eleventh Infantry Brigade of the 
United States Army entered the My Lai hamlet of Son My village with the explicit orders to 
eradicate the area of the vicious and spectre-like Viet Cong — that is, soldiers of the National 
Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The soldiers had been in the field for 40 days without relief 
and the weeks preceding the offensive had been particularly deadly and demoralizing for Charlie 
Company.53 Tensions were high within the company and the men were eager to enact some 
measure of revenge. Thus, within the four hours of warfare needed to sweep the area, including a 
brief break for lunch, American soldiers had claimed upwards of 507 casualties.54 The problem, 
																																																						
53 From Seymour M. Hersh’s November 25, 1969 article “Ex-GI Tells of Killing Civilians at Pinkville”: 
“The company had been in the field for 40 days without relief before the Pinkville incident on March 16, 
and had lost a number of men in mine accidents. Hostility to the Vietnamese was high in the company, 
Meadlo said.” (RV 24). 
54 As reported by the New York Times on November 16, 1969, survivors of the incident claim as many as 
567 Vietnamese were killed. See: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/my-lai-charlie-
company-and-massacre/ 
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however, is that not even one of said casualties were soldiers of the Viet Cong; rather, the body 
count was comprised entirely of children, women, and elderly civilians.  
The horror of the My Lai massacre was first publicly reported by investigative journalist 
Seymour M. Hersh nearly 20 months later in the November 13, 1969 edition of the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch: 
The Army is completing an investigation of charges that [Lt. William Calley Jr.] 
deliberately murdered at least 109 Vietnamese civilians in a search-and-destroy mission in 
March 1968 in a Viet Cong stronghold known as “Pinkville.” Calley has formally been 
charged with six specifications of mass murder. (RV 13)  
Yet, while the American public had been progressively growing disillusioned with their 
government’s involvement in the war, a poll conducted by The Wall Street Journal a few weeks 
after Hersh’s first article on the destruction of My Lai revealed that most Americans did not 
believe a massacre had actually taken place.55 This public disavowal would be short-lived, 
however, as photographs taken by military combat photographer Ronald Haeberle would confirm 
the accusations levied upon Charlie Company. A small selection of Haeberle’s photographs first 
appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, and within weeks several more were published in Life 
(December 5, 1969), organized to mimic cinematic montage. Before long, the images had 
circulated worldwide, and American citizens, who were already experiencing a crisis of national 
faith, became even more disillusioned and disgraced.  
The atrocities of the war in Vietnam, witnessed in graphic detail by American civilians 
via the unprecedented access to television, newspapers, and magazines, had a profound effect on 
American consciousness and self-perception. Moreover, Christian G. Appy argues in American 
																																																						
55 From “Charlie Company and the Massacre” 
(https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/my-lai-charlie-company-and-massacre/) 
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Reckoning: The Vietnam War and our National Identity, that no event in American history, aside, 
perhaps, from the Civil War, has required as much critical self-analysis than the U.S. aggression 
in Vietnam. As Appy indicates, the reasons for American disillusionment were manifold:  
The false pretexts used to justify our intervention, the indiscriminate brutality of our 
warfare, the stubborn refusal of elected leaders to withdraw despite public opposition, and 
the stunning failure to achieve our objectives — these harrowing realities provoked a 
profound national identity crisis, and American reckoning. (American Reckoning x) 
U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam therefore invalidated the fundamental principle of 
American national identity, that is, the conviction that the United States is an influential source 
of justice and goodness in the world, “superior not only in its military and economic power, but 
in the quality of its government and institutions, the character and morality of its people, and its 
way of life” (Appy xi-xii). The revelations from the reports on the My Lai massacre served only 
to exacerbate this invalidation, for the actions of the American soldiers were not relegated 
exclusively to the unjustified killing of civilians. As Appy details,  
They exercised every imaginable form of barbarism. GIs threw hand grenades into homes 
and underground shelters. They herded large groups of people together and forced them 
to lie on roads or in drainage ditches, where they were executed en masse with automatic 
rifles. Other civilians were shot individually. Some Vietnamese were killed only after 
being clubbed, tortured, stabbed, and raped. Some GIs mutilated their victims after killing 
them. It was not a spontaneous spasm of violence. (146)    
In an interview with Hersh, Sgt. Michael Bernhardt concludes that his fellow soldiers in the 
Eleventh Infantry Brigade had been conditioned to behave so barbarously. “The treatment was 
lousy,” he admits. “We were always out in the bushes. I think they were expecting us to run into 
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resistance at Pinkville and also expecting them (the Viet Cong) to use the people as hostages” 
(RV 19). Sgt. Bernhardt further explains that hatred for the Vietnamese had reached a boiling 
point in the weeks before the My Lai massacre due to casualties suffered in a minefield. Paul 
Meadlo, the first soldier to confess his complicity in the massacre, corroborates Sgt. Bernhardt’s 
assertion, revealing to Hersh that commanding officers Calley and Medina had told the soldiers 
before entering the hamlet that “if we ever shoot any civilians, we should go ahead and plant a 
hand grenade on them” (27). “Meadlo is not sure,” writes Hersh, “but he thinks the feel of death 
came quickly to the company once it got to Vietnam. ‘We were cautious at first, but as soon as 
the first man was killed, a new feeling came through the company… almost as if we all knew 
there was going to be a lot more killing’” (27). Thus, the dangerous and uncertain conditions of 
the battlefield combined with the dehumanization of the Vietnamese56 and the pressure from 
superiors to amass kill counts as a measure of success and progress in the war57 all contributed to 
the violation of the American rules of engagement in war by the soldiers in Charlie Company. 
Yet, while those who were guilty of committing the war crimes, as well as those who participated 
in the cover-up, went largely unpunished, the American public was nevertheless forced to take 
reckoning of, on the one hand, their government’s actions, and on the other, their national 
identity. Though the United States judicial system may have done its best to sweep the horrific 
details of the American presence in Vietnam under the rug, many civilians, such as Cormac 
McCarthy, could not so easily disavow the actions of their countrymen. I therefore argue that the 
																																																						
56 From Hersh’s November 13, 1969 article: “A third officer, also familiar with the case said: ‘There’s 
this question—I think anyone who goes to (Viet) Nam asks it. What’s a civilian? Someone who works for 
us at day and puts on Viet Cong pajamas at night?’” (15-16). 
57 From American Reckoning: “The body count was the paramount measure of success. Every month, 
General Westmoreland required a massive collection of statistical data from all units, and no number was 
more important than the body count. Commanders reporting low body counts were routinely punished 
with poor fitness reports and passed over for promotion. Careers were on the line. High body counts, on 
the other hand, led to medals, rapid promotion, and plum assignments” (169). 
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violence of Blood Meridian mirrors the violence of the American war in Vietnam, the kid and the 
Glanton gang avatars of the American soldiers whose brutality and loss of morality were 
substantiated and magnified by the exposure of the My Lai massacre.  
 In “Blood Meridian and the Poetics of Violence,” Steven Frye points to two films that 
establish, in part, the aesthetic that he believes inform the shocking portrayal of brutality in 
Blood Meridian: Sam Peckinpah's The Wild Bunch58 (1969) and Ralph Nelson's Soldier Blue59 
(1970), both of which represent a crisis in American national self-perception in the wake of the 
Vietnam War and, in the case of Soldier Blue, of the My Lai Massacre. Peckinpah openly 
disclosed that The Wild Bunch was in part an allegory of the violence in Vietnam, which was 
witnessed by the general public in more graphic detail than any previous conflict, because of the 
advent and accessibility of television. He was particularly interested in how the camera might be 
used to express a sense of actuality rather than produce mimetic representations. The aesthetic 
technique and allegorical suggestion of the final battle scene in The Wild Bunch is of particular 
interest here: the outlaws have resolved to rescue a friend from a corrupt Mexican general and 
his army, and as the battle unfolds, quick close-up shots intercut with wide-angle images of the 
soldiers and the townspeople fighting the bunch. Normal motion combines with slow motion and 
there is scarcely any sound besides gunfire. Peckinpah's objective was to create images that both 
mirrored the subjective experience of the combatants as well as portrayed violence in such a way 
																																																						
58 The Wild Bunch tells the story of an aging group of outlaws who struggle to adapt to the rapidly 
changing world of the 20th century. Leader of the bunch, Pyke Bishop, unites the men for a final heist: a 
train robbery. After a series of double-crosses, however, all are ultimately killed, except for Bishop’s 
former partner and chief antagonist, Deke Thorton, who rides off to join the Mexican Revolution.  
59 Soldier Blue is a retelling of the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864. The plot follows Cresta Lee and Private 
Honus Grant, the sole survivors of a Cheyenne attack on their travel party, as they attempt to travel to 
safety at Fort Reunion. The film culminates with brutal retaliatory attack by the Calvary upon the 
Cheyenne.       
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that they intensified the viewer's sense of horror. Frye thus links this scene to Blood Meridian's 
Yuma massacre, which concludes the action of the narrative before the kid becomes the man: 
They swarmed up the hill toward the fortifications where the Americans lay sleeping and 
some were mounted and some afoot and all of them armed with bows and clubs and their 
faces blackened or pale with fard and their hair bound up in clay. The first quarters they 
entered were Lincoln's. When they emerged a few minutes later one of them carried the 
doctor's dripping head by the hair and others were dragging behind them the doctor's dog, 
bound at the muzzle, jerking and bucking across the dry clay of the concourse. They 
entered a wickiup of willowpoles and canvas and slew Gun and Wilson and Henderson 
Smith each in turn as they reared up drunkenly and they moved on among the rude half 
walls in total silence glistening with paint and grease and blood among the bands of light 
where the risen sun now touched the higher ground. (BM 274) 
McCarthy’s portrayals of brutality are typically marked not only by the excess of the violence 
itself but by the excess of the language and form that he uses to construct said portrayals.60 But, 
as Frye notes, with the Yuma massacre scene, McCarthy departs from his typical complex style 
of ornate language, metaphor, and the use of multiple senses. Instead, the Yuma massacre is 
predominantly described in simple visual terms, such as, for example, the portrayal of “the 
doctor’s dripping head” or the Yumas “glistening with paint and grease and blood.” What is 
more, the rhythm of the sentences is paced with parataxis and predominantly single syllable 
words, culminating in a terse yet poetic description of the events. McCarthy, like Peckinpah, is 
																																																						
60 As Brian Evenson puts it in “Embodying Violence: The Case of Cormac McCarthy,” Blood Meridian’s 
narrative poetics, that is, the “shifting the speed of what the reader is reading, of moving back and forth 
between different registers of language, of employing the drumbeat of rhythm to enforce or undercut what 
is being said, of employing metaphor to make readers read something horrific to the end before they can 
flinch—is all a kind of violence to the reader, one that demands a palpable engagement with the text” 
(147).  
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attempting to portray the actuality of violence without drawing attention to himself as the author 
of said violence; that is, this focus is on the reality of the violence, rather than on the mimetic 
literary rendition of the violence.    
 Similarly, Solider Blue attempts to portray the actuality of violence by referring directly 
to the My Lai massacre. Frye writes that the Sand Creek Massacre scene at the end of the film 
involves a series of images that are edited to imitate the arrangement of the My Lai images in 
Life, and that most viewers at the time would have recognized the comparison. Soldiers murder 
children and rape and mutilate women directly in front of the camera's eye, and at the end, 
decapitated heads are displayed to the commanding officer. This scene mirrors the slaughter of 
the Gilenos in chapter twelve of Blood Meridian: 
When Glanton and his chiefs swung back through the village people were running out 
under the horses' hooves and the horses were plunging and some of the men were moving 
on foot among the huts with torches and dragging the victims out, slathered and dripping 
with blood, hacking at the dying and decapitating those who knelt for mercy. (BM 156) 
The realism of the scene is qualified by a cinematic method that links image to action, with 
simple present participle verbs like “moving,” “shrieking,” and “running,” used to heighten the 
reader's focus. Such aesthetic choices help to implant the horrific events in the subjective 
consciousness of the reader. Like the My Lai photos and the massacre in Soldier Blue, the 
selective presentation of images in the scene of the slaughter of the Gilenos is rendered more 
haunting by the lack of commentary, and thus heightens the excesses of violence through the 
“omission of a qualifying human consciousness” (Frye 115). In other words, by declining to 
condemn the actions and behaviour of his characters through the narration of the events, 
McCarthy's places the burden of making ethical considerations on the reader. This narrative 
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exclusion is meant to mirror the sober reporting on Vietnam in order to illicit from readers the 
sense of shame and responsibility that was felt by the American public as they discovered 
through news media the horror of their government’s actions. So conceived, Blood Meridian is 
not simply a novel about American history, but rather, bears witness to American history. As 
Barcley Owens notes in his book Cormac McCarthy's Western Novels: “there is no progressive 
myth of good overcoming evil, no courageous men taming the west for civilization” (7). The 
notions of nobility and honour, crucial to the Western genre, as we find in Owen Wister's The 
Virginian, Riders of the Purple Sage, or Larry McMurtry's Lonesome Dove, are absent in 
McCarthy's Blood Meridian. Instead, readers are presented with what Tim O’Brien would call a 
true war story:  
A true war story is never moral. It does not instruct, nor encourage virtue, nor suggest 
models of proper human behavior, nor restrain men from doing the things men have 
always done. If a story seems moral, do not believe it. If at the end of a war story you feel 
uplifted, or if you feel that some small bit of rectitude has been salvaged from the larger 
waste, then you have been made the victim of a very old and terrible lie. There is no 
rectitude whatsoever. There is no virtue. As a first rule of thumb, therefore, you can tell a 
true war story by its absolute and uncompromising allegiance to obscenity and evil. (The 
Things They Carried 65-66)  
Reading through Blood Meridian’s “absolute and uncompromising allegiance to obscenity and 









The kid: A Cursed Spectre Bears Witness 
 
A close reading of the opening page of Blood Meridian supplies us with several hints of 
McCarthy's reluctance to accept the Enlightenment's conception of human perfectibility, 
beginning with the very first line: “See the child. He is pale and thin, he wears a thin and ragged 
linen shirt” (3). McCarthy introduces the novel’s protagonist by immediately invoking Alexander 
Pope's Essay on Man, Epistle II: “Behold the child, by Nature's kindly law / Pleased with a rattle, 
tickled with a straw” (Pope 274-75). Notice that the commanding sound of “behold” is stripped 
down to a passive “see” and that the kid’s physical description is very ghostly, his thin white 
frame draped in thin linen. The child Pope describes, on the other hand, amuses itself with rattle 
and straw, and, as the stanza goes on to reveal, with age is eventually draped with scarfs, garter, 
and gold, symbols of distinction all. By comparison, the only symbols of distinction the kid will 
ever wear are his battle scars and Toadvine’s necklace of ears. Blood Meridian’s opening 
sentences are therefore an austere refutation of the philosophical optimism found in Pope’s 
poem. That being said, the poem’s chief argument does intersect with McCarthy’s stated 
ambitions for his novel — that is, where the poem argues that the “business of man [is] not to pry 
into God, but to study himself,”61 the aim of Blood Meridian is likewise to study the nature, 
powers, and frailties of the ontological and epistemological questions that plague man. Yet, I 
contend that McCarthy’s response to Pope’s philosophical optimism is not merely, as Boguta-
Marchel notes, ironic, but more accurately, critical insofar as the goal of critical analysis is to 
subject theories to rigorous and sometimes violent review in order to test their validity against 
said criticism (144). 
																																																						
61 From Pope’s summary: “The business of Man not to pry into God, but to study himself. His Middle 
Nature; his powers and frailties, v. 1 to 18” (280). 
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As David Robert King notes in Cormac McCarthy’s Literary Evolution, McCarthy 
explains in a letter to his editor, Albert Erskine, that the setting of the American frontier is really 
only incidental: “The truth is that the historical material is really — to me — little more than a 
framework upon which to hang a dramatic inquiry into the nature of destiny and history and the 
uses of reason and knowledge and the nature of evil and all these sorts of things which has [sic] 
plagued folks since there were folks” (82). The novel’s treatment is not of its protagonist, for he 
is mostly a ghostly figure who chaperones readers through the novel’s twenty-three chapters, but 
of the society to which that individual belongs and of which he is a spectre. In other words, the 
kid’s narrative function is to bear witness to the violence portrayed in novel as it reckons with the 
problems that have “plagued folks since there were folks.” He is, as Pope might say, the isthmus 
between the reader above and the beasts described in the novel. Much as Pope implores his 
readers to observe life and study the behaviours of nature to have the correct view of the 
universe, so are readers of Blood Meridian meant to observe through the kid’s eyes every violent 
transgression in their quest to accept their own position in the Great Chain of Being:   
on this isthmus of a middle state,  
a being darkly wise, and rudely great: 
with too much knowledge for the sceptic side, 
with too much weakness for the stoic’s pride, 
he hangs between; (Pope 281) 
 
The kid, pale, filthy, and undernourished, with neither rattle to please him, nor straw with which 
to be tickled, is the antithesis to the Enlightenment's idea of the innocent child as the hope for 
civilized man. He is without psychological reflection, interiority, or subjectivity, driven only by 
“a taste for mindless violence” (BM 3), a fact that is verified on the next page when we discover 
that when he comes down from his room above a courtyard behind a tavern in New Orleans, it is 
to fight with the sailors like “some fairybook beast” (BM 4). But as Justin Evans notes, the kid’s 
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absence of subjectivity is an important feature of the epic tradition whereby “characters are 
physical actors rather than subjective consciousnesses” (411). Given the absence of any kind of 
commentary or insight from either the narrator or the protagonist, the task of reckoning with the 
metaphysical problems that have plagued folks since there have been folks therefore falls on the 
reader.  
McCarthy provides further evidence of the kid’s tenuous role in the narrative with an 
allusion to the Book of Joshua in the very same paragraph. The narrator reveals that the kid’s 
“folks are known for hewers of woods and drawers of water” (3), a reference to Joshua 9:23, 
which reads “Now therefore ye are cursed, and there shall none of you be freed from being 
bondmen, and hewers of wood and drawers of water for the house of God” (King James Bible). 
The passage relates Joshua’s discovery that the Gibeonites, disguised in ragged clothing, have 
snuck back into the Promised Land after having been banished by the command of God, and, 
what is more, have persuaded the Israelites to make a covenant with them, allowing the two 
peoples to share the land. The Gibeonites’ deception breaks God’s command to the Israelites, 
yet, bound by their oath to the disguised interlopers, Joshua, rather than condemn them to death 
and risk the wrath of God, curses them with interminable servitude.  
There are two significant scriptural cross-references to bear in mind. The first is to 
Deuteronomy 29:11, Moses’s third of three sermons to the Israelites in the book:  
You are stationed here today all of you before the Lord your God, your heads, your tribes, 
your elders, and your overseers, every man of Israel. Your little ones, your wives, and 
your sojourner who is in the midst of your camps, from the hewer of your wood to the 
drawer of your water, for you to pass into the Covenant of the Lord your God […] (Five 
Books of Moses, Deut. 29:9-11) 
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Moses here calls to the different members of the tribe, listing them in order of importance, 
beginning with the leaders, and ending with the hewers of wood and drawers of waters, the 
servants of servants. Though the kid’s father is in truth a schoolmaster who “lies in drink [and] 
quotes from poets whose names are now lost” (BM 3), he is nevertheless known as one such 
servant. Yet, the kid and his kin appear not to be literal slaves, or descendants thereof, for if they 
were, the narrative details would certainly reflect as much given the context of slavery in the 
United States. We must therefore extrapolate that the allusion to scripture infers some deeper 
vilification. And it is through this extrapolation that we examine the second scriptural cross-
reference, that of Genesis 9:25.  
This second allusion to the Old Testament, I argue, is critical to the novel’s narrative arc 
because the genealogical connection that it suggests establishes that the misery that the kid will 
endure throughout his life, culminating in the narrative omission of his potential encounter with 
grace, has been foreordained. The correlation between the passage from the book of Joshua and 
that of Genesis is less overt than the correlation between Joshua and Deuteronomy. The 
connection is found not in a repeated verbiage, but rather in the genealogy of the Gibeonites, 
which Joshua references in 10:1262 and again in 11:19,63 and which we can verify against the 
Table of Nations in Genesis 10.64 Scripture reveals that the pre-conquest Gibeonites were 
predominantly comprised of Hivites and, as Samuel writes in 21:2 of his second book,65 
																																																						
62 “Then spake Joshua to the LORD in the day when the LORD delivered up the Amorites before the 
children of Israel, and he said in the sight of Israel, Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou, Moon, in 
the valley of Ajalon.”  
63 “There was not a city that made peace with the children of Israel, save the Hivites the inhabitants of 
Gibeon: all other they took in battle.”  
64 Genesis 10:15-19: “And Canaan begot Sidon, his firstborn, and Heth and the Jebusite and the Amorite 
and the Girgashite and the Hivite and the Archite and the Sinite and the Arvadite and the Zemarite and the 
Hamatite.” 
65 As written in the second book of Samuel 21:2: “And the king called the Gibeonites, and said unto them; 
(now the Gibeonites were not of the children of Israel, but of the remnant of the Amorites; and the 
	 154	
Amorites, both clans kin of Canaan, son of Ham. The ancestral relation of the Gibeonites to 
Canaan is significant because of Canaan’s curse. As punishment for his father’s transgression, 
which is described only as “[seeing] his father’s nakedness and [telling] his two brothers outside” 
(The Five Books of Moses, Gen. 9:14), Canaan is cursed by his grandfather Noah: 
And Noah woke from his wine and he knew what his youngest son had done to him. And 
he said, 
 
“Cursed be Canaan, 
    the lowliest slave shall he be 
       to his brothers.” 
 
And he said, 
 
“Blessed be the Lord 
    the God of Shem, 
       unto them shall Canaan be slave. 
 May God enlarge Japeth, 
    may he dwell in the tents of Shem, 
       unto them shall Canaan be slave.” (The Five Books of Moses, Gen. 9:24-29) 
 
There are two elements in this narrative that are unclear and that continue to be debated by 
scholars: first, the nature of Ham’s transgression, and second, the reason Canaan is punished in 
place of his father. The only incriminating evidence of offense provided to readers is that Ham 
saw his father naked and then told his brothers about it, but, given the severity of the punishment 
levied upon Canaan, the suspiciously unnarrated transgression invites skeptical review.  
Robert Altar posits, in The Five Books of Moses, that ancient audiences might have been 
familiar with the source material for the chapter, but that it must have “seemed to the 
monotheistic writer dangerous to spell out” (52). If such a context is accurate, readers must then 
rely on intertextual clues to fill in the blanks. And as John Sietze Bergsma and Scott Walker 
																																																						




Hahn demonstrate in “Noah’s Nakedness and the Curse on Canaan (Genesis 9:20-27),” the 
“literary artistry” and “the biblical intertextuality” of the Pentateuch suggests that there must be 
more to the story (27). Furthermore, the story of the curse of Ham is especially significant 
because it is the first entry in Genesis that deals with the national history of Israel. Given the 
nationalistic implications, it is not unreasonable to posit that the tale, as a national mythology, 
could have been reverse-engineered by the authors to retroactively justify the Israelite conquest 
and subjugation of the Canaanites. Whatever the case may be, we are left with three popular 
theories which have been argued for centuries: the first is that the offense is nothing more than 
voyeurism and that Ham’s failure to not only look away but also to refrain from gossiping about 
it with his brothers, is what incites his father’s ire. But, as Bergsma and Hahn note, voyeurism 
fails to account for “either the gravity of Ham's offense or the reason for the curse of Canaan [as 
it] requires the interpreter to assume the existence of a taboo against the accidental sight of a 
naked parent that is otherwise unattested in biblical or ancient Near Eastern literature” (27).  
The second theory, traditionally rabbinic,66 from as early as the classical Midrash, is that 
Ham castrates his father in an attempt to usurp him. The rationale for this interpretation is that 
since Ham has prevented Noah from the possibility of ever having a fourth son, the punishment 
must fall on Ham’s fourth son, Canaan. This framework is interesting insofar as it is reminiscent 
of the Chronos-Uranus story, but, as Bergsma and Hahn again point out, it has no intertextual 
support in the Bible. 
																																																						
66 Via Bersgma and Hahn: “For an extensive review of the rabbinic exegesis of this passage, see 
Baumgarten, who concludes that the rabbis developed the theory of castration as an explanation for 
features of the text ("Myth and Midrash,"55-71); thus, they are not transmitting an ancient tradition 
(contra Robert Graves and Raphael Ptai, Hebrew Myths: The Book of Genesis [Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1966], 121-22). The relevant rabbinic texts areb. Sanh.70a;Gen.Rab.36, 7;Tanh.49-50; 
PirqeR. El.ch.23;Tg.Ps.-J.onGen9:24-25. The earliest reference to this theory is found in Theophilus of 
Antioch, Ad Autolycum 3, 19” (27-28).   
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The third, widely accepted67 theory is that Ham sexually assaults his drunken father, 
again as a means to usurp him. As Altar notes, this reading is supported by the common 
interpretation of “to see the nakedness of” as “to copulate with.”68 Read against Leviticus,69 “to 
see the nakedness” becomes “to uncover nakedness,” or, as Alter translates it,  
And a man who takes his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter, and sees 
her nakedness and she sees his nakedness, it is vileness, and they shall be cut off before 
the eyes of their kinfolk. His sister’s nakedness he has laid bare. (Lev. 20:17-18) 
The passive act of seeing shifts to the transgressive act of the gaze70 as both verbs, to uncover 
and to lay bare, evoke an active engagement with the other.71 Alter also explains that the verb 
“takes” from “and a man who takes his sister” is “an ellipsis for “takes as wife,” but [the verse’s] 
choice of the term may be dictated by the way it stresses the male’s taking the initiative” (633). 
Note, moreover, that this chapter of Leviticus in general concerns the transgressions of incest, 
bestiality, and general moral depravity, listing the sins and implications for each. The biblical 
intertextuality thus suggests that Ham’s transgression against Noah had to have been assertive, 
																																																						
67 Via Bergsma and Hahn: “One of the more thorough defenses of this position is by Robert Gagnon in 
his recently published The Bible and Homosexual Practice, but other proponents include Anthony 
Phillips, Devorah Steinmetz, Martti Nissinen, Donald J. Wold, Seth Daniel Kunin, and O. Palmer 
Robertson. 
68 From Alter’s The Five Books of Moses: “It is noteworthy that the Hebrews associated the Canaanites 
with lasciviousness (see, for example, the rape Dinah, Genesis 34). Lot’s daughters, of course, take 
advantage of his drunkenness to have sex with him” (52-53). 
69 The King James version of Leviticus 20:17: “And if a man shall take his sister, his father's daughter, or 
his mother's daughter, and see her nakedness, and she see his nakedness; it is a wicked thing; and they 
shall be cut off in the sight of their people: he hath uncovered his sister's nakedness; he shall bear his 
iniquity.” 
70 From Dylan Evans’s An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis: “Lacan seperates the 
gaze with the act of looking; the gaze becomes the object of the act of looking, or, to be more precise, the 
object of the scopic drive. The gaze is therefore no longer on the side of the subject; it is the gaze of the 
other” (73). 
71 From Evans’s An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis: “The little other is the other 
who is not really other, but a reflection and projection of the Ego. He is simultaneously the counterpart 
and the specular image” (135). 
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deliberate, and gravely offensive. Noah knows as soon as he wakes from his drunken stupor 
“what his youngest son had done to him” (52), without first conferring with his other sons, to 
whom Ham has already admitted his crimes. Noah’s certainty suggests that he has been violated, 
that he knows what his son has done because he can feel it. This theory is enticing, but as 
Borgsma and Hahn prove, there is no intertextual precedent for a usurping son committing 
paternal rape. What is more, this theory does not account for Canaan’s punishment in place of his 
father.  
The critics thus provide a fourth, related theory: Ham has indeed committed incest, but 
with his father’s wife, and not with Noah himself. Their theory rests on an alternate reading of 
the phrase “the nakedness of your father,” as they demonstrate that all other relevant texts use “to 
uncover nakedness” in the context of heterosexual intercourse.72 Moreover, the critics 
demonstrate that there is much more textual support for heterosexual incest than there is for 
homosexual incest.73 Referring again to Leviticus, they show that “the nakedness of the father” 
therefore refers to “the nakedness of the mother”: 
No man of you shall come near any of his own flesh to lay bare nakedness. I am the Lord. 
Your father’s nakedness, which is your mother’s nakedness, you shall not lay bare. She is 
your mother; you shall not lay bare her nakedness. The nakedness of your father’s wife 
you shall not lay bare. It is your father’s nakedness. (The Five Books of Moses, Lev. 18:6-
9)   
																																																						
72 “Likewise, Lev. 18:14, 16; 20:11, 30, 21 all describe a woman's nakedness as the nakedness of her 
husband. The same logic is at work in Deut. 23:1 and 27:20, which describe intercourse with one's father's 
wife as "uncovering the father's skirt"” (34).  
73 From Borgsma and Hahn: “Thus, Nissinen and Gagnon maybe correct in viewing Ham's transgressive 
sexual act as an attempt to usurp Noah's patriarchal authority. However, they identify Ham's act as the 
violation of Noah himself, and there is no precedent in biblical or ancient Near Eastern documents for 
paternal rape as a means of usurping a father's position” (37). 
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Ham’s crimes are thus intrusion, theft of private property, and dishonouring his father. The rape 
of his father’s wife, if indeed he raped her, is a tertiary concern. As Alter writes, “in the 
patriarchal order her sexuality “belongs” to him—she is taboo” (621). As such, mother-son 
incest is considered a much more heinous crime than, for example, father-daughter incest 
because it is viewed as an attempt to supplant the father’s authority,74 particularly if the son 
succeeds in impregnating his mother. This fourth theory also accounts for why Noah curses 
Canaan instead of Ham, the child presumably the product of a forbidden union. Bergsma and 
Hahn’s premise is quite compelling, particularly when compared against the three more popular 
theories, but the true nature of Ham’s transgression remains ultimately unknowable, and it is 
unknowable because it is unsayable. The act of moral depravity is so egregious, so morally 
corrupt, that the details of the transgression are omitted from the text by the narrator.  
Which returns us to the kid, whose folk are known for hewers of woods and drawers of 
water. The narrator’s allusion to Joshua 9:13 reveals that the protagonist’s parents, at best, or his 
entire family, at worst, have been in some capacity scorned by their community. Though his 
father has in truth been a schoolmaster, he is looked down upon for some unnamed offence, 
whether it be a transgression of his own or one he has inherited. As for the kid’s mother, the 
narrator informs us that she died in childbirth, leaving the nurturing of her son entirely to his 
drunkard father: “The mother dead these fourteen years did incubate in her own bosom the 
creature who would carry her off. The father never speaks her name, the child does not know it. 
He has a sister in this world he will not see again” (3). The father is silent on the subject of the 
kid’s mother and instead quotes from poets as he lies in drink by the scullery fire. Whether he is 
																																																						
74 From Borgsma and Hahn: “Intercourse between father and daughter, while certainly transgressive, was 
less serious in ancient Near Eastern and Israelite society than intercourse between son and (step-)mother. 
Although both were forbidden (Lev. 18:7-8, 17), intercourse between son and (step-) mother openly 
threatened the patriarchal authority structure of the family or clan” (37). 
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drunk on Noah’s wine or some other spirit, we do not know, but the narrator’s reference to a 
sister immediately following that to the kid’s parents raises some suspicion, particularly in light 
of the examined allusion to the curse of Canaan. I thus put forward that the kid is the fruit of 
some incestuous union and that his estranged sister is in fact his mother, the story of her death 
fabricated to mitigate the dissemination of the unspeakable truth. We know that there is very 
little interaction between father and son based on, first, the father’s silence on the topic of the 
kid’s mother, and second, on the fact that though he has been a schoolmaster and can recite 
poetry from memory, he has not taken the time to teach his son how to read or to write: “He can 
neither read nor write and in him broods already a taste for mindless violence” (3). The feral 
mongrel, nameless like his mother, has been completely neglected by his father, the latter’s 
silence, I believe, suggesting some measure of shame, and, moreover, his disregard for his child 
exhibiting contempt. The kid thus carries with him not only a taste for mindless violence, but the 
curse of Canaan as well, the combination of which contribute to his unceremonious demise. 
The kid’s violent death by the hands of the judge is further foreshadowed in the lone line 
of dialogue attributed to his father, which describes the meteor shower that occurred on the night 
he was born: “Night of your birth. Thirty-three. The Leonids they were called. God how the stars 
did fall. I looked for blackness, holes in the heavens. The Dipper stove” (BM 3). Andrew Keller 
Estes writes, in Cormac McCarthy and the Writing of American Spaces, that this meteor shower 
was the most important astronomical event of the nineteenth century, and that those who 
watched it, particularly those who lived in the western United States where an understanding of 
astronomy was uncommon, believed it to be a sign of the end of times. Estes notes that we must 
pay mind to McCarthy's grammar, where stove, as the past participle of to stave, and when used 
intransitively meaning to break something by forcing it inward or piercing it roughly, suggests 
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that the constellation imploded, implying that “the objects which give meaning and directions to 
people's lives are breaking down” (123). Though the kid will later, after running away from 
home, use the Pleiades and Great Bear to navigate his way through the “terra damnata of 
smoking slag” (BM 61), his life will not amount to much more than a series of semi-random 
wanderings and violent happenstance. He will join Captain White’s militia and then the Glanton 
gang, not to fulfil some ideological purpose, or to accumulate capital, but to satisfy “the taste for 
mindless violence” (BM 3) that broods within him. Yet, as mindless as the kid’s meanderings 
may at times seem, they are never, as Brian Evenson notes in “Embodying Violence: The Case 
of Cormac McCarthy,” completely immaterial. “Instead,” adds Evenson, “we have a sort of 
perforated or haunted reality, with the fantastic and the hellish periodically breaking through” 
(140). Evenson’s point is that, as grotesque as the world of Blood Meridian becomes over the 
course of the narrative, it never devolves to being unrealistic. In fact, quite the opposite is true: 
those elements of the novel that seem most fantastic and hellish are indeed, as I argued above, 
wrought from reality, whether through the finely researched history of the frontier, or of the 
freshly witnessed American war in Vietnam. The mimesis of the violence described is thus too 
pointed for the casual reader, which is why, I believe, so many are haunted by the brutality 
portrayed in novel — they are haunted not strictly by the portrayals of violence, but by the 
violence of history.  
Consequently, I contend that the sublime horror of the meteor shower that heralds the 
kid’s coming into the world continues to navigate him up until his final confrontation with the 
judge. The disintegration of meaning that is implied by the reference to the Leonids on the first 
page of the novel is echoed in the final chapter by the setting of Fort Griffin. Originally a 
Cavalry outpost, the fort converted into a lawless refuge and hunting complex, serving as a point 
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of departure for western expeditions and a rest stop for buffalo hunters.75 Moreover, King notes 
in Cormac McCarthy’s Literary Evolution that the fort was also notoriously violent, the murder 
scene of thirty men in April of 1877 alone, a year or so before the kid, now the man, arrives to 
meet his own death (86). McCarthy’s decision to conclude the narrative at Fort Griffin is thus 
highly calculated, and it reveals the depth of his historical research for the novel. As King 
indicates, the fort would close in May of 1881, outlasting the kid by only three years, and so the 
protagonist’s denouement is inextricably linked “with the end of the buffalo trade and the end of 
the initial phase of western expansion” (87). Aggressive, industrial bison hunting76 has 
swallowed up the north Texas plains leaving little but dust and bones. Likewise is the kid, at last, 
swallowed up himself, his violent delights meeting violent ends.77 After a brief, embarrassing 
encounter with a prostitute, he confers a final time with the sky: 
Stars were falling across the sky myriad and random, speeding along brief vectors from 
their origins in night to their destinies in dust and nothingness. […] He stood outside 
listening to the voices fading away and he looked again at the silent tracks of the stars 
where they died over the darkened hills. (333) 
These repeated conferences with the sky recall Wordsworth’s “My heart leaps up,” which is 
quoted on the first page of the novel before the kid runs away from home: “All history present in 
																																																						
75 See Geoff Cunfer and Bill Waiser’s Bison and People on the North American Great Plains (2016). 
76 From Cunfer & Waiser: “From Fort Griffin 1,500 hunters and skinners moved onto the Texas plains in 
search of bison over the winter of 1876/77. They usually worked in teams of one sharpshooter and four to 
eight skinners. Hunting on foot and firing from a considerable distance, the sharpshooter could often kill 
dozens of bison in a morning before stampeding the herd. Skinners drove wagons to the kill site and 
stripped off the hides, leaving carcasses to scavengers and decay. Teams stayed out for months at a time, 
and there were scores of teams on the Texas plains that winter. A typical party might take two thousand, 
three thousand, or even four thousand hides over a few months. Middlemen drove wagons from camp to 
camp, buying fresh hides from the hunters as soon as they were available; prices ranged that year between 
$1.00 and $1.25 per hide collected in the field” (21-22). 
77 From Romeo & Juliette, Act 2, Scene 6. 
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that visage, the child the father of the man” (3). In “My Heart Leaps up”, the speaker feels an 
affinity with rainbows rather than with the stars, feeling the same sublime exhilaration every time 
he looks up to the sky and sees one: 
My heart leaps up when I behold  
   A rainbow in the sky: 
So was it when my life began;  
So is it now I am a man;  
So be it when I shall grow old,  
   Or let me die! 
The Child is father of the Man; 
And I could wish my days to be 
Bound each to each by natural piety. (1807)78 
 
This arresting, penultimate image of the kid looking up to the stars before his death, all history 
present in his visage, harks back to the meteor shower on the night of his birth. Yet, while the sky 
over Fort Griffin is much calmer than it was on that tumultuous night in 1833, the kid’s death 
will be as violent as his conception, the staved stars replaced with the immense and terrible flesh 
of the judge. As it was when the kid’s life began, so will it end: violent and terrifying and 
obscene. Or so, at least, must we assume since the narrator does not recount the kid’s encounter 
with the naked smiling judge. 
 I argue that the narrative absence — or rather, the explicit unnarration — of the kid’s 
demise in the jakes echoes Ham’s unspoken transgression in Genesis. We know, based on the 
strong reactions of other characters, that something terrible has transpired, but we do not know 
what exactly:  
Is someone in there? The first man said. 
 
The man who was relieving himself did not look up. I wouldn’t go in there if I 
were you, he said. 
																																																						
78 Accessed on the web at: https://www.poets.org/poetsorg/poem/my-heart-leaps 
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Is there somebody in there? 
I wouldn’t go in. 
He hitched himself up and buttoned his trousers and stepped past them and went 
up the walk toward the lights. The first man watched him go and then opened the door of 
the jakes. 
Good God almighty, he said. 
What is it? 
He didn’t answer. He stepped past the other and went back up the walk. The other 
man stood looking after him. Then he opened the door and looked in. (BM 334) 
The horrific violence the judge commits upon the kid, now the man, remains unspecified, 
undocumented, unnarrated, unrepresented, and so the reader is beckoned to fill the void with the 
scant textual evidence provided. The only traces of the judge’s action are the warning from the 
first man relieving himself not to enter the jakes and the reaction from the second man after he 
ignores the advice of the first. The common assumption is that the kid has been murdered, but, as 
Patrick W. Shaw convincingly argues in his essay “The kid’s Fate, the Judge’s Guilt: 
Ramifications of Closure in Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian,” there is sufficient evidence 
throughout the novel to suggest that the judge has sexually assaulted the kid: “Significant 
economic, social, and psychoerotic motifs in the narrative are clarified as a result of an act which 
for the kid is a fate fare worse than death” (103). To begin, the frontiersmen who fall upon the 
scene in the jakes would certainly not have been offended by any scene of murder, given the 
quotidian nature of the violence committed on the plains they travel as well as in the saloons and 
brothels they frequent. Secondly, the judge has exhibited his predilection for pedophilia 
throughout the novel, beginning with his introduction in the revival tent in Nacogdoches where 
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he projects his crimes onto the Reverend Green by falsely accusing him of violating an eleven-
year-old girl. The judge goes on to sexually assault and then murder several children throughout 
the novel, including, the narrative suggests in chapter 19, the idiot James Robert whom he saves 
from drowning only to perform some grotesque baptism whereby the idiot is reborn as his carnal 
companion: 
When they entered the judge’s quarters they found the idiot and a girl of perhaps twelve 
years cowering naked on the floor. Behind them also naked stood the judge. […] The 
idiot, who reached just to his waist, stuck close to his side, and together they entered the 
wood at the base of the hill and disappeared from sight. (275)  
Though the protagonist is a middle-aged adult by the time he reacquaints himself with the judge, 
his designation as “the kid” throughout the novel, combined with the apparent agelessness of his 
attacker who should be an elderly man at this point of the novel’s temporal structure, suggests a 
pedophilic inflection to their violent encounter in the jakes. Moreover, the filial quality of the 
kid’s strange rapport with the judge is evoked a final time when they meet in the Griffin saloon 
shortly before his death: “Do you believe it’s all over, son?” (327). Just as the novel begins with 
the kid rejecting and escaping his father, so does it end with his humiliation and annihilation at 
the hands of a father figure who is far more terrible than a negligent schoolmaster who “lies in 
drink” (3). The inferred sexual assault in the jakes is thus not only a physical transgression, but a 
moral transgression insofar as it is an incestuous act of pseudo-pedophilia. What is more, as 
Shaw deftly outlines, a number of scenes in the novel establish homosexuality not only as an 
affront, but as the ultimate transgression against the hyper-masculinity of life on the frontier. 
Recall that the kid opts for his chances in the San Diego prison rather than let the judge touch 
him, the latter having just told him, “Dont you know that I’d have loved you like a son?” (306, 
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307). The kid’s “devotion to the male code” (Shaw 111) is further emphasized a few pages later 
when he beats a man senseless for having mistaken him “for a male whore” (BM 311). Thus, the 
humiliation that is witnessed by the men in the jakes is not the judge’s taking of the kid’s life, but 
his taking of the kid’s masculinity. As Shaw writes, in the hyper-masculine culture of the 
frontier, “public homoeroticism is untenable and it is this sudden revelation that horrifies the 
observes at Griffin. No other act could offend their masculine sensibilities so throroughly as to 
cause the shock they display” (117-118). 
Shaw notes that as with Greek tragedy, McCarthy charges the reader with imagining the 
omitted details of the judge’s sexual assaults throughout the novel. “Even in a text otherwise 
replete with the rhetoric of carnage,” the critic writes, “such acts are horrible beyond words” 
(109). These narrative omissions thus provide precedent for McCarthy’s choice to make opaque 
the demise of the novel’s protagonist, the kid. What is more, I argue, following the work of 
narratologist Gerald Prince in “The Disnarrated,” that the ineffable nature of the kid’s death calls 
upon the use of two related narrative techniques: on the one hand, the scene is unnarratable, that 
is, “that which, according to a given narrative, cannot be narrated or is not worth narrating either 
because it transgresses a law (social, authorial, generic, formal) or because it defies the powers of 
a particular narrator (or those of any narrator) or because it falls below the so-called threshold of 
narratability” (1), while on the other, it is unnarrated, by which is meant the scene is omitted 
“because of some narrative call for rhythm, characterization, suspense, surprise, and so on” 
(Prince 2). Thus, whatever takes place in the jakes is simultaneously unnarratable and unnarrated 
— that is, the judge’s act is unnarratable insofar as it is an intertextual echo of Ham’s 
transgression which was so obscene it could not be fully repeated, as well as unnarrated insofar 
as its omission is a choice made by the narrator for the purpose of rhythm, characterization, and 
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suspense. The kid’s death is an ellipse in the narrative that is “explicitly underlined by the 
narrator or inferable from a significant lacuna in the chronology or through a retrospective 
filling-in” (Prince 2). I argue that McCarthy’s allusions to the Old Testament curses in his 
description of the protagonist’s kin as having been “known for hewers of wood and drawers of 
water” (3) provides this very retrospective filling-in at the beginning of the novel to suggest that 
the kid descends from a disgraced lineage, and as such, is disavowed from the possibility of 
grace. Try as he might to change the nature of his ways, whether by showing mercy to David 
Brown by helping him to remove the arrow from his leg, or by disobeying Glanton’s orders and 
sparing Dick Shelby’s life, or, finally, by declining to kill the judge when he has the chance, the 
kid’s fate has been sealed since his conception and thus any gestures towards redemption are 
futile.  
This redemptive impasse is further foreshadowed in the penultimate chapter when the kid 
attempts to rescue an old woman whom he finds crouched among a group of slaughtered 
travelers:  
He made his way among the corpses and stood before her. She was very old and her face 
was gray and leathery and sand had collected in the folds of her clothing. She did not 
look up. The shawl that covered her head was much faded of its color yet it bore like a 
patent woven into the fabric the figures of stars and quartermoons and other insignia of a 
provenance unknown to him. He spoke to her in a low voice. He told her that he was an 
American and that he was a long way from the country of his birth and that he had no 
family and that he had traveled much and seen many things and had been at war and 
endured hardships. He told her that he would convey her to a safe place, some party of 
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her countrypeople who would welcome her and that she should join them for the could 
not leave her in this place or she would surely die. (BM 315) 
I have quoted this passage at length because it is replete with details that forewarn the futility of 
the kid’s attempt to repudiate the taste for mindless violence that he has spent much of his life 
trying to satisfy. To begin, the pattern of stars on the woman’s shawl bespeaks the sky’s import 
to the kid’s existence, as discussed above. Yet, while he has used the firmament all his life to 
navigate his mindless meanderings, the stars he sees in the shawl are “of a provenance unknown 
to him,” and so he loses himself in his soliloquy, oblivious to his audience’s ghastly plight. 
Secondly, the sacramental nature of the kid’s interaction with the old woman signals a juncture 
in both his life and the text. In terms of the novel’s temporal structure, the chapter immediately 
following the kid’s conference with the old woman is set roughly thirty years later, and so their 
encounter serves as a conclusion to the narrative’s main action. The narrative juncture serves 
also as a turning point in the kid’s life, or, more accurately, as the possibility of a new path that, 
as the reader discovers a few pages later when he shoots dead the fifteen-year-old Elrod, is not 
available to him, try as he might to cleanse himself of his sins when he reveals them to the old 
woman. Given that his interaction with her is filtered through the narrator, the reader is not privy 
to the details of his confession, but the details, I argue, are secondary to the act of confession 
itself, since it is the very act that is revelatory. At no other point in the novel is he as forthcoming 
with another character, yet to this strange woman he manifests his inner personality without 
provocation, telling her not only about his home and his family, but about the horrors of war that 
he has both endured and committed. The kid’s efforts are for naught, however, since his 
confidant turns out to be but the shell of a woman who has been “dead in that place for years” 
(BM 315), and so his confessions are but the soliloquy of a forsaken wanderer. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explore how McCarthy employs the combination of descriptions and 
omissions of violence in Blood Meridian to produce a text that bears witness to the history of 
American imperialism. To this end, I have applied Slavoj Žižek’s typology of violence as 
outlined in his book Violence: Six Sideways Reflections to argue that though the novel is replete 
with vivid depictions of subjective violence, that is, a violent act committed by one identifiable 
subject upon another, the true horror with which McCarthy reckons is the objective-systemic 
violence that fosters the individual outbreaks of brutality, i.e. warfare, aggressive territorial 
expansion, and state-sanctioned genocide. In Lacanian terms, individual incidents of violence are 
but the ‘points de capitons’ of a systemic violence which is the latent ‘everywhere’ of the Real.  
I have also argued that the novel’s excessive descriptions of violence are juxtaposed with 
an absence of description insofar as the relentless representations of war and gratuitous murder 
throughout the narrative culminate in the unnarrated death of the protagonist. McCarthy’s 
omission of the kid’s murder thus serves two functions: in the first place, the absence of details 
within the context of a novel that is otherwise unsparing in its description of brutality suggests 
that the nature of the kid’s death is too horrific to repeat. As I have shown, this narrative absence 
is foreshadowed by McCarthy’s allusion to the curse of Canaan, by proxy of a reference to 
Joshua 9:13, as Ham’s transgression against Noah is likewise too terrible to describe, indeed 
remaining a mystery to scriptural scholars. Moreover, the allusion to the curse indicates that the 
kid is himself damned, which thereby disrupts the possibility of his being offered a moment of 
grace.  
The second function of the narrative omission of the kid’s death is to prevent readers 
from witnessing the culmination of the protagonist’s dramatic arc, thereby obstructing the 
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potential for catharsis and forcing a more active engagement with the atrocities portrayed in the 
text. As Joyce Carol Oates suggests in her collection of essay In Rough Country, the writer’s 
imposition upon the reader to bear witness to the violence described in the novel recalls the 
purpose of Bertolt Brecht’s Epic Theatre which is to prohibit the members of the audience from 
suspending their disbelief so that they are forced to contend with the gravity of the subject matter 
being dramatized. Thus, to omit the kid’s death from the narrative is to withhold the punishment 
he has earned through his complicity in all the violence committed by the Glanton gang, and to 
withhold his punishment is to disrupt the reader’s potential cathartic release. The interruption of 
the reader’s moment of catharsis, I conclude, is meant to mirror the interruption of the 
protagonist’s epiphanic moment of grace. Thus, just as the kid’s narrative role is to bear witness 
to the violence perpetrated on the frontier, so must the reader bear witness to the violence 
enacted in the name of American imperialism.  
Harold Bloom might say that the kid, following a traditional theme of American 
literature,79 is an Oresteian anti-hero80 who is in flight from the consequences of his 
transgressions, and “in search of his identity in the universe” (Sin and Redemption 299). Farrell 
O’Gorman, as I outlined in the introduction, suggests that this identity is that of prophet, but that 
the kid ultimately fails to achieve his prophetic function. As I have shown, however, the kid is in 
																																																						
79 “The image of the anti-heroic Orestes,” Bloom writes, “seems always to have been present in the 
transgression-conscious American literature. It is a clear motif in works such as The Scarlet Letter, Billy 
Budd, and Moby Dick as well as in William Faulkner’s Euripidean studies of the mythical South. The 
Oresteian myth is a more subtly defined element of interpretation in the work of other Americans: in that 
of Walt Whitman, Robert Frost, T. S. Eliot, Emily Dickinson, and Edna St. Vincent Millay. In the works 
of all of these writers there appears the contour of the guilty protagonist, man in exile, in flight from his 
own transgression. D. H. Lawrence has commented that the study of guilt—the residue of the Puritan 
heritage—is one of the most persistent themes in American literature” (Sin and Redemption 303-304). 
80 As opposed to the Aristotelian anti-hero who is traditionally morally grounded and experiences an 
unlucky change of fortune, thus eliciting pity from the reader.  
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flight from much more than the consequences of his transgressions, and, moreover, his flight is a 

































































“I believe that it’s perfectly 
 possible to run a course of academic degrees in English and to emerge  
a seemingly respectable Ph.D. and still not know how to read fiction.”  
 









Like much American writing of the first half of the twentieth century, the texts of Flannery 
O’Connor and Cormac McCarthy convey the schizophrenic break in American literature 
between the self-affirming positivity of the transcendentalists and the failing vision of 
perfectibility that germinates in late work of Nathanial Hawthorne and then blooms with 
modernism. Both writers portray this break, as I have shown, through the use of a poetics of 
violence, typically labelled as the Southern grotesque, to represent the least flattering aspects of 
the human experience. The characters they describe are selfish, judgmental, and violent, and the 
narratives they construct are almost always shocking, if not tragic. Moreover, their texts are not 
immediately accessible to most readers and so demand patience and discipline: to engage in a 
productive reading of their narrative poetics requires a high tolerance for the appalling and a 
taste for the tragi-comic. As O’Connor writes, “[there] is no room for abstract expressions of 
compassion or piety or morality” in writing and so “the writer’s moral sense must coincide with 
his dramatic sense, and this makes the presentation of fiction to the student, and particularly to 
the immature student, very difficult indeed” (MM 124-125).  
Part of this difficulty lies in O’Connor’s depiction of the delayed epiphanies of her 
characters, which usually result in violent death. Her texts demonstrate that the epiphanic 
moments that derive from the presence of grace typically come at a considerable cost insofar as 
grace is the bestowal of God's blessing of which we are undeserving: “And if by grace, then is it 
no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more 
grace: otherwise work is no more work” (King James Bible, Rom. 11:6). Grace is therefore not a 
reward—the grace that we would receive is far more than what could ever have earned. 
Conversely, McCarthy’s texts, offer no such consolation as the violence he depicts is devoid of 
mystery and grace—in other words, it is Christless.  
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The Violence of Bearing Witness begins with an examination of the O’Connor texts that 
engage with the topic of racial divide in the United States, specifically the titular text of her 
posthumous collection Everything That Rises Must Converge, and “Judgment Day.” As I have 
shown, these late works establish a turn in her portrayal of Black characters as they move from 
being the mostly passive bystanders of her earlier work, to performing the prophetic function of 
characters like Mary Grace in “Revelation,” or even the Misfit from “A Good Man is Hard to 
Find.” Moreover, I demonstrate that while these two stories represent a shift in O’Connor’s 
writing toward a more mature, more nuanced portrayal of the plight of Black Americans in the 
mid 20th century, Blacks and whites are only equal insofar as they are equally prone to the same 
emotional and sometimes violent transgressions as the white protagonists. Carver’s mother, 
Coleman, and the angry actor neighbour are thus all permitted their transgressions the same as 
Mrs. Chestny, Julian, or Tanner. More significantly, however, Carver’s mother and the angry 
actor neighbour are O’Connor’s first (and only) Black prophets insofar as they bear witness to 
the actions of their respective text’s protagonists and return them, through violent means, to 
reality.    
“Judgment Day” is central to my analysis of O’Connor’s narrative poetics as it belongs to 
a group of texts that I have termed The Geranium Variations, and which I argue are sign-posts 
for her artistic development. I thus demonstrate that the variations provide evidence of the 
writer’s artistic evolution as the same basic set of characters and circumstances are written and 
re-written over the course of twenty years, from the germ of “The Geranium” in her master’s 
thesis, to the final drafts that she continued to edit while on her death-bed. Though Karl-Heinz 
Westarp’s Flannery O’Connor: Growing Craft was an indispensable resource for my analysis of 
the variations, I believe my findings have contributed to the field of O’Connor studies by 
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exploring the development of the Black prophet in her late texts. It is indisputable that Black 
characters operate as part of the cultural landscape in her early fiction, but the variations, I 
demonstrate, reveal O’Connor’s efforts to remedy these superficial portrayals by complicating 
the interactions between her white and Black characters. 
My study of Blood Meridian begins with an acknowledgment of the novel’s use of the 
epic form and demonstrates that the poetic gestures towards this traditional mode imbues the 
narrative with the authority of a foundational myth. The national and cultural truths revealed 
therein, however, prove to be too horrific to bear as they expose not only the violence of 
aggressive territorial expansion on the frontier in the 19th century, but the brutality of 20th 
century warfare as well. I then use Žižek’s typology of violence to situate the terrible crimes of 
the bounty hunters within the larger context of systemic, state-sanctioned violence. I have sought 
to argue that rather than seek to illicit outrage at the individual moments of violence, or even at 
the agents of chaos themselves, Blood Meridian invites its readers to take a step back and assess 
the world in which the violent acts take place—in other words, to bear witness to a world defined 
by bloodshed and meanness. McCarthy alludes to favouring reflection in a New York Times 
Magazine interview with Richard B. Woodward when he explains his understanding and use of 
violence in his work, in turn expressing a reluctance to trust any idealistic expectations of 
perfectibility: 
There’s no such thing as life without bloodshed. […] I think the notion that the species can 
be improved in some way, that everyone could live in harmony, is a really dangerous idea. 
Those who are afflicted with this notion are the first ones to give up their souls, their 
freedom. Your desire that it be that way will enslave you and make your life vacuous. 
(Woodward) 
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I conclude with a hermeneutic analysis of the intertextual references to the Old Testament 
and investigate the emphasis on punishment in lieu of redemptive grace. Though I am of course 
not the first person to identify McCarthy’s scriptural allusions, I believe that the parallels that I 
draw between, on the one hand, the narrative details of the kid’s life and death, and on the other, 
the tale of the curse of Canaan from the Old Testament, provide a new point of departure for the 
interpretation of Blood Meridian, one that allows for a more sympathetic reading of the kid, 
which in turn makes the narrative absence of his death all the more tragic. 
* 
After having filled so many pages with a close study of brutality and depravity, meanness and 
self-indulgence, failed prophets and prophets gone wrong, I wish to conclude on a more positive, 
hopeful (or, at the very least, less violent) note by calling upon one of the great American 
prophets of the twentieth century: James Baldwin. In his introduction to James Baldwin, Harold 
Bloom writes that Baldwin, whom he deems a reluctant prophet, “is of the authentic lineage of 
Jeremiah, most inward of prophets" insofar as he "opposes [what] might be called, in Jeremiah's 
language, the injustice of outwardness, which means that Baldwin always must protest, even in 
the rather unlikely event that his country ever were to turn from selfishness and cruelty to justice 
and compassion" (1-2). Thus, while Baldwin disclaims in his texts many of the same societal ills 
dramatized, to varying degrees, by Flannery O'Connor and Cormac McCarthy in their works, his 
attempts to redeem our humanity (or to return us to reality, as O'Connor would say) are 
communed with love rather than portrayed through O'Connor's violent Christ or McCarthy's 
Christ-less violence.  
Yet, Bloom insists that Baldwin's moral appeal is post-Christian and that his "prophetic 
stance is not so much religious as aesthetic" (3). Though he performs the role of prophet, he 
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speaks not for God, but in the name of humanity. Christopher Z. Hobson echoes this sentiment in 
James Baldwin and the Heavenly City, noting that Baldwin's religious references are "a matter of 
literary expression, not creed" (5), and that he practices a "nontheist 'theological interpretation' 
toward both general Christian beliefs and African American prophetic traditions, appropriating 
but also reshaping them" (7). Post-Christian though his prophecy may be, Baldwin nevertheless 
follows in the tradition of the American jeremiad insofar as his prophetic message contains both 
threat and possibility—that is, the threat of self-destruction and the possibility of redemption. 
But, as Mel Watkins writes in his essay entitled "The Fire Next Time This Time," "[instead] of 
redemption in the eyes of God, [Baldwin] is concerned with redemption in the eyes of man. God 
is replaced by morality and love. His message is finally as basic as it is undeniable: if we do not 
love one another, we will destroy one another" (182).  
Love is essential to Baldwin's prophetic task as it is only through love that one can strive 
to become a truly moral human being. "If the concept of God has any validity or use," he writes 
in The Fire Next Time, "it can only be to make us larger, freer, and more loving" (61). Otherwise, 
he concludes, we must dispense of Him. Moreover, he contends that we must not simply hope 
that is it possible to become truly moral human beings, but that we must "believe that it is 
possible" (61), his faith in love thus supplanting his faith in the grace of an all-powerful deity. It 
is important to note that Baldwin's use of the word "love" refers not to the personal exchange of 
attachment or affection, but rather, signals "a state of being, or a state of grace—not in the 
infantile American sense of being made happy but in the tough and universal sense of quest and 
daring and growth" (109).  
Yet, despite Baldwin’s faith in the grace of love, and in the possibility of morality, his 
jeremiad nevertheless employs a rhetoric of anxiety and impeding crisis so to emphasize the 
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unfulfillment of the errand at hand. “What will happen to all that beauty?” he asks in the closing 
pages of The Fire Next Time as he considers God’s—or Allah’s—vengeance. “[When] that 
vengeance [is] achieved, What will happen to all that beauty then?” (119). It is a question well 
worth considering, for, as O’Connor and McCarthy have shown us, a world deprived of such 
beauty, and indeed a world deprived of love, is one that is occupied by prophets failed and 
prophets gone wrong; a world where misfits and marauders deal in terrible violence, redemptive 
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